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ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND
EXCHANGE RATES
Cesar Martin Rodriguez Mosquera, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2009
This dissertation analyzes how the degree of nancial integration and the exchange rate
regime of a country a¤ect its economic growth. The discussion is focused on developing
countries, with special emphasis on Latin America, and it contributes to the recent economic
growth and development literatures. The rst paper analyzes how scal policy and credit
constraints a¤ect the impact of macroeconomic volatility on long-run growth. A tractable
theoretical model is examined where agents engage in two types of investment: a short-run
investment in physical capital and a long-run investment in R&D. The main implication is
that in countries with lower degree of nancial development, countercyclical scal policy is
particularly important in reducing the negative consequences of adverse aggregate shocks
on rmslong-run investments. The empirical analysis conrms the theoretical predictions
from the model.
The second paper examines the relationship between exchange rate regimes, the degree
of international nancial integration and economic growth. The main implication of the
theoretical model is that a more exible exchange rate can reduce average growth, especially
in countries with low level of domestic nancial development and low degrees of international
nancial integration. The empirical analysis conrms the predictions from the model. This
paper has policy implications, since it suggests that the exchange rate regime needs to be
considered in the light of the development of domestic credit markets and the degree of
international nancial integration of a country.
The third paper examines the political economy of exchange rate policy in Latin America
iii
by analyzing a model in which special interest groups and policymakers interact to determine
the exchange rate regime and its level. The main implication is that the optimal exchange
rate is determined by economic parameters, the distribution of special interest groups in
the economy, and their capacity to inuence policymakers. The empirical analysis for Latin
America for the period 1975-2006 conrms the predictions of the model, and establishes that
political economy factors have played a role in shaping exchange rate policy; both its regime
and its level.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines how the degree of nancial integration and the exchange rate
regime of a country a¤ect its economic growth. The discussion is focused on developing
countries, with special emphasis on Latin America, and it contributes to the recent eco-
nomic growth and development literatures. In particular, the aim is to identify under what
conditions higher growth rates can be predicted when countries adopt scal policies over the
business cycle and are constrained by their degree of international nancial integration with
the rest of the world. Eventually, the analysis also concentrates on the political economy of
exchange rate policy in the context of nancially integrated economies.
The rst paper, "Financial Development, Fiscal Policy and Volatility: Their E¤ects on
Growth", studies the business cycle properties of an endogenous growth model in which
rms face credit constraints and the government implements scal policy. The rationale
is that if rms could always borrow enough funds to either reorganize their activities or
move to new activities, then the best would be to recommend that governments do not
intervene over the business cycle. However, this is not the case when rms face credit market
imperfections that prevent them from innovating. The rst part of this paper, analyzes a
tractable (Schumpeterian) endogenous growth model generalizing Aghion et al. (2005) by
allowing for governmental scal policy over the business cycle. The main hypothesis is that
countries with low nancial development perform countercyclical scal policy when facing a
shock, that is, when facing volatility.
In the second part, this paper tests the main hypothesis by considering an empirical
analysis of Latin American countries for the period 1960-2000. Both the model and the em-
pirics suggest that more countercyclical scal policy makes growth less sensitive to volatility
for incomplete credit markets. Furthermore, less procyclical scal policies in less nancially
1
developed countries can have a positive e¤ect on growth.
The second paper, "The Growth E¤ects of International Financial Integration and Ex-
change Rates: Theory and Empirics", joins two broad areas of international nance and
growth. It argues that a countrys level of international nancial integration ought to be
central in choosing the degree of exibility of an exchange rate system; particularly, if the
objective is long run growth. The rst part of this paper develops a stylized open monetary
economy model with wage stickiness, where exchange rate uctuations a¤ect the growth
performance of credit constrained rms generalizing Aghion et al. (2006) by allowing for
international nancial markets. In other words, rms are able to borrow not only from the
domestic credit market but also from foreign lenders. Still, the existence of credit constraints
hinders the provision of domestic and foreign credit. The basic mechanism underlying the
positive growth interaction between the degree of international nancial integration and
exchange rate exibility is a balance sheet e¤ect. The main implication is that the more
nancially integrated to the international capital ows a country is, the better it will do
with a more exible exchange rate.
In the second part of this paper, the main theoretical prediction is tested by conducting
a systematic panel data analysis with 85 countries over the years 1960-2000. The ndings
support the hypothesis that a high degree of exchange rate exibility leads to lower growth
in countries with less degree of integration with the international nancial markets. The
implications of this paper are important from a policy perspective, since they indicate that
the exchange rate regime needs to be considered in the light of the development of domestic
credit markets and the degree of international nancial integration of a country.
The third paper, "The Political Economy of Exchange Rates in Latin America", analyzes
the nature of the process that determines exchange rate policy in Latin America. The liter-
ature on the appropriate currency policy is vast but unlike the case of trade or scal policy,
there is no simple welfare benchmark. The debates typically involve di¤erent weightings of
the trade-o¤s associated with the exchange rate policy choices. In the rst part of the paper,
a theoretical stylized model discusses how the political economy of exchange rate policy is
driven. The political game follows a simplied version of Barons (1994) and Perssons (1998)
and models the interaction between special interest groups and policymakers and eventually
2
how this translates to pressures on the size of the change of the exchange rate. Since eco-
nomic structure is crucial for dening potential actors, the focus is on the share and type of
tradable goods produced in an economy and how important they are for dening preferences
and strategies for special interest groups.
In the second part of this paper, an empirical exercise is conducted by analyzing the
determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime and level in Latin America, placing special
emphasis on political, institutional and interest-group explanations. The data suggest that
political economy factors play a role in shaping exchange rate policy. In particular, special
interests appear to a¤ect currency policy, especially as the tradable goods sectors promote
more exible exchange rate regimes to maintain the competitiveness of their products.
3
2.0 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, FISCAL POLICY AND VOLATILITY:
THEIR EFFECTS ON GROWTH
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The relationship between macroeconomic volatility and economic growth is an old and im-
portant issue, both from a theoretical and an empirical standpoint. Specically, two key
questions matter: what are the determinants of economic growth and if volatility is one of
them, how does this a¤ect business cycles and welfare. Still, it is only recently that empiri-
cal and theoretical attempts have been made to analyze the relationship between volatility
and growth in more depth. Starting with the seminal paper by Ramey and Ramey (1995)
authors like Martin and Rogers (2000), Fatas (2002), Blattman et al. (2007), Hnatkovska
and Loayza (2004) and Koren and Tenreyro (2004) nd a negative relation between volatil-
ity and growth in cross-country data. Among others, Aghion et al. (2004 and 2005) and
Turnovsky and Chattopadhyay (2003) have emphasized the e¤ect of volatility on growth
among countries with di¤erent levels of nancial development. In particular, only recently,
Aghion and Marinescu (2007) analyze the e¤ects of countercyclical budgetary policies on
growth for OECD countries. However, the role of governmental scal policy has not yet
been analyzed in the context of an endogenous growth model where rms face volatility
shocks and credit constraints.
The objective of this paper is to study the business cycle properties of an endogenous
growth model in which rms face credit constraints and the government implements scal
policy. The rationale is that if rms could always borrow enough funds to either reorganize
their activities or move to new activities, then the best would be to recommend that govern-
ments do not intervene over the business cycle. However, this is not the case when we have
4
credit market imperfections that prevent rms from innovating. This paper involves two
stages. In the rst stage, a stylized (Schumpeterian) endogenous growth model is discussed
generalizing Aghion et al. (2005) by allowing for governmental scal policy over the business
cycle and focusing on the qualitative properties of the model. In particular, the interest is in
evaluating whether countries with low nancial development perform countercyclical scal
policy when facing a shock, that is, when facing volatility.
In the second stage, the model is confronted with the data by testing two central hy-
potheses. The rst one, argues for a stronger negative impact of volatility on growth at
lower levels of nancial development. The second hypothesis implies testing the possibility
of countercyclical scal policy at lower levels of nancial development. The empirical analy-
sis will be focused over the period 1960-2000 for a panel of Latin American countries, as a
special group of developing countries with low levels of nancial development. For robustness
purposes OECD countries are also considered.
The main mechanism at work in the model is as follows. Innovation requires that rms
survive short run liquidity shocks and that, in order to cover liquidity costs, rms can rely
only on their short run earnings plus borrowing. As in an endogenous growth model with
R&D, growth is driven by innovations. In the absence of credit constraints volatility will
neither a¤ect innovation nor growth as rms can always borrow up to the net present value of
their future earnings in order to cover the short-run liquidity costs. However when rms face
credit constraints, that is a low nancial development, the business cycle will be amplied.
In other words, macroeconomic volatility tends to be more harmful to growth the lower the
level of nancial development. Furthermore, it will be evaluated whether countries with low
nancial development perform countercyclical scal policy when facing a shock, that is, when
facing volatility. In the model, scal policy will depend on the state of the economy. Hence,
a natural conjecture is that the tighter the credit constraints faced by rms, the greater the
scope for appropriate government intervention, in particular to reduce the costs that negative
liquidity shocks impose on credit constrained rms. The idea is that countercyclical scal
policy may foster innovation and growth by reducing the negative consequences of a bad
aggregate shock on rmsinnovative investments1.
1For example, the government may decide to increase public expenditure, investment, or even taxes in
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This paper contributes to the literature in the sense that it is relevant for the implemen-
tation of macroeconomic policy. Specically, the e¤ects generated by credit constraints and
the di¤erent levels of nancial development have important practical implications, especially
for developing countries. The arguement is that scal tax policy instruments as stabilization
policies -but ultimately as growth-enhancing policies- should eventually be considered to
reduce the costs that negative liquidity shocks impose on credit-constrained rms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2 the paper discusses current
issues about volatility and growth and its interaction with macroeconomic policies. In section
2.3, the model is presented. Section 2.4 discusses the empirical strategy and evidence; the
last section concludes.
2.2 VOLATILITY, MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND GROWTH
According to the Schumpeterian approach, the relationship between volatility and growth
can be positive or negative, depending on the mechanism underlying the growth process.
A reason why a positive relationship between volatility and growth may exist, relies on
the positive e¤ect that recessions may have on long run investments2. Nevertheless, this
argument relies heavily on the assumption of developed nancial markets and to some extent
on the ability to conduct countercyclical innovation expenditures; that is, the argument
ts the case for developed economies alone. On the other hand, a negative relationship
between volatility and growth may occur if a recession worsens nancial markets so rms
face credit constraints that a¤ect long run investments and therefore growth; this is the case
of developing countries.
Based on the empirical evidence it is still unclear what is the correct explanation for the
observed correlation between volatility and growth. First, the impact of volatility persists
even after controlling for the aggregate investment rate which implies that total investment
some sectors.
2The intuition is that long run investments often take place at the expense of directly productive activities,
and because the return to the latter is lower in recessions due to lower demand, the opportunity cost of long
run investments is lower.
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cannot be the main channel through which volatility a¤ects growth3. Second, the relationship
may be spurious, driven by the e¤ect that nancial development and scal procyclicality have
on both growth and volatility.
Aghion et al. (2005) present a model where economic growth is driven by R&D innova-
tion in the spirit of an overlapping generation two-period-lived agents model. They develop
an endogenous growth model where the main channel through which volatility a¤ects growth
is the composition of investment. In this model, agents (rms) engage in two types of in-
vestment activity: one type is the short-term investment (physical capital) and long-term
investment (R&D). An interesting insight of this model is that they characterize the cyclical
behavior of the composition of investment as a function of the level of nancial development,
and they analyze how this a¤ects growth and volatility. Even though Aghion et al. (2005)
provide useful conclusions, there is a reasonable extension that implies considering govern-
mental macroeconomic policy over the business cycle. Looking for a general framework to
understand the channels through which countercyclical policy in low nancial development
countries can a¤ect the mean growth, the focus will be on Latin America, a region facing
high volatility and credit constraints4.
2.3 THE MODEL
2.3.1 The Economy
In Aghion et al. (2005) the basic framework is derived but under the assumption of no
government intervention. Hence, in this section the model is extended to account for gov-
ernmental scal policy over the business cycle. Time is discrete and indexed by t. In any
given period t, the economy is populated by a continuum 1 of overlapping generations of
two-period lived risk neutral agents (entrepreneurs) which are all ex ante identical, who will
be indexed by i and uniformly distributed over [0,1]. As in Aghion et al. (2005), in the
rst period, an entrepreneur decides how much to invest in short-term or long-term projects
3Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Aghion et al. (2005) analyze this e¤ect.
4The recent paper by Aghion and Marinescu (2007) is another reference where they analyze the e¤ects
of countercyclical budgetary policies on growth for OECD countries.
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(physical capital versus R&D). Capital produces at the end of the rst period while R&D
produces at the end of the second period but only if the agent has spent additional resources
to develop the product by the end of the initial round of investment. At the end of the
second period, the agent consumes her total life-time income and dies. Productivity growth
is driven by past aggregate R&D activity.
Let Tt be the aggregate stock of knowledge and At is the aggregate productivity at time
t. So aggregate productivity (with volatility) is represented by:
lnAt = lnTt + ln at (2.1)
where
ln at =   ln at 1 + "t (2.2)
with at representing an exogenous productivity shock,  < 1 and "t  N(0; 2) .
Each agent born in period t has initial wealth,W it , which is proportional to the aggregate
level of knowledge: In the rst period the agent must decide how to allocate her wealth
endowment between short-run investment, Kit ,and long-run investment, Z
i
t . Therefore the
initial detrended budget constraint is thus given by:
kit + z
i
t  w (2.3)
Short-term investment at date t generates prot:
it = At
 
kit

(2.4)
where  is a neoclassical production function. Long-term investment at date t generates
income only if the investment is successful in generating an innovation by the end of period
t, and the entrepreneur has implemented the innovation. That is, the initial long-term
investment pays o¤ in period t+1, but only if the liquidity needs at the end of period t have
been met: Cit = c
i
tTt . Also, c
i
t to be i.i.d. both across agents and periods
5. Conditional on
paying this cost, the income generated by the long-run investment is:
it+1 = Vt+1q(z
i
t) + C
i
t (2.5)
5With cdf F and positive density f over R+:
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where Vt+1 is the value of the new innovation and Vt+1q(zit) is the return to R&D. By
assuming that q is a neoclassical production function and letting vt+1 = Vt+1=Tt denote the
knowledge-adjusted nal wealth and the knowledge-adjusted value of a new innovation in
t+1. As in Aghion et al. (2005) the returns to R&D are less procyclical than return to capital
investment 6. Also, from the special case where Vt+1 = At+1, in which ln vt+1 =   ln at+"t+1
7 , a more general case will be used where ln vt+1 =   ln at+ t+1 with t+1  N(0; 2v) which
implies that:
Etvt+1 = (at)
 (2.6)
An agent born at date t can borrow only up to  times her initial wealth, so that she
faces the investment constraint
kit + z
i
t    w (2.7)
Similarly, after the realization of the liquidity cost cit on the long-term investment at the
end of period t, the entrepreneur can borrow up to  times her end-of-current-period wealth
xit for the purpose of covering these liquidity needs. Therefore, her initial R&D investment
at the beginning of period t will pay out next period if and only if:
cit    xit    [at(kit)] (2.8)
Following Aghion et al. (2005) dene the probability of the agent being able to meet the
liquidity shock and implement her innovation given by8:
Pr
 
cit    xit
  F  xit (2.9)
This probability of meeting the R&D liquidity shock will be assumed to be procyclical, that
is @F (x)=@x > 0; and concave @2F (x)=@x2 < 0:
6This amounts to assuming that the correlation between vt+1 and at over the business cycle is less than
one.
7This implies that vt+1 = a

t e
"t+1and therefore Etvt+1 = a

t
8The special case of the log linear approximation lnF
 
xit
    ln(  xit) where  is the local elasticity
of F and both parameters  and  reect the tightness of credit constraints is used. A lower value of 
corresponds to tighter credit constraints or equivalently to a lower degree of nancial development. On the
other hand, a higher value of  means that the probability of surviving the long-term investment liquidity
needs is dependent on the wealth.
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2.3.2 The Government
The government will nance its expenditure requirements by the way of a tax on capital
investment and by issuing public debt. Tax on capital investment is  t(at) and depends
positively on the state of the economy, that is, it will be assumed that  t(at) is procyclical
such that 0 <  t(at) < 1 and @ t=@at > 0 , with tax collection as Gt9. The government will
rebate tax collection to individuals by taxing in period t in order to transfer the proceeds
to agents in period t + 1 so they can consume it. With this framework, the government is
assumed to follow a procyclical scal policy by endogenizing the decision. The governments
budget constraint is thus,
bt +  t(at) = (1 + rt)  bt 1 +Gt (2.10)
2.3.3 Credit market
In this section the paper presents the basic framework of an agent facing both credit con-
straints and governmental scal policy. Credit constraints limit agentsborrowing capacity
to what is necessary in order to cover the R&D adjustment costs to a nite multiple  of
their current wealth in both periods of their lifetime. At the beginning of period t an agent
born at date t faces the constraint10:
kt + zt    w
At the end of period t the entrepreneur must satisfy the following constraint if she wants
to survive until next period
cit    [at(kt)(1   t(at)) + (1 + rt)bt] (2.11)
9I beneted from a discussion with Maria Julia Bocco about this assumption.
10Dropping the i superscripts since all agents born at date t are ex ante identical.
10
Using condition (2.11) to substitute for the probability of survival in the entrepreneurs
objective function so a new agent born at date t will be choosing:
max
kt;zt
fat(kt)(1   t(at)) + (1 + rt)bt+ (2.12)
+Etvt+1q(zt)F [  (at(kt)(1   t(at)) + (1 + rt)bt)] +Gtg
s:t: kt + zt + bt  w
From the rst order conditions and using the log -linear specication for the distrib-
ution function of the liquidity cost ct for some constant , the following marginal rate of
substitution between short-run investment (kt) and long-run investment (zt) is obtained:
q0(zt)
0(kt)
 a1 t (1   t(at)) 
(
1
  (at(kt)(1   t(at)) + (1 + rt)b)
+ (2.13)
+  a

t  q(zt)
[at(kt)(1   t(at)) + (1 + rt)b]

From this last condition11, it follows that the right hand side is equal to the rst order
conditions for the case of complete markets times a greater-than-one bracket term. Under
complete markets an increase in at reduces the share of R&D zt and increases the share
of capital investment kt. This conclusion implies that the share of capital investment is
procyclical and the share of R&D investment is countercyclical. Specically, the share of
R&D would be more countercyclical the less persistent the aggregate shock or the longer the
horizon of R&D investment and the higher the tax is12. This is the case for the opportunity
cost e¤ect stated by many scholars. The intuition is that short run capital investment prots
are more sensitive to the current state of the economy than the long run R&D investment.
That is, after a "bad" aggregate shock agents expect that investment in the short run
will not be very protable, while the value of R&D investment is less correlated with the
contemporaneous state of the economy.
11And the fact that debt is constant in equilibrium.
12To see this, it is useful to consider a standard Cobb-Douglas specication for (kt) and q(kt) recalling
that in the complete marketscase  = 0 implying that the probability of surviving the investment liquidity
need is independent of the wealth.
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However, in the general case of incomplete markets the share of R&D, zt; becomes pro-
cyclical and the share of capital investment, kt; becomes countercyclical13. The intuition
in this case is that with credit constraints, whenever the economy faces a "bad" aggregate
shock, a low level of short run investment prots will be realized in the current period. More-
over, low level of short run investment prots implies -because of the credit constraints- a
low borrowing capacity and thus a low probability of responding to the liquidity shock ct on
the long term R&D investment. With a low probability of covering the liquidity shock in the
rst period it is unlikely that long term R&D investment will pay out in the future. Thus,
agents facing the situation of a low probability of covering ct will anticipate and move away
from long term R&D investment generating the procyclicality in this type of investment. In
fact, the procyclicality of zt increases with a short horizon of long term investment ; a lower
nancial development , a high persistence of the shocks  or a low tax  t(at). Therefore,
in the context of our assumption of procyclicality of scal policy, in countries facing nan-
cial constraints a "bad" aggregate shock will determine a decrease in the level of long run
investment zt as well as an increase in its procyclicality.
2.3.4 Volatility and growth
This section will consider the e¤ect of increased volatility on long-run average growth, and
how growth is a¤ected by credit constraints and scal policy. As in other models of en-
dogenous technological progress, such as Romer (1990) or Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998),
only long-term investments, zt, contributes to long-run growth. In an economy with credit
constraints only those rms that can meet their adjustment costs are able to innovate and
therefore contribute to aggregate productivity growth. Thus, assuming that knowledge grows
at a rate proportional to the number of implemented innovations, then the growth rate of
technology is given by:
gt  lnTt+1   lnTt    q(z(at))(at) (2.14)
13Again, if considering a standard Cobb-Douglas specication for (kt) and q(kt) the result is straightfor-
ward.
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where z(at) is the equilibrium level of R&D and
(at)  F

  (at(kt)(1   t(at)) + (1 + rt)b)

(2.15)
 F   (at(w   z(at))(1   t(at)) + (1 + rt)b)
is the equilibrium probability of meeting the R&D adjustment costs. In the previous section
the conclusion was that zt is increasing in at, that is, zt is procyclical. Additionally, as
pointed out by Aghion et al. (2005), R&D investment should be 0  zt  w implying that
zt must be not only increasing but also partly concave on this interval. Hence, this suggests
the possibility of a negative correlation between volatility and R&D, and therefore mean
productivity growth. Thus, it can be shown that q(z(at)) is concave and similarly (at) is
increasing in at and bounded between 0 and 1, which suggests that (at) is also concave in at.
Note that (1   t(at)) is less than 1, thus, gt is a concave function of at, so the mean growth
will fall in response to an increase in the variance of at14. Therefore, in an economy facing
credit constraints, an increase in volatility will result in lower mean growth, and all the more
when  is lower and when the tax  t(at) is more procyclical. In particular, the tighter the
credit constraint, the more procyclical long term R&D investment is and therefore the lower
its mean is over time, implying a lower average growth rate for the economy.
As in Aghion et al. (2005) this simple model emphasizes the importance of distinguishing
between short run capital investment and long term R&D investment and the latter as the
determinant of the average growth rate for the economy. Moreover, another important issue
to emphasize is the role of the channel through which scal policy can be countercyclical over
the business cycle. The analysis shows that in countries with lower nancial development,
negative shocks or higher volatility have more damaging e¤ects on average long-term R&D
investment and growth. Considering the cyclical e¤ects of the tax introduced in the model
suggest that countercyclical scal policies should be more growth-enhancing in countries
14Although this paper is not focusing on the case of complete markets, it is interesting to analyze the
implications. In this latter case, the probability of covering the liquidity shock of R&D investment at the
end of the rst period will be one, that is (at) = 1: The implication from section 3.3 is that without credit
constraints zt is countercyclical with respect to at (and mitigates the business cycle), hence z(at) is decreasing
in a. So at least in the interval [0,w] the equilibrium R&D investment z(at) is convex. In particular, an
increase in the variance of at will increase the mean of R&D investment. Hence, the latter is the Aghion et
al.s (2005) complete markets case where the e¤ect of volatility on growth is positive.
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with lower degrees of nancial development to reduce the negative consequences of a bad
aggregate shock on rms innovative R&D investments.
2.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The model of the previous section explains the relationship between volatility and growth,
the interaction with nancial development and the possibility of macroeconomic (scal)
policy. To take these predictions to the data, three steps will be followed using the panel
data structure. The rst case will explore the relationship between volatility and growth
in the context of credit constraints. In the second step, the relationship between scal
policy cyclicality and growth also in the context of credit constrained countries. Finally,
the relationship between scal policy cyclicality, volatility and growth in countries that face
credit constraints is addressed.
2.4.1 Data
For the empirical exercise, two samples - Latin America and the OECD countries- will be
considered mainly for two reasons, (i) to compare two di¤erent circumstances: an incomplete
market case (Latin America) and a complete market sample (OECD) and (ii) to be able to
compare our estimates with the work by Aghion and Marinescu (2007). The data set is then
composed by 20 countries from Latin America and 19 OECD countries over the 1960-2000
period. GDP, annual growth and government expenditure as a share of GDP were obtained
from the Penn World Tables mark 6.1 (PWT). The terms of trade serie is from the World
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank over the period 1960-2000. The ratio of
private credit to GDP rst compiled by Levine et al. (2000) and recently updated by Beck
under the project Financial Structure Dataset of the World Bank15 is used as a measure of
nancial development. The average years of schooling in the population over 15 years old
series is borrowed from the Barro-Lee dataset16. The control variables considered, relative
15Data downloadable at http://econ.worldbank.org/sta¤/tbeck
16This measure corresponds better to the labor force for many developing countries than the over-25 age
group.
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GDP per capita, investment share of GDP, openness17, population growth and ination
were also obtained from PWT. Following Levine et al. (2000) policy control variables such
as black market exchange rate premium and property rights are considered. Black market
premium was obtained from the Levine et al. data set from the World Bank while the
property rights information was obtained from the Fraser Institutes Economic Freedom of
the World database.
As a robustness check for the results of the estimations for Latin America, the same 19
OECD countries that Aghion and Marinescu (2007) considered will be used. The only di¤er-
ence here is that government expenditure will be used as the measure of scal policy while
Aghion and Marinescu (2007) use government consumption and government investment.
The reason for the choice depends on governmental data availability for Latin America18.
By performing the empirical analysis based on two samples it is expected to have a more
conclusive evidence of the predictions of the theoretical model. Specically note that the
idea of considering developed countries allows the comparison of two di¤erent structures of
nancial development: the 20 Latin American developing countries and the 19 OECD devel-
oped countries. This is the composition of the whole sample considered. Latin America is a
region that faces more volatility and credit constraints than OECD countries, so in that sense
it will be enriching to have another sample as a reference to compare with. Furthermore,
the data for OECD countries have the same sources as in the case for Latin America.
2.4.2 Volatility and Credit Constraints: Their E¤ects on Growth
This section explores the relationship between volatility and growth in a panel of credit
constrained countries. Specically in this rst step the following specication is estimated
over a 5-year period interval in a panel for the sample of 20 Latin American countries.
growthi;t = 0 + 0priv:crediti;t + 1volatilityi;t + (2.16)
+2priv:crediti;tvolatilityi;t + Xi;t + i + "i;t
17Dened as exports and imports over GDP.
18It is not yet available a systematic source of information with a comparable discrimination of government
expenditures into consumption and investment.
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where the i subscript denotes countries and the t subscript denotes time. growth is annual
growth rate of GDP per capita, volatility is a measure of annual GDP per capita variation
that will be explained below, priv:credit is private credit over GDP. X denotes a vector
of country specic control variables described below. In essence, equation (2.16) is similar
to equation (11) from Aghion et al. (2005) but in that case the authors perform a cross
section analysis while this paper explores the panel structure of the data. This equation is a
starting point for the hypotheses discussed following the model. To deal with the potential
problem of omitted country-level variables, country xed e¤ects by country were included.
Moreover, to capture possible time trends a¤ecting all countries in the sample, year xed
e¤ects were also considered. The main interest is in the interaction term 2 between volatility
and private credit, and it is expected to be positive: more private credit should make growth
less sensitive to volatility. A positive 2 would imply that the marginal impact of volatility
on growth is increasing in private credit so "better" private credit lessens the adverse impact
of volatility on growth.
In this specication the concept of volatility is introduced through the term volatility
and an interaction term to account for the relationship with private credit. Since the data
is annual, output volatility is the 5-year standard deviation of the residuals of a rst-order
autoregressive process of the annual growth rate of GDP for each country over the period
1965-2000. This is the unpredictable component of real output growth and ensures that the
standard deviation is measured in percentage terms and is therefore unit free. Moreover, X
denotes a vector of control variables such as relative GDP per capita, average years of school-
ing for the population over 15 years old, openness, ination, population growth, government
share of GDP, investment share of GDP, property rights and black market premium. As
another step equation (2.16) is estimated for the 19 OECD countries as well as the whole
sample.
Table 1 shows the results for Latin America, OECD and for the whole sample. For
the case of Latin America there is a direct and signicant negative e¤ect of volatility on
growth and a positive and signicant coe¢ cient on the interaction term between volatility
and private credit. This interaction term has a positive sign which implies that more credit
to the private sector should make growth less sensitive to volatility. There is evidence of
16
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a strong direct negative e¤ect of volatility on economic growth of -0.28 and a signicant
positive coe¢ cient on the interaction term of 0.034 (Column(2)). This is consistent with
the predictions of the model discussed in section 2.3 in the sense that there is evidence of a
negative relationship between volatility and growth in the context of credit constraints. For
the case of OECD countries, it seems to be some evidence that favors the idea that volatility
and growth have a positive relationship when facing no credit constraints. This is consistent
with the theoretical model in the case of complete credit markets19. For the cross section
analysis of OECD countries, Aghion et al. (2005), do not nd signicant coe¢ cients for the
direct e¤ect of volatility on growth and the interaction term. When making the estimation
for the whole sample, the evidence favors the incomplete marketshypothesis where volatility
has a negative e¤ect on growth under credit constraints.
2.4.3 Cyclicality of scal policy
2.4.3.1 In the cross country sample In the empirical characterization of scal policy
the measure of scal policy that will be used is government expenditure. There are two
reasons for this choice. The rst one is that most of the uctuations on the revenue side
of the budget come from automatic reaction of tax revenues to the state of the economy,
this way we are less exposed to endogeneity problems. The second reason is that only for a
small number of countries disaggregated time series data on government consumption and
government investment is available; while, aggregate government expenditure is available for
all countries and ready to use.
Following Gavin and Perotti (1997), Catao and Sutton (2002) and Alesina and Tabellini
(2005) a measure of cyclicality of scal policy will be constructed. Separately, for each
country in the sample for Latin America the following regression is estimated, where  is
the coe¢ cient of interest:
Gt = +  GDPGAPt + 1  TOTt + 2 Gt 1 +  Wt + "t (2.17)
where Gt is the government expenditure as a percentage of GDP; GDPGAPt is the output
19See discussion in section 2.3.3.
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gap, dened as the log deviation of GDP from its Hodrick-Prescott trend; TOTt is a measure
of the gap in terms of trade (that accounts for relative price shocks); and Wt represents
additional control variables. Specically, for each country a time trend, ination and ination
squared were used20. A positive coe¢ cient on GDPGAPt implies that a cyclical boom is
associated with an increase in government expenditure; that is, a procyclicality scal policy.
Table 2 shows the estimate of the parameter  for Latin America in a sample that cor-
responds to 1965 to 2000. Estimates conrm previous results by other scholars: in Latin
America, government spending is procyclical. Still, many of the  coe¢ cients exhibit large
standard errors and are not signicantly di¤erent from zero while some others have the
wrong sign, something consistent with Alesina and Tabellini (2005). To cope with likely
measurement error, instead of weighting observations with the inverse of the estimated stan-
dard error of the  coe¢ cient, like Alesina and Tabellini (2005), it was decided to perform
another analysis to make full use of the panel structure of the data.
2.4.3.2 A time series approach Barros (1979) tax-rate smoothing approach is a
useful and broadly used framework to analyze budget decits and cyclicality. The argument
is that for a given path of government spending, tax rates should be held constant over the
business cycle and the budget surplus should move in a procyclical fashion. In particular,
the focus will be on the cyclicality of government spending rather than on its nancing.
Indeed, as suggested by Aghion and Marinescu (2007), this approach can also be helpful in
the context of panel data. To get a more comprehensive model an empirical counterpart of
the tax-rate smoothing model of budget decits in terms of government expenditure is used:
Gt  Gt 1
Yt
= 1  Y gapt 

Gt
Yt

+ 2 Ggapt 

Gt
Yt

+ 3 

Gt 1
Yt

+ 4 + "t (2.18)
where Gt is the government expenditure; Yt is the GDP in year t; Y gapt is the output
gap; Ggapt is the government expenditure gap, dened as the log deviation of government
20Ination was included to ensure that results are not driven by high-ination episodes in which monetary
instability may be causing the comovement between government expenditure and output. Ination squared
is also included to control for possible non-linearities in the relationship between ination and government
expenditure.
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expenditure from its Hodrick-Prescott trend. Finally, () indicates the Hodrick-Prescott
trend.
To measure the cyclicality of scal policies it is very common to use regression based
approaches, with the drawback of getting only one observation of cyclicality per country.
Thus, to make use of the whole panel structure, for each country yearly measures for the
cyclicality of government spending will be constructed. To do so, it will be allowed the
possibility of time-varying coe¢ cients in (2.18) as suggested by Schlicht (2003) and Aghion
and Marinescu (2007), although the latter authors use Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods
instead of the Bayesian inference in a hierarchical model associated with the method proposed
by Schlicht21. The idea is that, instead of having xed coe¢ cients as in ordinary least squares
regressions, coe¢ cients will be allowed to vary over time using a state space representation.
The assumption made here is that all changes in the coe¢ cients are datadriven rather than
induced by the structure of the model. Therefore, a random walk will generate each of the
coe¢ cients22 in (2.18) as:
i;t = i;t 1 + "
i
t , "
i
t  N(0; 2i)
This procedure is statistically superior to the Kalman lter since it is a two-sided l-
ter23. Separately for each country these equations using the VC program by Schlicht24 are
estimated. Specically the interest is in the coe¢ cient 1 to characterize the time path of
the procyclicality of government expenditure in each of the 20 Latin American and the 19
OECD countries in the sample.
Figure 1 and 2 plot the evolution of procyclicality of government spending in Latin Amer-
ica. The low variation in the estimated coe¢ cient values gives evidence that procyclicality
21The Markov Chain Monte Carlo method explores randomly a wide spectrum of possible values for the
variances, and one then retains a set that is representative of probable values given the data. In practice,
the estimates obtained by Aghion and Marinescu (2006) using this method are highly correlated with the
ones obtained using Schlicht method.
22As noted by Schlicht (2003), the assumption which links the past with the future is that the stability,
or variance, of any coe¢ cient be time invariant.
23The estimate of the state of coe¢ cients at time t will depend not only on past and current conditions
but on future observations too. Also, instead of using maximum likelihood methods, in the VC program a
GMM estimator is implemented.
24Downloadable from www.semverteilung.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/mitarbeiter/frameset_es.htm
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Figure 1: Procyclicality of government expenditure in Latin America
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Figure 2: Prociclicality of government expenditure in Latin America (cont.)
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is stable or increasing over time in all countries and only in Argentina and Peru a declining
trend is observed. These results are consistent with the idea that scal policy is procyclical
in Latin America. A vast literature explored this issue regarding procyclicality in developing
countries and at least three arguments appear as answers. Some researchers argue that the
(lack of) credit supply is the answer why we observe procyclicality in developing countries:
Hausmann and Stein (1996), Gavin and Perotti (1997), Gavin and Hausmann (1998), Talvi
and Végh (2005), Catao and Sutton (2002), Lane (2002) and Kaminsky et al. (2004) among
others. Others authors understand that di¤erences in the cyclical stance of macroeconomic
policy across developing countries may be attributed to di¤erences in their level of institu-
tional quality: Alesina and Wagner (2006), Calderon et al. (2004). Finally, a third answer to
this issue comes from the political economy literature: Lane and Tornell (1996,1998), Tornell
and Lane (1999), and Alesina and Tabellini (2005). The ndings from the current paper are
in line with the rst argument and are consistent with the focus of the analysis of a market
failure -the nancial constraint. For OECD countries the evidence so far is mixed: some
researchers like Perotti (2004) understand that scal policy is countercyclical while others
like Lane (2002) nd that it is procyclical.
Figures 3 and 4 show, for OECD countries, stability and sometimes increasing procycli-
cality over time. These gures are consistent with Lane (2002) and also with the current
work by Aghion and Marinescu (2007), who nd that government consumption and invest-
ment are procyclical. In this case, although using government expenditure as the reference
measure, these conclusions are perfectly consistent. These estimated coe¢ cients represent
the procyclicality of scal policy and extend the cyclicality analysis pursued in the previous
section and therefore, will be used in the panel estimation.
2.4.4 Procyclicality and Financial Development: Their E¤ects on Growth
This section analyzes the relationship between scal policy cyclicality and growth in the con-
text of credit constrained countries. As in the previous equation, the regression is estimated
over a 5-year period interval. The specication is:
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Figure 3: Procyclicality of government expenditure in OECD countries
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Figure 4: Procyclicality of government expenditure in OECD countries (cont.)
26
growthi;t = 0 + 0procyclicalityi;t 1 + 1priv:crediti;t 1 + (2.19)
+2procyclicalityi;t 1priv:crediti;t 1 + Xi;t + i + "i;t
where procyclicality is a measure of procyclicality of scal policy that will be described
below. To address the potential problem of reverse causality country xed e¤ects were used
to capture the possible e¤ect that countries with higher average growth rates can pursue
more countercyclical scal policies. There might be concern about the potential endogeneity
of scal policy and private credit in this type of estimation. Hence, to mitigate this issue,
lagged values of both variables will be used to exploit the signicant time variation. The
coe¢ cient of interest is the interaction term 2; between procyclicality and private credit.
That coe¢ cient is expected to be positive since the less nancially developed a country is,
the more growth enhancing it is for the government to be countercyclical in its scal policy.
A positive 2 implies that the marginal impact of procyclicality on growth is increasing
in private credit so "better" private credit lessens the adverse impact of procyclicality on
growth.
In essence in this specication procyclicality is introduced plus an interaction term with
priv.credit. The variable procyclicality is the coe¢ cient 1 estimated for section 2.4.3.2 for
each year for each country.
Table 3 shows the results. For the di¤erent samples considered, there is evidence of a neg-
ative and signicant e¤ect of procyclicality in government expenditures on growth whereas a
positive and signicant interaction e¤ect between the procyclical variable and private credit.
Therefore, the more credit constrained a country is, the more growth enhancing it is for the
government to be countercyclical in its scal policy. This is also consistent with the theo-
retical model discussed, although the coe¢ cients associated with procyclicality and with the
interaction term for Latin America and for OECD countries di¤er in magnitude. For the
whole sample similar evidence than for each individual sample is found, but estimates are
closer to the results for OECD countries.
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2.4.5 Volatility and Procyclicality through Financial Development
Finally the relationship between scal policies and economic growth in the context of volatil-
ity is analized. The main interest is in getting evidence about the e¤ect of scal policies
on growth when facing volatility and credit constraints. For this purpose careful attention
is paid to the results for Latin America since this sample faces incomplete credit markets.
Still, the OECD countries and the whole sample were also estimated. As in previous cases,
estimations were preformed over a 5-year period interval. Considering samples for Latin
America and for OECD countries adds more insights into the credit market structure and
reinforces the predictions of the model. The specication in this case is:
growthi;t = 0 + 0procyclicalityi;t 1 + 1volatilityi;t + (2.20)
+2procyclicalityi;t 1volatilityi;t 1 + Xi;t + i + "i;t
In this last step the interest is in the interaction term 2; between procyclicality and
volatility. This analysis is an afterthought of the main prediction of the model. To deal
with the identication problem -as in the previous section- country xed e¤ects were used,
as well as lagged averages of volatility and policy cyclicality to mitigate the potential endo-
geneity and omitted variable biases. That coe¢ cient is expected to be negative since more
countercyclical scal policy should make growth less sensitive to volatility. A negative 2
implies that the marginal impact of procyclicality on growth is decreasing in volatility so
low volatility lessens the adverse impact of procyclicality on growth.
Table 4 shows the results. For the case of Latin America there is evidence that supports
our predictions from the theoretical model: the coe¢ cient associated with the interaction
term between volatility and procyclicality is negative. Thus more countercyclical scal pol-
icy should make growth less sensitive to volatility for incomplete credit markets. For OECD
countries the evidence favors the idea that having less countercyclical scal policy should
make growth less sensitive to volatility because the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is pos-
itive. This argument relies on the fact that for developed nancial markets the relationship
between volatility and growth seems to be positive. When considering the whole sample
29
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again there is evidence of a negative coe¢ cient as in the case for Latin America. Also for
the whole sample the negative coe¢ cient of volatility supports a more incomplete credit
marketsinterpretation.
Furthermore, to analyze the relationship between volatility, procyclicality and credit
constraints a new specication will be considered for the two samples of countries over a
5-year period interval.
growthi;t = 0 + 0procyclicalityi;t 1 + 1volatilityi;t +
+2(procyclicalityi;t 1volatilityi;t 1) + 3priv:crediti;t +
+4(priv:crediti;tvolatilityi;t) + Xi;t + i + "i;t (2.21)
Equation (2.21) is a combination of the previous analyses so the main interest is in the
direct e¤ect of volatility on growth through 1, the interaction term 2 between procycli-
cality and volatility and the interaction term 4 between private credit and volatility. The
interpretation of these coe¢ cients separately in terms of their marginal impact was already
discussed in the previous sections. In this specication the idea is to capture the joint ef-
fect on economic growth. Again in this estimation country xed e¤ects and lagged averages
of volatility and policy cyclicality were used to mitigate endogeneity and omitted variable
biases.
Table 5 shows the results. For the Latin America sample there is evidence of a strong
direct e¤ect of volatility on economic growth of -0.28 (Column (2)), a similar magnitude than
for specication (2.16), although the interaction term between private credit and volatility
is no longer signicant. The reason for this result might be related with the fact that 2 is
capturing some of the impact of volatility that used to be associated with the interaction
term between private credit and volatility in equation (2.16). Moreover, the interaction term
between procyclicality and volatility is signicant and negative as the theoretical model is
predicting and is in line with the results from specication (2.19). Thus, again evidence
suggests that a more countercyclical scal policy makes growth less sensitive to volatility
in incomplete credit markets. For OECD countries the same evidence than in specication
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(2.16) regarding volatility and its interaction term with private credit was found. Further-
more, although the interaction term associated with volatility and procyclicality is positive
as the theoretical model predicts, it is no longer signicant. When considering the whole
sample results show a strong direct e¤ect of volatility on growth of -0.25 (Column (6)) in
Table 5 which compares with the -0.23 (Column (6)) in Table 4 -that is using specication
(2.20)- giving evidence of the structural nature of volatility. The other relevant result is
that the interaction term between procyclicality and volatility is signicant and negative,
-0.0323 in Column (6) in Table 5 and also compares with the -0.0385 in Column (6) in Table
4 through specication (2.20). Again with these results, the whole sample supports a more
incomplete markets interpretation.
2.4.6 Robustness
This section checks the robustness of the results from the previous sections, mainly through
the analysis of equations (2.16), (2.19) and (2.20). The whole sample will be used dening
an indicator variable that is 1 if the country is from Latin America and 0 if it is from the
OECD. This dummy variable will be interacted with nancial development, volatility and
procyclicality.
In the rst case the following equation that follows from (2.16) is estimated:
growthi;t = 0 + 0priv:crediti;t + 1volatilityi;t + 2priv:crediti;tvolatilityi;t +
+3D(priv:crediti;t) + 4D(volatilityi;t) + 5D(priv:crediti;tvolatilityi;t) +
+Xi;t + i + "i;t (2.22)
where D = 1 if the country is from Latin America and 0 otherwise. Results are presented in
Table 6 where it is notable the di¤erentiable e¤ect of Latin America.
The implications can be ordered as following: (i) there is a positive signicant e¤ect of
volatility on growth for OECD countries, given by coe¢ cient 1 in Column (8) while there
is a di¤erential e¤ect for Latin America given by the fact that both 1 and 4 are signicant
implying a strong negative e¤ect of volatility on growth of -0.29 for Latin American countries.
This is consistent with the results from the previous sections and with the theoretical model.
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(ii) The coe¢ cient 2 of the interaction term has a negative sign which characterizes the
developed markets where credit is available so countries can benet from volatility. For
Latin America, although that 5 is positive and signicant (0.3983) which implies that more
credit to the private sector should make growth less sensitive to volatility the total e¤ect
(2 + 5) seems to be small. (iii) From the exclusion tests of Column (8) the hypotheses
that (1+ 4) = 0 and that (2+ 5) = 0 were rejected. To answer the question if volatility
and the interaction between volatility and private credit have a di¤erential e¤ect for Latin
American countries than for OECD countries, the exclusion tests conclude that there is
evidence that favors the idea that the e¤ect is sensitive to the choice of country groups.
As a second robustness check from (2.19) the following equation is estimated:
growthi;t = 0 + 0procyclicalityi;t 1 + 1priv:crediti;t 1 +
+2procyclicalityi;t 1priv:crediti;t 1 + 3D(procyclicalityi;t 1)
+4D(priv:crediti;t 1) + 5D(procyclicalityi;t 1priv:crediti;t 1)
+Xi;t + i + "i;t (2.23)
whereD = 1 if the country is from Latin America and 0 otherwise. As expected from previous
regression, there might be concerns about the endogeneity of scal policy and private credit.
Hence, lagged values of those variables will be used to address this issue. Although not a
perfect solution it will considerably mitigate the endogeneity bias. Results are presented in
Table 7 and the focus will be on the estimates from Column (8).
The estimation can be interpreted as following: (i) there is a negative and signicant
e¤ect of procyclicality in government expenditures on growth for Latin America and for
OECD countries. For OECD countries, because 0 is negative and signicant and for Latin
America because 3 is also negative and signicant implying a negative total e¤ect. (ii) The
interaction term between the procyclical variable and private credit is positive and signicant,
both 2 and 5. Thus, this e¤ect goes in the same direction for Latin American countries
and for OECD countries. The general implication is therefore that more credit constrained
a country is, the more growth enhancing it is for the government to be countercyclical in
its scal policy. This is consistent with the results from the previous sections and with
the theoretical model. (iii) From the exclusion test of Column (8) the hypothesis that
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(0+3) = 0; which means that procyclicality in government expenditures has no di¤erential
e¤ect on countries for Latin America was rejected. In this case the di¤erence is in magnitude.
The other hypothesis that (2 + 5) = 0 which implies an e¤ect of the interaction term for
countries from the Latin America group was also rejected, giving evidence of a direct e¤ect
for Latin American countries.
Finally, the equation that follows from (2.20) to analyze the relationship between volatil-
ity and procyclicality is estimated:
growthi;t = 0 + 0procyclicalityi;t 1 + 1volatilityi;t +
+2procyclicalityi;t 1volatilityi;t 1 + 3D(procyclicalityi;t 1) +
+4D(volatilityi;t) + 5D(procyclicalityi;t 1volatilityi;t 1) +
+Xi;t + i + "i;t (2.24)
where D = 1 if the country is from Latin America and 0 otherwise. Again in this case, and
due to the potential endogeneity of scal policy and nancial development, lagged values of
procyclicality and private credit will be used to mitigate this problem. The focus will be on
the results reported in Column (8) from Table 8.
As in Table 4 the main conclusion from this estimation is related with 2 and 5 . There is
evidence of a positive and signicant 2 which implies that for OECD countries the evidence
favors the idea that having less countercyclical scal policy should make growth less sensitive
to volatility. For Latin American countries, given that 2 and 5 are signicant, it implies a
negative interaction term. This implies that the marginal impact of procyclicality on growth
is decreasing in volatility so low volatility lessens the adverse impact of procyclicality on
growth. These results are consistent with the results from the previous sections and with
the theoretical model. Furthermore, although at a 11% of signicance, the exclusion test on
(1+ 5) = 0 , gives evidence of a di¤erential e¤ect that is sensitive to the choice of country
groups.
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2.5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes how scal policies and credit constraints can a¤ect the impact of macro-
economic volatility on long run growth. In the rst part, the paper generalizes Aghion et
al. (2005) by accounting for government scal policy in a more general framework and pre-
serving the distinction between short-run and long-run investment and the presence of credit
constraints. The main implication from the model is that in an economy facing credit con-
straints, an increase in volatility will result in lower mean growth, and all the more the less
nancially developed a country is and the more procyclical the scal policy is. Considering
the cyclical e¤ects of the tax introduced in the model, countercyclical scal policies should
be more growth-enhancing in countries with lower degrees of nancial development to reduce
the negative consequences of a bad aggregate shock on rmslong-run investments. For the
empirical part of the paper, and making use of the panel structure of the data, a measure of
cyclicality of government expenditure considering a coe¢ cient variation method is created.
Through this analysis the main policy implications of the paper are built. By taking the
model to the data and analyzing a panel of Latin American and OECD countries the main
theoretical predictions from the model were conrmed.
The model and the empirical analysis presented suggest that more countercyclical scal
policy makes growth less sensitive to volatility for incomplete credit markets. Furthermore,
less procyclical - or more countercyclical- scal policies in less nancially developed coun-
tries can have a positive e¤ect on growth. These conclusions are empirically conrmed for
countries from the Latin America sample. This outcome is also compared with the case of
more developed nancial markets like the OECD countries nding evidence in the opposite
direction. Therefore, the empirical evidence conrms that the model supports a developing
country approach.
Through the measure of government expenditure as scal policy, procyclicality is stable
or increasing over time in Latin America while to a much smaller degree in OECD countries.
These results are in line with Aghion and Marinescu (2007) that less nancially developed
countries display less countercyclical- or more procyclical- scal policies.
It should be noted that conclusions drawn from this paper are positive rather than norma-
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tive. There is no ideal situation or viewpoint stated but rather a relationship assuming that
countercyclical scal policy can mitigate volatility for countries with low levels of nancial
development.
There is however an unanswered question regarding the reason why countries follow sub-
optimal procyclical scal policies that may be contributing to macroeconomic instability.
There are at least two arguments for this question. On the one hand, procyclicality may
arise due to credit market imperfections. In bad times developing countries cannot borrow or
can do so only at very high interest rates and therefore they cannot run decits and have to
cut spending. In booms they can borrow more easily and choose to do so, increasing public
spending. On the other hand, political economic factors may play a role. Hence, procyclical-
ity may arise when more resources are available (i.e. in booms), the common pool problem
is more severe, and the ght over common resources intensies, leading to a procyclical bias
in scal policy. This discussion is certainly an interesting question that exceeds the scope of
this paper and opens an avenue for future research. Moreover, another possible avenue is the
analysis theoretically and empirically of an open economy with domestic and international
nancial integration in the context of a growth model.
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3.0 THE GROWTH EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INTEGRATION AND EXCHANGE RATES: THEORY AND EMPIRICS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Does the choice of exchange rate regime matter? The choice of exchange rate regime stands
as one of the most contentious aspects of macroeconomic policy. The recent policy discussion
on which exchange rate regime should a country choose has tended to consider this policy
decision largely independent from country-specic characteristics and the external environ-
ment. To some extent, this may be a result of witnessing extreme cases: Chinas inexible
exchange rate system in one hand and South Africas highly volatile currency on the other
hand. Moreover, after the collapse of Bretton Woods, popularity of pegs grew signicantly
in the 80s and early 90s until the eruption of currency crises in the mid nineties starting
with the Mexican devaluation. Still, although it may seem a key question of policy which
exchange rate regime to choose, in particular for long run growth, the existing theoretical
and empirical literature o¤ers little guidance. The "one-size-ts-all" view of exchange rate
regimes that underlies such fashion, seem at odds with both the causal evidence and the
conventional wisdom that indicate that the regime choice is itself endogenous to the local
and global economic contexts. The classical theoretical literature, like Garber and Svensson
(1995) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996), that analyzes the determinants of the regime choice
is mainly focused in developed countries with developed institutions and markets. Moreover,
there is little connection between the exchange rate regime and long run growth implications.
In particular, are oating exchange rates associated with faster output growth? The empir-
ical literature, in general, is largely negative, suggesting that the degree of exchange rate
exibility simply does not matter for growth. Baxter and Stockman (1989) were among the
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rst to analyze this issue but also recently Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003) in an extensive
survey conclude that the exchange rate arrangement does not matter for growth at all, or
for anything except the real exchange rate. Furthermore, Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and
Reggio (2004), Razin and Rubinstein (2004), Husain, Mody and Rogo¤ (2005) and Aghion,
Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogo¤ (2006) analyze at di¤erent levels and focusing in di¤erent
aspects to what extent the exchange rate regime matters. In particular Aghion, Bacchetta,
Ranciere and Rogo¤ (2006) analyze how a countrys level of (domestic) nancial develop-
ment is central in choosing how exible an exchange rate system to adopt. However, the
focus so far has been on the development level of domestic credit markets but other factors
such as the level of international nancial integration (IFI) has not yet been analyzed as
a key element of the exchange rate regime for long run productivity growth and economic
stability.
There is a widespread belief among policymakers that IFI, that is, the degree to which
an economy does not restrict cross-border transactions, generates positive e¤ects for host
countries. Some of the positive externalities include better global allocation of capital and
improved international risk-sharing possibilities. Still, empirical ndings and existing theory
provide conicting predictions about the e¤ects IFI on economic growth. From a theoretical
standpoint, on one hand, Obstfeld (1994), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) and Kalemi-Ozcan,
Sorensen and Yosha (2001) have pointed out that IFI facilitate risk-sharing and thereby en-
hance production specialization, capital allocation, and economic growth. Moreover, IFI
mainly inuences growth through indirect channels: "potential collateral benets". Thus,
under certain circumstances, IFI may promote the development of nancial systems through
the intensication of competition and the importation of nancial services as analyzed by
Klein and Olivei (2000) and Levine (2001), and encourage better government and corporate
governance, with positive growth e¤ects. On the other hand, Lucas (1990), Rodrick (1998),
Bhagwati (1998) and Stiglitz (2002) view increasing capital account liberalization as a serious
impediment to global nancial stability and eventually to economic growth. The empirical
evidence is also not conclusive and ndings are divided. Eichengreen (2002) surveyed the
literature on capital account liberalization and concluded that there is no empirical substan-
tiation of the conventional theoretical tenets about the growth benets of capital account
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liberalization. Still, Kose, Prasad, Rogo¤ and Wei (2006) in an extensive survey argue that
a key and nontrivial issue in the empirical studies is related to the measurement of nancial
integration1.
This paper will join these two broad areas of international nance and growth and will
argue that a countrys level of IFI ought to be central in choosing how exible an exchange
rate system to adopt, particularly, if the objective is long run growth. In particular, the main
implication would eventually be that the more nancially integrated to the international
capital ows a country is, the better it will do with a more exible exchange rate.
Figure 5: Real Exchange Rate Flexibility and Productivity Growth by Degree of International
Financial Integration
Figure 5 shows the relationship between productivity growth and exchange rate exibility
for countries at di¤erent levels of IFI2. In particular, the idea is to compare the residuals of
a productivity growth regression on a set of variables with the residuals of an exchange rate
1In Kose, Prasad, Rogo¤ and Wei (2006) there is a detailed literature review of the growth e¤ects of
nancial globalization.
2Exchange rate exibility is the exchange rate classication proposed by Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004).
More about this variable in the data description section.
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Figure 6: Real Exchange Rate Flexibility and Productivity Growth by the World Bank Categories
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exibility regression on the same variables3. This adjusted measure of exibility is purged
from any colinearity with the standard growth determinants. Dividing the country sample
by the level of IFI, Figure 1 shows the regression of growth residuals on the adjusted measure
of exibility of the exchange rate regime for the whole sample, the lower quartile and the
upper quartile of the distribution. Although not strong, there is a negative relationship
between productivity growth and exchange rate exibility for the whole sample and for the
di¤erent quartiles of IFI distribution. Figure 6 shows the same exercise but now dividing
the sample by the World Bank categories of income4. The same pattern as in Figure 1 is
observed. Although this is preliminary and not evidence enough, this might be giving some
indication that the growth e¤ects of the exibility of the exchange rate regime vary with the
level of IFI. The main purpose of this paper is to rationalize and then explore the robustness
of this claim.
This paper involves two stages. In the rst stage, Section 3.2 develops a stylized open
monetary economy model with wage stickiness, where exchange rate uctuations a¤ect the
growth performance of credit constrained rms generalizing Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere
and Rogo¤ (2006) by allowing for international nancial markets. In other words, rms
will be able to borrow not only from the domestic credit market but also from foreign
lenders. Still, the existence of credit constraints will hinder the provision of credit both in
the domestic and the international markets. The basic mechanism underlying the positive
growth interaction between IFI and exchange rate exibility is a balance sheet e¤ect that can
be explained as follows. Suppose that the nominal wage is preset and cannot be adjusted by
rms to variations in the nominal exchange rate. In addition, suppose that the borrowing
capacity of rms is proportional to their current earnings. Hence, following an exchange
rate depreciation (less units of domestic currency needed to buy the same amount of foreign
currency), rmscurrent earnings are reduced, and so is their ability to borrow in order to
survive idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and thereby innovate in the longer term. Their ability
to borrow is conditioned by the degree of nancial development and IFI of the domestic
3A pooled regression using ve-year average data for 85 countries over 1960-200 period is performed.
Initial productivity, secondary schooling, nancial development, government expenditure, trade openness,
terms of trade growth and an indicator of currency crises were used as control variables. A detailed description
will be given in Section 3.
4In particular, 1=low income, 2=lower middle, 3=upper middle and 4=high.
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Figure 7: Real Exchange Rate Flexibility and Productivity Growth by Region of the World
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economy. The main mechanism, in spirit, is similar to Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and
Rogo¤ (2006), but with the key addition that international credit markets can reinforce the
impact on growth.
In the second stage a reduced form of the model is confronted with the data by testing
the main theoretical prediction by conducting a systematic panel data analysis with a data
set for 85 countries over the years 1960-2000. When a countrys level of IFI is interacted with
the degree of exchange rate exibility the results prove both robust and signicant. The main
empirical analysis is pursued using the classication of Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) for the
degree of exibility of exchange rate, but this main result holds to other de facto classication
as the one by Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). The ndings support the hypothesis that
a high degree of exchange rate exibility leads to lower growth in countries with a lower degree
of integration with the international nancial markets. The main results, generalize Aghion,
Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogo¤ (2006) where they only focus on the domestic market while
in this paper a more broad international nancial market is also considered. Finally, to
address the potential endogeneity problem associated with exchange rate regimes a dynamic
panel data GMM methodology is used as well as a treatment e¤ect decomposition of the
inuence of IFI on growth through the exchange rate regime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, the model and the main
theoretical prediction are presented. Section 3.3, develops the empirical strategy and the
data used. In Section 3.4, the main ndings and a robustness analysis are discussed. The
last section concludes.
3.2 THE MODEL
This section presents a simple model to analyze the e¤ect of exchange rate exibility on
productivity growth. In particular, a generalization of Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and
Rogo¤ (2006) allowing for international nancial credit markets will be discussed. Hence,
the model is a small open economy populated by successive overlapping generations of two
period lived entrepreneurs and workers. Nominal wages are rigid and the central bank
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xes the nominal exchange rate5. Therefore, as in Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogo¤
(2006), macroeconomic volatility is driven by nominal exchange rate movements in presence
of wage stickiness. Finally, and most important, productivity grows as a result of innovation.
This innovation is the result of entrepreneurs with funds enough to meet short run liquidity
shocks at the end of their rst period6. It should be noted, nevertheless, that this may be
a simplication since innovation might not be always a feasible option. For instance, other
things equal, countries with low initial levels of domestic nancial development and IFI may
only be capable of imitate from developed countries rather than innovate by themselves. This
clarication does not change the model and gives insights and intuition about the mechanism
and the upcoming empirical testing.
The intuition behind the main mechanism can be explained through a balance sheet
e¤ect. First, the nominal wage is preset and cannot be adjusted by rms to variations
in the nominal exchange rate. Second, the borrowing capacity of rms is proportional to
their current earnings -what that naturally involves wages. Hence, after a change in the
exchange rate, rms current earnings can be reduced, and so is their ability to borrow in
order to survive idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and thereby innovate in the longer term. Their
ability to borrow is conditioned by a domestic multiplier that reects the degree of nancial
development of the economy and an international multiplier reecting the degree of IFI of
the domestic economy with the international credit market.
In the following analysis, the discussion will be centered on the impact of regimes on
productivity growth but not on the analysis of the factors that lead a country to choose one
or other regime.
3.2.1 The Environment
There is one good identical to the world good. The economy is populated by half workers
and half entrepreneurs. Individuals are risk neutral and consume their accumulated income
at the end of their life. Finally growth is determined by the proportion of entrepreneurs who
5Actually, the central bank can also follow an interest rate rule.
6To some extent this feature is similar to Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova (2005) and Rodriguez
(2007).
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innovate.
Since rms in the small open economy are price-takers, they take the foreign price of the
good at any date t; P t , as given. Assuming purchasing power parity (PPP), converted back
in units of the domestic currency, the value of one unit of sold output at date t, is equal to:
Pt = StP

t (3.1)
where Pt is the domestic price level and St is the nominal exchange rate. It will be assumed
that P t is constant and normalize to 1, thus Pt = St:
In a xed exchange rate regime, St; is constant, whereas under a exible exchange rate
regime St is random and uctuates around its mean value E(St)  S: The reason why
uctuations in the nominal exchange rate St will lead to uctuations in rmsreal wealth,
with consequences for innovation and growth, is that nominal wages are rigid for one period
and preset before the realization of St. Firmsshort-run prots are eventually exposed to an
exchange rate risk as the value of sales will vary according to St.
As in Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogo¤ (2006) the wage rate at date t equals
the real wage at the beginning of that period to some reservation value, !At, where ! < 1
refers to the workersproductivity-adjusted reservation utility and At is current aggregate
productivity. Hence the real wage is
Wt
E(Pt)
= !At
where Wt is the nominal wage rate preset at the beginning of period t and E(Pt) is the
expected price level. Using the fact that E(Pt) = E(St)  S; then
Wt = !SAt (3.2)
49
3.2.2 Output and Entrepreneurs Prots
At the beginning of their rst period, the individuals who became entrepreneurs need to
decide how much labor to hire at the given nominal wage; this decision occurs after the
aggregate shocks are realized. Second, at the end of their rst period, entrepreneurs face a
liquidity shock and must decide whether or not to cover it (if they can) in order to survive
and thereby innovate in the second period. The proportion t of entrepreneurs who innovate
determines the growth rate of the economy.
The production of an entrepreneur born at date t in her rst period, is given by
yt = At
p
lt (3.3)
where lt and At denotes the rms labor input and current aggregate productivity, which it
will be rst assumed non-random, at date t respectively 7.
Aggregate nominal prots net of debt repayments in period t are given by,
t = Ptyt  Wtlt = AtSt
p
lt   !SAtlt
In the second period, the entrepreneur innovates and thereby realizes the value of innovation
vt+1 with probability  will depends upon whether the entrepreneur can cover her liquidity
cost at the end of her rst period. As we shall see, in an economy with credit constraints,
the latter depends upon the short-term prot realization and therefore upon both the level
of employment and the aggregate shocks in the rst period.
The optimal level of employment in the rst period is then chosen by the entrepreneur
in order to maximize her net present value
max
lt
n
AtSt
p
lt   !SAtlt + Etvt+1
o
(3.4)
where  denotes the entrepreneurs discount rate.
7This choice of production technology is made for analytical simplicity, but it can easily be extend to
more general settings.
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3.2.3 Innovation and Liquidity Shocks
Innovation upgrades the entrepreneurs technology up to some factor  > 1; so that a
successful innovator has productivity At+1 = At. It is natural to assume that the value of
innovation vt+1 is proportional to the productivity level achieved by a successful innovator,
that is vt+1 = vPt+1At+1; with v > 0. Next, the model considers that innovation occurs in
any rm i only if the entrepreneur in that rm survives the liquidity shock Cit that occurs at
the end of the rst period. Due to the existence of credit constraints, the probability of the
entrepreneur being able to innovate will depend upon her current cash-ow but eventually
upon the choice of the optimal level of borrowing.
As in Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogo¤ (2006), the liquidity cost of innovation is
proportional to productivity At; according to the following linear form (multiplied by Pt as
it is expressed in nominal terms):
Cit = c
iPtAt
where ci is independently and identically distributed across rms in the domestic economy,
with uniform distribution function F over the interval [0; c]: While all rms face the same
probability distribution over ci ex ante, ex post the realization of ci di¤ers across rms.
Moreover, it is assumed that the net productivity gain from innovating (measured by v)
is su¢ ciently high that it is always protable for an entrepreneur to try and overcome her
liquidity shock.
In order to pay for her liquidity cost, the entrepreneur can borrow on local credit market
or on the foreign market. However, credit constraints are present in this economy. Due to
the existence of these credit constraints, entrepreneurs can borrow an amount t from
the domestic market and an amount (1  )t from the foreign market. In particular, 
represents the share of current cash ow t that the entrepreneur borrows from the local
credit markets. Dene  and  as proportionality coe¢ cients, or credit multipliers with
1 >  > 0 and 1 >  > 0. Therefore  reects the degree of nancial development in the
domestic economy while  reects the degree of international nancial integration of the
domestic economy. Higher values of  correspond to higher levels of nancial development
and higher values of  correspond to a high degree of international nancial integration.
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It will be assumed that the proportionality factor  and  are constant8. The borrowing
constraints are no longer binding if  and  becomes large.
Thus, the funds available for innovative investment at the end of the rst period are at
most equal to
t + 
 (1  )t
and therefore the entrepreneur will innovate whenever:
t + 
 (1  )t  Cit (3.5)
From these last equations the extreme cases can be analyzed. When the domestic economy
does not have access to international nancial markets, i.e.  = 0, the model collapses to
Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogo¤ (2006) since  = 1 and the entrepreneur borrows
only on the local credit market. Another special case is  = 0, that is no access to the
domestic credit market, which is also solved as in Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogo¤
(2006) but  is used instead of  :The last special case is when both  and  are 1, that
is the complete markets case. In this situation, borrowing constraints are no longer binding
and the condition for growth is trivially satised. From this step it can be anticipated
that there might be heterogeneity in the nature of  and  depending on the level of
(nancial) development. In fact, developing countries entrepreneurs, borrowing not only on
the local credit market but also on the international credit market will face additional foreign
currency restrictions. This might a¤ect the amount of e¤ective credit and therefore the level
of  and , shaping a di¤erential impact whether a developed or a developing country. This
distinction does not a¤ect the main implications from the model and will be further explored
in the empirical section.
As described above, the timing here implies that rst the shock is realized at the end
of the rst period and then the entrepreneur decides to cover it (if she can). Here a new
decision is introduced. The entrepreneur chooses the share  of her cash ow t to borrow
8Aghion, Banerjee and Picketty (1999) consider  to be a negative function of the nominal interest rate:
t = (it 1): In this case, the negative e¤ect would be reinforced. Moreover, if a foreign interest rate for
foreign borrowing with the usual arbitrage (uncovered) parity condition is also considered, then the negative
e¤ective would be reinforced even more.
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from the domestic and the foreign capital markets subject to the credit constraints from each
market. In particular, from (3.5), the share  will be at most
 =
1
(  )

Cit
t
  

(3.6)
where it will be assumed:
Assumption A1:
 6=  (3.7)
to rule out non-existence.
Finally, from (3.5) the probability of innovation t is equal to
9
t = F

t + 
 (1  )t
StAt

(3.8)
3.2.4 Equilibrium Prots
Now, t can be substituted in the entrepreneurs maximization problem. The entrepreneur
will choose the level of employment lt to maximize (3.4) which yields
lt =

St
2!S
2
(3.9)
and therefore
t =

1
4!S

AtS
2
t =  AtS
2
t (3.10)
with  = 1
4!S
. It can be shown that equilibrium prots are increasing in the nominal
exchange rate St: Hence, from (3.8) the probability of innovation can be expressed as:
t = F ( St + 
 (1  ) St)
= Pr
 
 St + 
 (1  ) St  ci

(3.11)
and using the fact that ci is independently and identically distributed across rms in the
domestic economy with uniform distribution over the interval [0; c]; then
t =
8>>><>>>:
1 if et  1et if 0 < et < 1
0 if et  0
(3.12)
9Since t > 0 in equilibrium and St > 0, it is always the case that t > 0:
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where et = 1c ( St +  (1  ) St) (3.13)
Moreover the share  can be expressed as:
e = 1
(  )

ci
 St
  

(3.14)
Furthermore from (3.14) it can be shown that the amount of cash ows borrowed from
the local credit market (e) is an increasing function of  and a decreasing function of : In
particular, assuming that
Assumption A2:
 ci +  St > 0 (3.15)
then
@e
@
=
 ci +  St
St (  )2  
> 0 (3.16)
@e
@
=   1
(  )  
 ci +  St
St (  )2  
< 0 (3.17)
from where it can be concluded that when the degree of nancial development increases then
the entrepreneur will weight more the local credit market. In a similar fashion, when the
degree of international nancial integration increases then the entrepreneur will weight more
the foreign credit market. Finally if one analyzes the balance sheet e¤ect of the impact of
the nominal exchange rate in (3.14) it can be seen that
@e
@St
=   

St (  )  
 ci +  St
S2t (  ) 
> 0 (3.18)
since
  

St (  ) <
 ci +  St
S2t (  ) 
and
 St <  ci +  St
where eventually
0 <  ci + 2 St
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holds by assumption A2. Hence, equation (3.18) implies that whenever the nominal exchange
rate depreciates the entrepreneur will put more weight on the local credit market for her
borrowing needs.
Going back to (3.12) it can be seen that the probability t depends on the nominal
exchange rate. In particular the innovation probability t declines with the occurence of a
domestic currency appreciation. However, this decline is mitigated the higher nancial de-
velopment  or international nancial integration : Furthermore, equation (3.12) compares
with equation (8) from Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogo¤ (2006), but in particular, it
can be shown that when nominal exchange rate varies, the magnitude of the change in t is
greater in this paper rather than in Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogo¤ (2006), which
gives evidence of the importance of considering international nancial credit markets in the
analysis.
3.2.5 Productivity Growth
Expected productivity at date t + 1 will be dened as in Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and
Rogo¤ (2006):
E(At+1) = E()At + (1  E())At (3.19)
Hence, the expected rate of productivity growth between date t and date t+ 1 is given by:
gt =
E(At+1)  At
At
= (   1)E() (3.20)
Proposition 1. Moving from xed to exible exchange rate reduces average growth.
Moreover, as nancial development measured by  becomes large and/or as international
nancial integration measured by  increases the growth gap decreases.
Proof: As stated in (3.20), the average growth rate is proportional to the expected
proportion of innovating rms. Hence for the comparison between xed exchange rate and
exible exchange rate, rst the focus will be on the di¤erence between the corresponding
expected innovation probabilities:
t =   E(t);
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where
 = F
 
 S +  (1  ) S
= F


1
4!
+  (1  ) 1
4!

and
E(t) = E (F ( St + 
 (1  ) St))
The rst part of the proposition follows from the form of the distribution function F . If
t < 1 for all St , then t would be linear in St and therefore E(t) = E () = : But it
may be the case that for some values of St; t = 1; then t is a concave function of St and
therefore E(t) < : The second part of the proposition follows from the fact that  and
E(t) converges to 1 as  and 
 increase. Note that once  and  equal one, any further
growth impact can be attained through the change in the exchange rate channel.
3.3 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
The e¤ect of international nancial integration or just nancial liberalization on growth is
in general a matter of great controversy. As argued before, evidence is not conclusive and
ndings are divided. Still, as Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2006) show, there are two
competing e¤ects that can be brought together with an overall positive impact e¤ect10. The
basic hypothesis to be tested is that the degree of exibility of the exchange rate regime has
a negative impact on long run growth when countries face a lower degree of IFI.
In order to test the main hypothesis, a standard growth regression is considered to which
a measure of exchange rate exibility is add, as well as an interaction term with exchange
rate exibility and IFI. In this analysis, two measures of exchange rate exibility will be
used: (i) the exchange rate regime based on the natural classication of Reinhart and Rogo¤
(2004) and (ii) the exchange rate classication of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) which
includes changes in reserves in the classication. Furthermore, two measures of IFI will also
10In particular, the two competing e¤ects are: in one hand, nancial liberalization strengthens nancial
development and contributes to higher long run growth and in the other hand, liberalization induces excessive
risk-taking, increasing macroeconomic volatility and leads to more frequent crises. Decomposing both e¤ects
Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2006) show that the overall impact is positive.
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be used: (i) Chinn and Itos (2006) measure of de jure capital account openness and (ii)
a de jure binary indicator constructed by Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2006) using
the o¢ cial dates of equity market liberation described in Beckaert, Harvey and Lundblad
(2005).
As it is now standard in the literature, and will be explained below, instead of using
annual data, the time series data will be transformed into ve-year averages. The main
reason why this is done is to lter out business cycle uctuations, so to focus on long run
growth e¤ects. The panel consists of data for 85 countries over the period 1960-2000.
3.3.1 Flexibility of the Exchange Rate Regime
Classifying a countrys exchange rate regime is not a trivial issue. Although the textbook
answer is simple: either xed or exible, the richness of real world regimes belies this elegant
dichotomy because most governments try to reach some compromise between the di¤erent
elements of the so-called "impossible trinity", that is, independent monetary policy, rigidly
xed exchange rates, and complete capital mobility. Moreover, popular regimes run the array
from currency board and traditional pegs to crawling pegs to crawling pegs, target zones,
and oats, with varying degrees of intervention. In their survey, Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf
(2003) provide an extensive and detailed description of the di¤erent classications as well
as a discussion about what should be relevant for this issue. Hence to pursue this empirical
section it is important to decide upon the methodology for classifying regimes.
Two measures to capture the exibility of exchange rate regime were used. First, the
classication of Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004). This measure is based on the verication of
the de facto regime, reclassifying the regimes where the exchange rate behavior does not
match what is expected from the stated policy. Ignoring the free falling category, this
annual broad classication orders regimes from the most rigid to the most exible, i.e.
ERRt 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g = fx, peg, managed oat, oatg. To make it more operational, an
index of exchange rate exibility in each ve-year interval is constructed, such that exibility
of the exchange rate for that period is equal to the average regime (for the period). Second,
the classication of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) was used. This measure is available
57
for 118 countries since 1974 and it is a variable that is based on a comparison of exchange rate
movements and foreign exchange intervention. Actually it has two di¤erent classications,
one is a three-way and the other is ve-way. For the purposes of the estimations in this paper
the three-way classication, i.e. ERRt 2 f1; 2; 3g = fx, intermediate, oatg will be used.
To deal with the ve-year period, the same treatment as before was followed, constructing a
new ve-year average index.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) classication o¤ers the
advantage that it corrects for multiple exchange rates, a practice that, while common among
developing countries until the early 1970s, diminished steadily to less than 10 percent of
cases during the post Bretton Woods period. However, it is not giving information about
the degree of exchange rate intervention, an aspect that is essential to characterize exchange
rate policy, particularly when it comes to regime choice.
3.3.2 International Financial Integration
As noted before, a key issue in the empirical studies is related to the measurement of -
nancial integration. Some authors used proxies for government restrictions on capital ows
-de jure measures which uses the International Monetary Funds (IMF)-restriction measure
on international nancial transactions. This dummy variable takes the value of one when a
country faces restrictions. As noted by Kose, Prasad, Rogo¤ and Wei (2006) this measure is
quite coarse and may not capture the true extent of IFI. A ner version of IMF-restriction
measure was developed by Quinn (1997), but unfortunately this measure is only available
for intermittent years for most countries11. In the search for more sophisticated and com-
prehensive measures to capture the inuence of nancial linkages two alternatives were used.
First, Chinn and Itos (2006) measure of de jure capital account openness, usually referred
as KAOpen. This measure is available for 185 countries since 1970 and it is based on four bi-
nary dummy variables reported in the IMFs Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions with a higher number indicating a lower overall level of restrictions12.
111958, 1973, 1982 and 1988.
12Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) have a capital controls index that may be an alternative but it only
covers information for 28 countries.
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Second, a de jure binary indicator constructed by Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2006)
using the o¢ cial dates of equity market liberation described in Beckaert, Harvey and Lund-
blad (2005). This measure is available for the 85 countries in our sample since 1980 and it
is dummy variable based on the dates of o¢ cial equity market liberalization corresponding
to formal regulatory changes after which foreign investors o¢ cially have the opportunity to
invest in domestic equity securities.
3.3.3 Dynamic Panel Data Model
To avoid the potential bias associated with the xed e¤ects estimator, an estimator based
on the generalized method of moments (GMM) is used. This section follows the method-
ological description of DeJong and Ripoll (2006). This GMM panel estimator controls for
the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables, which is superior to controlling for the
endogeneity of the main interested regressor only. The way the panel estimator controls for
endogeneity is by using "internal instruments", that is, instruments based on lagged values
of the explanatory variables. This method does not allow to control for full endogeneity but
for a weak type of it. To be precise, it is assumed that the explanatory variables are only
"weakly exogenous", which means that they can be a¤ected by current and past realizations
of the growth rate but must be uncorrelated with the future realizations of the error term.
In sum, the weak exogeneity assumption implies that future innovations of the growth rate
do not a¤ect current IFI. To be clear about this assumption, note that weak exogeneity does
not mean that agents do not take into account expected future growth in their decision to
develop conditions for the degree of IFI of the domestic economy; it just means that future
(unanticipated) shocks to growth do not inuence current IFI. It is the innovation in growth
that must not a¤ect IFI. Eventually, the validity of the weak exogeneity assumption will be
assessed below.
The GMM estimators developed for dynamic panel data introduced by Holtz-Eakin,
Newey, and Rosen (1990), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995) are
going to be used following the methodology proposed by Windmeijer (2004). As stated
before, the panel consists of data for 85 countries over the period 1960-2000 but it is an
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unbalanced panel13. In particular, data is averaged over non-overlapping, ve-year periods,
so that data permitting there are eight observations per country14. Letting the subscripts i
and t represent country and time period respectively, the equation considered is given by
yit   yit 1 = (  1) yit 1 + 0Xit + t + i + "it (3.21)
where yit is the logarithm of real per capita GDP in country i at time t, Xit represents a set
of explanatory variables (other than lagged per capita GDP), t is a period-specic constant,
i is an unobserved county-specic e¤ect and also time dummies to account for time-specic
e¤ects were included. Equation (3.21) can be rewritten as:
yit = yit 1 + 
0Xit + t + i + "it (3.22)
which makes apparent that the estimation of (3.21) is analogous to the estimation of a
dynamic equation with a lagged-dependent variable on the right-hand side. Equation (3.22)
is sometimes called a partial adjustment model, since it is possible to separate the short-run
from the long-run impact of IFI on growth and allows for the possibility that IFI a¤ects
growth only with a lag. Although attractive because of its interpretation, equation (3.22) is
subject to Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) critique. In particular, these authors discuss
that consistency of OLS estimators, or any variant that allows for non-spherical disturbances,
depends on the assumption that the country-specic e¤ect i is uncorrelated with the other
right-hand side variables. This assumption is violated by (3.22) due to the presence of yit 1
as an explanatory variable since E [yit 1i] 6= 0: Thus, to estimate this equation it is rst
needed to eliminate i:
One approach to eliminating i that has been employed in the empirical literature in-
volves its interpretation as a country-specic constant term. This interpretation motivates
the implementation of a xed e¤ects estimator, as in Islam (1995) or the closely-related
between estimator. As an alternative, a second approach has involved the interpretation
of i as a country-specic random variable that is uncorrelated with the included regres-
sors. In particular one can use the feasible generalized least squares estimator (FGLS) if
13Table 1 presents the list of countries included in the sample.
14To be even more precise, the reasons for this averaging can be at least twofold: (i) to isolate from business
cycles and (ii) to stay in the Arellano Bond (1991) and Arellano Bover (1995) assumption of T < N .
60
the covariance structure of i + "it is taken as invariant. This is often characterized as the
random-e¤ects estimator. As Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) note, under either interpre-
tation, unless all explanatory variables are strictly exogenous, contemporaneous correlation
between explanatory variables and error terms will remain, and inconsistency will continue
to be problematic.
An alternative GMM-based approach can be derived by taking rst di¤erences of (3.22)
yit   yit 1 =  (yit 1   yit 2) + 0 (Xit  Xit 1) +
 
t   t 1

+ ("it   "it 1) (3.23)
The use of instruments is required to deal with the likely endogeneity of the explanatory
variables and with the problem that OLS procedures cannot be used to estimate ("it  
"it 1) because by construction the new error term is correlated with the lagged dependent
variable, yit 1  yit 2:Under the assumptions that the error term "it is not serially correlated
(E ["it"it j] = 0 for all j 6= 0) and that the period-specic constant is uncorrelated with
future realizations of the error term (E [t"it+s] = 0 for all t and s  0), Arellano and Bond
(1991) propose a GMM di¤erence estimator based on the following moment conditions:
E [yit s ("it   "it 1)] = 0 for t = 3; : : : ; T and s  2 (3.24)
E [Xit s ("it   "it 1)] = 0 for t = 3; : : : ; T and s  2 (3.25)
As discussed in Alonso Borrego and Arellano (1999), Blundell and Bond (1998) and Easterly
and Levine (2001), this di¤erence estimator has the statistical shortcoming that when the
explanatory variables are persistent, then lagged levels of the regressors are weak instruments
for the regression in di¤erences. To overcome the bias and imprecision associated with
the usual di¤erence estimator, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)
developed a systems estimator that combines the di¤erenced model (3.23) with the levels
model (3.22). In this case, the instruments for the regression in di¤erences are the same
as above while the instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged di¤erences of the
corresponding variables. In order to be able to use lagged di¤erences of the variables on
the right-hand side of (3.22) as valid instruments for the regression in levels, additional
identifying assumptions are needed. In particular, what is needed is the assumption that
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there is no correlation between the di¤erences of the regressors and the country-specic
e¤ect; i.e., interactions between the country-specic e¤ect and the regressors are stationary.
Moreover, the additional moment conditions for the second part of the system (the regression
in levels) are:
E [(yit s   yit s 1) (i + "it)] = 0 for s = 1 (3.26)
E [(Xit s  Xit s 1) (i + "it)] = 0 for s = 1 (3.27)
Therefore, using the moment conditions presented in (3.24), (3.25), (3.26) and (3.27) a GMM
procedure to generate consistent and e¢ cient parameter estimates of (3.22) was employed.
Still, the equation to be estimated is eventually a variation of (3.22):
yit = yit 1 + '1ERit + '2ERit  IFIit + IFIit + 0Xit + t + i + "it (3.28)
where ERit is the degree of exibility of the exchange rate regime, IFIit is the measure
of international nancial integration, Xit represents a set of explanatory variables (other
than lagged per capita GDP), t is a period-specic constant, i is an unobserved county-
specic e¤ect and time dummies to account for time-specic e¤ects and regional dummies
were also included. The set of control variables includes average years of secondary schooling
as a proxy for human capital ination, trade openness as imports and exports as a share
of GDP, the size of the government as government expenditure as proportion of GDP to
control for macroeconomic stability. In addition to this baseline framework, following Aghion,
Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogo¤ (2006) a dummy indicating the frequency of a systemic
banking crisis within each ve-year period interval is introduced. In this specic case, this
indicator controls for rare but severe episodes of aggregate instability and is a much broader
indicator where a bank run or a currency crisis are only a subset of the cases captured by
this index based on Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Glick and Hutchinson (2001). A more
detailed denition and sources for all variables included in this analysis are given in Tables
9, 10 and 11.
The main prediction of the model can be tested using (3.28) and implies that '1 < 0
and '2 > 0 so that the impact of exchange rate exibility is more negative at low levels
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Table 9: List of 85 countries included
COUNTRY WB CATEGORY* REGION** COUNTRY WB CATEGORY* REGION**
ALGERIA 2 4 MOROCCO 2 4
ARGENTINA 3 3 NEPAL 1 2
AUSTRALIA 4 5 NETHERLANDS 4 5
AUSTRIA 4 5 NEW ZEALAND 4 5
BANGLADESH 1 2 NICARAGUA 2 3
BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG 4 5 NIGER 1 1
BOLIVIA 2 3 NIGERIA 1 1
BRAZIL 2 3 NORWAY 4 5
BURKINA FASO 1 1 PAKISTAN 1 2
BURUNDI 1 1 PANAMA 3 3
CAMEROON 2 1 PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1 2
CANADA 4 5 PARAGUAY 2 3
CHILE 3 3 PERU 2 3
CHINA,P.R.: MAINLAND 2 2 PHILIPPINES 2 2
CHINA,P.R.:HONG KONG 4 2 PORTUGAL 4 5
COLOMBIA 2 3 SENEGAL 1 1
COSTA RICA 3 3 SIERRA LEONE 1 1
COTE D IVOIRE 1 1 SINGAPORE 4 2
DENMARK 4 5 SOUTH AFRICA 3 1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 2 3 SPAIN 4 5
ECUADOR 2 3 SRI LANKA 2 2
EGYPT 2 4 SWEDEN 4 5
EL SALVADOR 2 3 SWITZERLAND 4 5
FIJI 2 2 TANZANIA 1 1
FINLAND 4 5 THAILAND 2 2
FRANCE 4 5 TOGO 1 1
GABON 3 1 TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 3 3
GERMANY 4 5 TUNISIA 2 4
GHANA 1 1 TURKEY 3 4
GREECE 4 5 UNITED KINGDOM 4 5
GUATEMALA 2 3 UNITED STATES 4 5
GUYANA 2 3 URUGUAY 3 3
HAITI 1 3 VENEZUELA, REP. BOL. 3 3
HONDURAS 2 3 ZAMBIA 1 1
INDIA 1 2 ZIMBABWE 1 1
INDONESIA 2 2
IRAN, I.R. OF 2 4
IRELAND 4 5
ISRAEL 4 4
ITALY 4 5
JAMAICA 2 3
JAPAN 4 5
JORDAN 2 4
KENYA 1 1
KOREA 4 2
LESOTHO 2 1
MALAWI 1 1
MALAYSIA 3 2
MAURITIUS 3 1
MEXICO 3 3
* WB CATEGORY: 4 = high-income countries; 3= upper middle-income countries; 2= lower-middle income countries and
    1=low-income countries.
** REGION: 1= Africa; 2= Asia; 3= Latin America; 4= Middle Esst and 5= Industrial countries
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Table 10: Denitions and sources of variables included in the regressions
Variable Description Source
Real per capita GDP Ratio of total GDP to total population. GDP is in
1985 PPP-adjusted US$
Penn World Tables
GDP per capita growth log difference of real GDP per capita Penn World Tables
Degree of Exchange Rate
Flexibility - RR
See Section Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
Degree of Exchange Rate
Flexibility - LYS
See Section Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2003)
International Financial
Integration
See Section Chin and Ito (2006)
De Jure Index of Financial
Liberalization
See Section Ranciere, Tornell and
Westermann (2006) based on
Beckaert and Harvey (2005)
Total capital flows Sum of inflows and outflows as share of GDP International Financial
Statistics, IMF
Private credit Credit by banks and other financial intermediaries to
private enterprises as share of GDP
Beck and Levine (2002)
Average years of secondary
schooling
Average years of secondary schooling in the
population over 15
Barro and Lee (1996)
Openness to trade Log sum of exports and imports as share of GDP Penn World Tables
Government size Log government expenditure as share of GDP Penn World Tables
Inflation rate Log of 1 + difference of Consumer Price Index World Development Indicators
Crisis dummy Number of years in which a country underwent a
systemic banking or currency crisis, as a fraction of
the number of years in the corresponding period
Caprio and Klingebiel (1999)
and Gosh , Gulde and Wolf
(2000)
Terms of Trade Shocks
Standard deviation of the logarithm of terms of trade
growth
World Development Indicators
Years in Office
Years the chief executive has been in office Worldbank Database of
Political Institutions
Veto Points
Variable referred to the extent of institutionalized
constraints on the executive
Polcon_2002 Database
Variable1 Lagged value of variable
Table 11: Descriptive statistics and correlations
Mean Standard Deviation Minimun Maximum Observations
Real GDP per capita 8.34 1.04 5.81 10.28 678
GDP growth 2.21 2.90 -6.71 15.32 680
Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility - RR 6.21 3.74 1.00 13.00 619
Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility - LYS 2.25 0.75 1.00 3.00 473
International Financial Integration -0.04 1.40 -1.77 2.60 500
de jure Financial Liberalization 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 680
Total Flows 0.08 0.13 -0.37 1.37 447
Private Credit 3.29 0.91 0.23 5.27 571
Average years of secondary schooling 1.50 1.19 0.03 5.74 637
Openness to Trade 3.85 0.72 1.71 6.29 680
Government Size 2.86 0.44 1.03 4.21 674
Inflation Rate 0.14 0.25 -0.05 2.81 635
Crisis Dummy 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.67 680
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of IFI. Moreover, a similar analysis to Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogo¤ (2006) can
be followed by computing a threshold e¤ect where a threshold level of IFI can be obtained
above which a more exible exchange rate regime becomes growth enhancing. Thus, from
(3.28), the interest is to estimate the level of IFI such that an increase in the exibility of
the exchange rate regime turns positive the following expression
@yit
@ERit
= '1 + '2IFIit
When doing this analysis the standard errors associated with the threshold are obtained
using the delta method15.
Another interesting issue associated with the estimation of (3.28) is that  can be inter-
preted as the speed of convergence to steady state values of the growth rate. Furthermore,
; the annualized rate of conditional convergence, or divergence if negative, can be esti-
mated implicitly by the coe¢ cient estimates associated with lagged per capita GDP . In
particular,  = exp ( t) ; where t is the time distance between current and lagged income16.
To assess the validity of the instruments it is standard to consider two specication
tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998). First, Hansens (1982) J test of over-identication restrictions, which tests the
exogeneity assumption of the instruments. The second test examines the hypothesis that
the error term "it is not serially correlated. Indeed here two statistics are used: m1 and m2.
m1 test is of the null hypothesis of no rst-order serial correlation, which should be rejected
under the identifying assumption that "it is not serially correlated; and m2 test is of the null
hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, which should not be reject.
3.4 ESTIMATION RESULTS
In the next subsection the estimation results are presented. First the results of testing the
main theoretical hypothesis are presented followed by a discussion regarding convergence.
Then, endogeneity issues are addressed and nally, a robustness analysis is discussed.
15Although it is known that in small sample the delta method result in excessively large standard errors,
by bootstrapping similar values are obtained.
16In Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) more details about the link between  and  can be found.
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3.4.1 Exchange Rate Flexibility, International Financial Integration and Eco-
nomic Growth
Estimation results are presented in Tables 12, 13 and 14. Each table displays the results of
four regressions. In the rst column the e¤ects of the exchange rate measure along with the
measure of IFI and a set of control variables, without interaction term are displayed. The
second regression adds the interaction term of the exchange rate measure and the measure
of IFI in order to test the main prediction: that the exchange rate regime, has a negative
impact on long run growth when countries face a lower degree of IFI. In other words, this
implies a non linear e¤ect of exchange rate exibility on growth depending on the level of IFI.
The third and fourth columns replicate the same regressions with the addition of a dummy
variable indicating the frequency of a systemic crisis.
In Table 12, the rst regression is giving evidence of a negative e¤ect of the exibility
of exchange rate on per capita growth, something that is consistent with pervious studies.
The second regression shows that the interaction term of exchange rate exibility and IFI
is positive and signicant: the more the level of IFI of a country, the higher is the point
estimate of the impact of exchange rate exibility on productivity growth. Moreover, the
total e¤ect of the exibility of the exchange rate regime turns out to be signicant at a 5%
level (as indicated by the Wald test in Column 2). Although in this rst regression the degree
of domestic nancial integration is not signicant, its positive e¤ect on productivity growth
is strong when introducing the interaction e¤ect on the second regression. This positive
and signicant result is consistent with many previous studies about the e¤ect of nancial
development on growth. Furthermore -although not always signicant- education exerts a
positive impact while government burden has a signicant negative e¤ect in the per capita
growth. It will be clear from other specications that the latter impact is consistent and
robust across di¤erent specications.
By combining the degree of exchange rate exibility and the interaction e¤ect it is possible
to identify a threshold level of IFI above which a more rigid regime fosters economic growth.
In this case, the point estimate of the threshold is in the 82nd percentile, that is, in the upper
part of the distribution of the measure of IFI. In other words, only above this threshold a
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Table 12: Growth E¤ects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regimes
Dependent variable: log(Real GDP per capita)
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Output per Capita 0.4034 0.7013 0.3884 0.6721
(log(initial real GDP per capita)) (0.1222)*** (0.1071)*** (0.1277)*** (0.1157)***
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.0929 -0.0317 -0.0894 -0.0314
(Reinhart and Rogoff classification) (0.0415)** (0.0196)# (0.0408)** (0.0194)*
Financial Development 0.1632 0.2906 0.1777 0.2942
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.1613) (0.1066)*** (0.1525) (0.0941)***
International Financial Integration 0.2048 0.0527 0.2097 0.0599
(Chinn-Ito, capital account variable) (0.0996)** (0.0646) (0.1020)** (0.0662)
Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0192 0.0196
(0.0096)** (0.0098)**
Education 0.2691 0.0993 0.2660 0.1098
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (0.1228)** (0.0641) (0.1227)** (0.0652)*
Trade Openness 0.1560 0.0442 0.1403 0.0575
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.2235) (0.1979) (0.2149) (0.1883)
Government Burden -1.4867 -0.6788 -1.4884 -0.6530
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (0.4870)*** (0.1995)*** (0.5022)*** (0.1813)***
Price instability 0.8224 0.1175 0.8136 0.1307
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.3071)*** (0.2103) (0.3142)** (0.2079)
Crisis 0.0870 0.1324
(banking or currency crisis dummy) (0.1122) (0.1396)
Implied lambda 0.1135 0.0444 0.1182 0.0497(1 +? = exp(- ?t))
(0.0379)*** (0.0191)*** (0.0411)*** (0.0215)***
No. Countries 75 72 75 72
No. Observations 382 324 382 324
Specification Tests (p-values)
   (a) Hansen Test: 0.3981 0.430 0.288 0.515
   (b) Serial Correlation:
        First-Order 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.008
        Second-Order 0.289 0.825 0.295 0.585
Wald Tests (p-values)
Ho: Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect = 0 0.0178 0.0191
Ho: International Financial Intergration Total Effect = 0 0.0925 0.0994
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%
Threshold Analysis
Growth enhancing effect of exchange rate flexibility:
IFI variable greater than: 1.6823 1.6843
s.e. 1.0234 1.0225
Non-overlapping 5-year average
1960 - 2000
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more exible regime is growth enhancing. In particular, this level applies mostly to advanced
economies. Finally in the third and fourth columns, the crisis dummy variable is introduced
in the regressions and although it has the expected negative impact on productivity growth,
it is not signicant. Furthermore, the interaction term and its point estimate stay almost
unchanged.
The main result from Table 12 is that countries with lower levels of IFI may derive
growth benets from maintaining a rigid exchange rate regime. Thus, through this analysis
it is possible to get another and by now widespread accepted evidence of the Calvo and
Reinhart "fear of oating" behavior.
In Table 13, the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) exchange rate regime classication
is used. The rst and the third column indicate that the exibility of the exchange rate
regime has a signicant negative impact on economic growth. This e¤ect is economically
important: an increase of one unit in measure of the exibility or the exchange rate regime
leads to a 0.21 percent points reduction in annual economic growth -when controlling for
the impact of crises-. Regressions two and four show that the interactions between exchange
rate exibility and IFI are positive and signicant. As already discussed, this implies that
the more the level of IFI of a country, the less adversely it is a¤ected by the exibility of
the exchange rate regime -now captured through the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003)
classication-. To illustrate the main lesson here, an example can be considered. For instance,
Indonesia, which is a lower middle income country according to theWorld Bank classication,
increased approximately 83% its level of IFI measuring it through Chinn and Itos (2006)
index of de jure capital account openness. This drastic change decreases the negative impact
of a more exible exchange rate regime by a factor of 1.04. So, although not particularly big
in magnitude, the economic impact is statistically signicant. Furthermore, the combined
interacted and non-interacted coe¢ cients of exibility become signicant at the 10% level,
as indicated by the Wald tests. Regarding the threshold e¤ect below which a more rigid
regime fosters economic growth, the point estimate evidences a level in the 80th percentile,
that is, in the upper part of the distribution of the measure of IFI. It is worth noting here
that these are similar results as the one reported in Table 12. In other words, a more exible
regime is growth enhancing but only when you are above this threshold. Hence, this result
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Table 13: Growth E¤ects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regimes with LYS Classication
Dependent variable: log(Real GDP per capita)
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Output per Capita 0.6414 0.9386 0.6667 0.9302
(log(initial real GDP per capita)) (0.1082)*** (0.0426)*** (0.1170)*** (0.0355)***
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.1731 -0.0527 -0.2086 -0.0488
(Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger classification) (0.0760)** (0.0294)* (0.0991)** (0.0235)**
Financial Development 0.3353 0.1388 0.3498 0.1493
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.0613)*** (0.0275)*** (0.0711)*** (0.0260)***
International Financial Integration 0.0523 0.0972 0.0480 0.0997
(Chinn-Ito, capital account variable) (0.0313)* (0.0421)** (0.0292)* (0.0470)**
Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0392 0.0362
(0.0172)** (0.0181)**
Education 0.1017 0.0194 0.0886 0.0226
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (0.0510)** (0.0263) (0.0518)* (0.0237)
Trade Openness -0.1305 0.0316 -0.1318 0.0488
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.0984) (0.0392) (0.1216) (0.0382)
Government Burden -0.3462 -0.1495 -0.4176 -0.1759
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (0.2106)* (0.0570)** (0.2091)** (0.0541)***
Price instability 0.1089 0.0177 0.1074 0.0314
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.0964) (0.0436) (0.0956) (0.0313)
Crisis -0.1240 -0.0491
(banking or currency crisis dummy) (0.1285) (0.0575)
Implied lambda 0.0555 0.0478 0.0507 0.0090(1 +? = exp(- ?t))
(0.0211)*** (0.0201)** (0.0219)** (0.0048)*
No. Countries 80 80 81 80
No. Observations 393 393 394 393
Specification Tests (p-values)
   (a) Hansen Test: 0.422 0.206 0.345 0.998
   (b) Serial Correlation:
        First-Order 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.000
        Second-Order 0.227 0.282 0.265 0.370
Wald Tests (p-values)
Ho: Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect = 0 0.0742 0.1119
Ho: International Financial Intergration Total Effect = 0 0.0288 0.0508
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%
Threshold Analysis
Growth enhancing effect of exchange rate flexibility:
IFI variable greater than: 1.3903 1.3913
s.e. 0.9173 1.1461
Non-overlapping 5-year average
1960 - 2000
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is consistent with what was discussed before, and mostly applies to advanced economies.
What should be noted by now is the need for a more detailed analysis to disentangle the
potential di¤erences between rich and poor countries, something that will be discussed in
the next sections.
In Table 14, the classication of Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) is used again but now the
modication is the IFI measure. In particular, a de jure binary indicator constructed by
Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2006) using the o¢ cial dates of equity market liberation
described in Beckaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) is used. The regression in the rst
column is giving evidence of a negative e¤ect of the exchange rate regime on per capita
growth. This result is not changed when the crisis dummy variable is introduced in the third
column. Furthermore, the second regression shows that the interaction term of exchange
rate exibility and IFI is positive and signicant, although at a 10% level. Hence, again the
implication is that the more the level of IFI of a country, the higher is the point estimate
of the impact of exchange rate exibility on productivity growth. In terms of the combined
interacted and non-interacted coe¢ cient of exibility the Wald test showed a statistically
signicant e¤ect at the 5% level. Eventually, the crisis dummy variable is introduced in the
regressions and although again it has the expected negative impact on productivity growth,
it is not signicant. As in Tables 12 and 13, the degree of domestic nancial integration
has a clear positive and signicant e¤ect, giving evidence of the importance of nancial
intermediation on productivity growth.
3.4.2 Convergence Discussion
The measure of conditional convergence estimated in each regression of Tables 12, 13 and 14
deserves a brief discussion. First, the GMM system estimates of the speed of convergence is
statistically signicant in all regressions. In particular, when using the exchange rate regime
exibility measure of Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) and Chinn and Itos (2006) measure of
de jure capital account openness in Table 12, the point estimates vary between 0.4% and
1.2%. When using the classication of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) for exchange
rate regime exibility, the point estimates vary between 0.9% and 6%. Finally, using Rein-
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Table 14: Growth E¤ects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regimes with de jure Classi-
cation
Dependent variable: log(Real GDP per capita)
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Output per Capita 0.4463 0.8665 0.4601 0.8751
(log(initial real GDP per capita)) (0.1916)** (0.0662)*** (0.1895)** (0.0506)***
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.0405 0.0085 -0.0531 0.0097
(Reinhart and Rogoff classification) (0.0247)* (0.0051)* (0.0323)* (0.0059)*
Financial Development 0.6794 0.1747 0.6576 0.1565
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.2111)*** (0.0627)*** (0.2029)*** (0.0476)***
International Financial Integration 1.6133 0.2485 1.4200 0.2640
(de jure official equity market liberalization) (0.8052)** (0.1456)* (0.8365)* (0.1580)*
Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0295 0.0314
(0.0167)* (0.0181)*
Education 0.0713 0.0348 0.0803 0.0390
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (0.0968) (0.0314) (0.0899) (0.0339)
Trade Openness 0.1227 -0.0023 0.1077 -0.0046
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.2545) (0.0398) (0.2354) (0.0427)
Government Burden 0.0155 -0.2400 -0.0685 -0.2437
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (0.4405) (0.0731)*** (0.4335) (0.0755)***
Price instability 0.4695 -0.0113 0.4435 -0.0328
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.2690)* (0.0861) (0.2818) (0.0694)
Crisis -0.3338 0.1240
(banking or currency crisis dummy) (0.8699) (0.1026)
Implied lambda 0.1009 0.0179 0.0970 0.0167(1 +? = exp(- ?t))
(0.0637) (0.0096)* (0.0615) (0.0072)**
No. Countries 75 75 75 75
No. Observations 438 438 438 438
Specification Tests (p-values)
   (a) Hansen Test: 0.686 0.442 0.468 0.505
   (b) Serial Correlation:
        First-Order 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.000
        Second-Order 0.559 0.844 0.485 0.894
Wald Tests (p-values)
Ho: Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect = 0 0.0493 0.0658
Ho: International Financial Intergration Total Effect = 0 0.0905 0.0972
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%
Non-overlapping 5-year average
1960 - 2000
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hart and Rogo¤ (2004) and de jure binary indicator constructed by Ranciere, Tornell and
Westermann (2006) in Table 14, the signicant point estimates tend to uctuate around
1.8%. A widely used benchmark in conditional convergence analysis is the cross-section OLS
estimates of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003). They obtain a convergence estimate of 2.5%
using a broad set of explanatory variables. The results in this paper, are in line with DeJong
and Ripoll (2006) that highlighted the benets of using a GMM system estimator in this
type of analysis, and are close to the range of convergence estimates traditionally associated
with OLS estimators.
3.4.3 Endogeneity Discussion
In any growth regression analysis a standard question to address is the issue of endogene-
ity. More specically it is relevant to account both for possible endogeneity and the reverse
causation associated with the relationship that one tries to analyze. The GMM system esti-
mator used controls for the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables and accounts
explicitly for the biases induced by including the initial level of real GDP per capita in the
growth regressors. Moreover, the dynamic panel procedure using the GMM system esti-
mator is superior to the GMM di¤erence estimator where a weak-instrument bias is known
to plague the estimates, particularly given the use of persistent explanatory variables. As
pointed up in the previous section, the GMM system estimation procedure is valid only un-
der the assumption of weak exogeneity of the explanatory variables, which means that they
can be a¤ected by current and past realizations of the growth rate but must be uncorrelated
with the future realizations of the error term. Hansens (1982) J test of over-identication
restrictions, which tests the exogeneity assumption of the instruments, was used to test this
assumption. Tables 12, 13 and 14 report that the null hypothesis is not rejected, hence the
validity of instruments cannot be rejected.
In particular, the empirical approach used in this paper has several features that makes
it less vulnerable to a potential endogeneity bias. Since the focus here is on the contrasting
growth e¤ects of exchange rate exibility at di¤erent levels of IFI endogeneity is a second
order e¤ect. This last conclusion comes from the fact that focusing on an interaction term
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rather than on a single variable makes the analysis less sensitive to the potential endogeneity
bias17.
3.4.4 Robustness Checks
Tables 12, 13 and 14 presented above established evidence that the level of IFI plays a key
role in mitigating the negative e¤ects of exchange rate exibility on productivity growth.
Domestic nancial development appears always positive and signicant while control vari-
ables have the expected e¤ects: education a positive but not always signicant impact and
government burden a negative and always statistically signicant impact. Trade openness
and price stability usually lacked signicance. Moreover, results stay unchanged when the
e¤ects of crises are accounted for.
Nevertheless, since the channel through which exchange rates a¤ect productivity growth
in the model described is through a balance sheet e¤ect there is a key issue to account
for: the fact that rich and poor countries might be di¤erently a¤ected. As discussed in the
model, rather than just innovation, poor -credit constrained- countries engage in imitation
behavior. This feature does not alter the main prediction of the model, but certainly a¤ects
the empirical strategy. The fact that rich countries do not face credit constraints and poor
countries face them, determines that the amount of credit will be substantially di¤erent:
poor countries that imitate have less credit than rich countries that innovate. Furthermore,
poor countries may even need to borrow from international markets to imitate. This is
because there are information restrictions and domestic credit constraints that do not let
poor countries rely on such source of nancing. This argument motivates the need to analyze
poor and rich countries separately. Rather than using dummies and omitting a subgroup
of countries from the regression in Tables 12-14, this section will split the sample into two
subsamples: rich and poor, according to the World Bank classication18.
The regressions from Table 12 are repeated for poor and rich countries in Tables 15 and 16
17Another fact that may be diminishing the endogeneity bias is the exclusion of the category "free falling"
exchange rate regimes in the baseline regressions. This way, cases where low per capita growth and the
choice of exible exchange rate regime are explained simultaneously are not taken into account.
18The subsample division is based on the World Bank classication, such that categories 1 and 2 represent
the poorsample and categories 3 and 4 the richsample.
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Table 15: Growth E¤ects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regimes in Poor Countries
Dependent variable: log(Real GDP per capita)
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Output per Capita 0.8676 0.8630 0.8862 0.8877
(log(initial real GDP per capita)) (0.0532)*** (0.0569)*** (0.0789)*** (0.0723)***
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.0250 -0.0078 -0.0131 -0.0082
(Reinhart and Rogoff classification) (0.0089)*** (0.0047)* (0.0065)** (0.0049)*
Financial Development 0.1983 0.1550 0.1525 0.1899
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.0438)*** (0.0639)** (0.0644)** (0.0611)***
International Financial Integration 0.0297 0.0888 0.0225 0.0666
(Chinn-Ito, capital account variable) (0.0169)* (0.0323)** (0.0136)* (0.0279)**
Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0153 0.0128
(0.0077)** (0.0066)*
Education 0.1113 0.0814 0.0706 0.0614
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (0.0421)** (0.0548) (0.0482) (0.0458)
Trade Openness -0.0864 -0.0649 -0.0389 -0.0966
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.0518) (0.1262) (0.0846) (0.1059)
Government Burden -0.3648 -0.3201 -0.3571 -0.3225
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (0.0948)*** (0.0606)*** (0.1591)** (0.0866)***
Price instability -0.0860 -0.0976 -0.2009 -0.1439
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.0674) (0.1342) (0.3427) (0.1919)
Crisis -0.0844 -0.1661
(banking or currency crisis dummy) (0.1339) (0.2458)
Implied lambda 0.0177 0.0184 0.0151 0.0150?? = exp(- ?t))
(0.0077)** (0.0082)** (0.0091)* (0.0091)*
No. Countries 39 38 39 38
No. Observations 193 164 190 164
Specification Tests (p-values)
   (a) Hansen Test: 0.844 0.932 0.590 0.933
   (b) Serial Correlation:
        First-Order 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003
        Second-Order 0.336 0.908 0.540 0.948
Wald Tests (p-values)
Ho: Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect = 0 0.0853 0.1007
Ho: International Financial Intergration Total Effect = 0 0.1196 0.1101
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Threshold Analysis
Growth enhancing effect of exchange rate flexibility:
IFI variable greater than: 0.5117 0.6410
s.e. 0.3134 0.3739
Non-overlapping 5-year average
1960 - 2000
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Table 16: Growth E¤ects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regimes in Rich Countries
Dependent variable: log(Real GDP per capita)
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Output per Capita 0.9791 0.9510 0.9796 0.9483
(log(initial real GDP per capita)) (0.0749)*** (0.0882)*** (0.0924)*** (0.0692)***
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.0187 -0.0035 -0.0193 -0.0046
(Reinhart and Rogoff classification) (0.0097)* (0.0021)* (0.0102)* (0.0027)*
Financial Development 0.1175 0.1112 0.1131 0.1214
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.0420)*** (0.0419)** (0.0411)*** (0.0464)**
International Financial Integration 0.0171 0.0883 0.0249 0.0962
(Chinn-Ito, capital account variable) (0.0104)* (0.0468)* (0.0151)* (0.0542)*
Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0075 0.0072
(0.0042)* (0.0044)*
Education 0.0656 0.0100 0.0661 0.0168
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (0.0389)* (0.0053)* (0.0405)# (0.0096)*
Trade Openness 0.0228 0.0763 0.0362 0.0672
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.0688) (0.0622) (0.1115) (0.0446)
Government Burden -0.2498 -0.1683 -0.2562 -0.1825
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (0.1325)* (0.1017)* (0.1536)* (0.1102)*
Price instability -0.1584 -0.0262 -0.1302 -0.0564
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.1011) (0.2598) (0.1498) (0.1980)
Crisis 0.0910 0.0676
(banking or currency crisis dummy) (0.1329) (0.1225)
Implied lambda 0.0026 0.0063 0.0026 0.0066?? = exp(- ?t))
(0.0016)* (0.0032)* (0.0017)* (0.0039)*
No. Countries 36 34 36 34
No. Observations 192 160 192 160
Specification Tests (p-values)
   (a) Hansen Test: 0.735 0.997 0.985 0.997
   (b) Serial Correlation:
        First-Order 0.010 0.024 0.009 0.014
        Second-Order 0.340 0.633 0.273 0.703
Wald Tests (p-values)
Ho: Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect = 0 0.1253 0.1285
Ho: International Financial Intergration Total Effect = 0 0.0691 0.0707
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Threshold Analysis
Growth enhancing effect of exchange rate flexibility:
IFI variable greater than: 0.4766 0.6500
s.e. 0.2833 0.4001
Non-overlapping 5-year average
1960 - 2000
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respectively. These results are consistent with results from Table 12: the degree of exchange
rate exibility is negative and signicant, IFI remains positive and signicant and the inter-
action term between exchange rate exibility and IFI is also positive and signicant. When
comparing the point estimates of the interaction terms it is clear that poor countries face a
higher value than rich countries (Columns (2) and (4) from Tables 15 and 16). This result is
consistent and conrms the theory behind this empirical analysis: poor countries -that face
credit constraints- need to borrow from international markets a¤ected by their degree of IFI
implying a higher point estimate with respect to rich countries. Again in this case, domes-
tic nancial development appears positive and signicant, education positive -although not
always signicant-, government burden signicantly negative across specications and the
introduction of the crisis dummy did not reverse the main result. In terms of the total e¤ect
both for the exchange rate exibility measure and the IFI, Wald tests reported signicance
although usually at the 11%. Regarding the threshold e¤ect below which a more rigid regime
fosters economic growth, in Table 15, the point estimate proved signicant at the 5% and
evidences a level in the 89th percentile, something that is consistent with the poor countries
subsample.
Figures 8 and 9 show the entire "poor" distribution of IFI and the threshold value -when
crossing the horizontal axis-. In Table 16, the threshold is also signicant -at a 5% level- and
determines a level in the 48th percentile. Figures 10 and 11 show the "rich" distribution of
the IFI measure and the threshold values at 0.48 and 0.65 levels of IFI respectively. These
results are consistent with the fact that when facing low levels of IFI, moving from a exible
to a xed exchange rate is (more) growth enhancing. That is the reason why the threshold
is in the 89th percentile for the poor countries sample while in the 48th percentile for the
rich ones.
From Table 12, Column (4) the analysis might suggest that the direct impact of IFI on
growth per capita is at odds with the impact reported on Columns (4) from Tables 15 and 16
from the split of the whole sample into poor and rich. Nevertheless, it can be shown that the
quantitative implication of the IFI e¤ect on growth is consistent across all samples and the
seeming disagreement only arises from the fact that the poor sample is much more volatile
than the other samples. For instance, by keeping the degree of exchange rate exibility at
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Figure 8: International Financial Integration Threshold in Poor Countries [Table 15, Column (2)]
Figure 9: International Financial Integration Threshold in Poor Countries [Table 15, Column (4)]
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Figure 10: International Financial Integration Threshold in Rich Countries [Table 16, Column (2)]
Figure 11: International Financial Integration Threshold in Rich Countries [Table 16, Column (4)]
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Table 17: Growth E¤ects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regimes excluding by Region
Dependent variable: log(Real GDP per capita)
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Output per Capita 0.6993 0.7533 0.7094 0.7300
(log(initial real GDP per capita)) (0.1024)*** (0.1095)*** (0.1018)*** (0.1189)***
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.0157 -0.0051 -0.0167 -0.0059
(Reinhart and Rogoff classification) (0.0091)* (0.0031)* (0.0101)* (0.0036)*
D*Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.0139 -0.0043 -0.0073 -0.0044
(0.0074)* (0.0021)** (0.0075) (0.0022)**
Financial Development 0.1557 0.1991 0.1577 0.2056
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.0660)** (0.0640)*** (0.0659)** (0.0620)***
International Financial Integration 0.0124 0.0794 0.0152 0.0981
(Chinn-Ito, capital account variable) (0.0071)* (0.0480)* (0.0080)* (0.0482)**
D*International Financial Integration 0.0209 0.0192 0.0158 -0.0301
(0.0094)** (0.0116)* (0.0097)# (0.0135)**
Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0076 0.0078
(0.0041)* (0.0041)*
D*Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0109 0.0118
(0.0054)** (0.0072)*
Education 0.1001 0.0620 0.0969 0.0748
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (0.0671) (0.0627) (0.0751) (0.0691)
Trade Openness 0.0110 -0.0837 0.0096 -0.0772
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.1052) (0.0977) (0.1060) (0.0936)
Government Burden -0.5652 -0.5478 -0.5574 -0.5591
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (0.1534)*** (0.1473)*** (0.1597)*** (0.1597)***
Price instability 0.1286 0.1060 0.1141 0.1312
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.1974) (0.1066) (0.1783) (0.1208)
Crisis -0.1579 -0.1732
(banking or currency crisis dummy) (0.0908)* (0.1031)*
Implied lambda 0.0447 0.0354 0.0429 0.0393?? = exp(- ?t))
(0.0183)** (0.0182)* (0.0179)** (0.0203)*
No. Countries 75 73 75 73
No. Observations 382 378 382 378
Specification Tests (p-values)
   (a) Hansen Test: 0.332 0.461 0.229 0.251
   (b) Serial Correlation:
        First-Order 0.005 0.019 0.004 0.005
        Second-Order 0.896 0.677 0.865 0.665
Exclusion Tests (p-values)
Ho: Exchange Rate Flexibility Coeff. = 0 0.0301 0.1035 0.0752 0.0448
Ho: International Financial Intergration Coeff. = 0 0.0497 0.0838 0.0633 0.0887
Ho: Flexibility*International Financial Integration Coeff.= 0 0.1046 0.0425
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
D = 1 if country is categorized as 1 or 2 (poor) by the World Bank and 0 otherwise (rich)
Non-overlapping 5-year average
1960 - 2000
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its mean value -in each subsample-, a one standard deviation increase in IFI is associated
with a 0.25 percent increase in growth19. The equivalent impacts for the poor and the rich
samples are 0.28 and 0.20 percent, respectively, something that is consistent with the fact
that the whole sample results are a weighted average of the poor and the rich ones20. The
impact of IFI remains positive and signicant both for the poor and the rich countries. In
fact, as suggested before, the volatility of the poor sample is higher than that of the whole
and the rich samples: in particular, the standard deviation of the whole, the poor and the
rich samples are 1.40, 1.97 and 1.45, respectively.
In Table 17 another perspective is taken by using the whole sample and dening an
indicator variable D that takes the value of 1 if the country is categorized as 1 or 2 (poor)
by the World Bank and 0 otherwise (rich). This dummy variable is then interacted with the
degree of exchange rate exibility, the measure of IFI and the interaction e¤ect. Proceeding
this way is an alternative for dividing the whole sample into poor and rich. In fact, the
regressions presented in Table 17 proved consistent with the original Table 12 and with
Tables 15 and 16 and the main conclusions hold. Furthermore, all terms interacted with
the dummy variable are signicant with the correct sign. Thus, it is possible to assess the
signicance of the "reference" category -poor countries- by using exclusion tests. Columns
1-4 from Table 17 show exclusion tests for exchange rate exibility, IFI and their interaction
e¤ect. In all three cases the null hypothesis is rejected usually at the 5% level (although
in some cases at 10%) what implies that there is evidence that favors the argument that
the e¤ect is sensitive to the choice of country groups. In fact, there is a signicant direct
e¤ect in the poor countries sample. Thus, the hypothesis that poor countries that need to
borrow from international markets a¤ected by the degree of IFI exerts a higher interaction
e¤ect point estimate with respect to rich countries is conrmed. For instance, from the
exclusion test of the coe¢ cients of Flexibility  International F inancial Integration and
D  Flexibility  International F inancial Integration it is concluded they are signicant
at the 5% level (with a p-value of 0.0425 in Column (4) of Table 17). This implies that the
e¤ect of the poor countries is (0:0078 + 0:0118) percentage of annual GDP growth, which
19The estimated impact is found to be signicant at a 10%.
20The estimated impacts are found to be signicant at a 5% in the poor sample and at 10% for the rich
sample.
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compares to the 0.0128 from Column (4) from Table 15.
In Tables 18 and 19, the regressions from Table 13 are repeated for poor and rich countries
using the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) exchange rate regime classication. Similar
to the previous exchange rate classication -Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004)- in Tables 15 and 16,
the results presented in Tables 18 and 19 are consistent with Table 13 and the conclusions
hold: the degree of exchange rate exibility is negative and signicant, IFI remains positive
and signicant and the interaction term between exchange rate exibility and IFI is also
positive and signicant. Hence, at lower levels of IFI countries may derive growth benets
from maintaining a rigid exchange rate regime. Also, poor countries face a higher point
estimate than rich countries (Columns (2) and (4) from Tables 18 and 19) something that
is consistent with and conrms the argument that poor countries, facing credit constraints,
need to borrow from international markets inuenced by their degree of IFI.
Regarding the threshold e¤ect, in Table 18, Figures 12 and 13 show the entire "poor"
distribution where the point estimate proved signicant at the 11% and evidences a level
in the 90th percentile, consistent with results from Table 15 using the Reinhart and Rogo¤
(2004) classication. In a similar fashion, Figures 14 and 15 show the "rich" distribution
of the IFI measure with the corresponding threshold values of 1.149 and 1.390 at the 54th
and 65th percentiles respectively. Finally, Table 20 reports equivalent results consistent with
Tables 13, 18 and 19. In fact, it can be concluded that using the indicator variable D to
denote a poor country, results show that countries with lower levels of IFI may derive growth
benets from maintaining a rigid exchange rate regime. The exclusion tests give evidence
of a di¤erential e¤ect that is sensitive to the choice of country groups consistent with the
conclusion from Table 17 in terms of sign and magnitude of the coe¢ cients.
Tables 21 and 22 repeat the regression from Table 14 for poor and rich countries using
the de jure measure of IFI constructed by Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2006). Re-
sults once again conrm those from Table 14 and reinforce those from Tables 15 and 16 and
Tables 18 and 19. Hence, (i) at lower levels of IFI countries may derive growth benets from
maintaining a rigid exchange rate regime and (ii) poor countries face a higher point estimate
than rich countries (Columns (2) and (4) from Tables 21 and 22). Moreover, domestic nan-
cial development is strongly positive and signicant while government burden is signicantly
81
Table 18: Growth E¤ects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regimes with LYS Classication
in Poor Countries
Dependent variable: log(Real GDP per capita)
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Output per Capita 0.7674 0.7721 0.7969 0.8096
(log(initial real GDP per capita)) (0.0937)*** (0.1122)*** (0.1306)*** (0.0934)***
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.0302 -0.0249 -0.0250 -0.0194
(Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger classification) (0.0161)* (0.0151)* (0.0149)* (0.0109)*
Financial Development 0.2913 0.1451 0.2992 0.1795
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.0794)*** (0.0543)** (0.1001)*** (0.0581)***
International Financial Integration 0.0516 0.0492 0.0261 0.0413
(Chinn-Ito, capital account variable) (0.0206)** (0.0259)* (0.0138)* (0.0252)*
Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0308 0.0265
(0.0149)** (0.0155)*
Education 0.0744 0.0466 0.0495 0.0482
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (0.0381)** (0.0393) (0.0302)* -0.0397
Trade Openness -0.0828 -0.0353 0.1008 -0.1183
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.1425) (0.1015) (0.1003) (0.1228)
Government Burden -0.4834 -0.4856 -0.2521 -0.4684
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (0.1904)** (0.2312)** (0.1124)** (0.1594)***
Price instability 0.1451 -0.1000 0.0096 -0.0124
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.1264) (0.0989) (0.1134) (0.0668)
Crisis -0.4910 -0.4171
(banking or currency crisis dummy) (0.2553)* (0.1459)***
Implied lambda 0.0331 0.0322 0.0282 0.0262?? = exp(- ?t))
(0.0153)** (0.0136)** (0.0163)* (0.0156)*
No. Countries 43 43 43 43
No. Observations 206 206 206 206
Specification Tests (p-values)
   (a) Hansen Test: 0.401 0.999 0.471 0.989
   (b) Serial Correlation:
        First-Order 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.002
        Second-Order 0.211 0.238 0.247 0.296
Wald Tests (p-values)
Ho: Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect = 0 0.0862 0.1134
Ho: International Financial Intergration Total Effect = 0 0.0629 0.0326
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Threshold Analysis
Growth enhancing effect of exchange rate flexibility:
IFI variable greater than: 0.8102 0.7588
s.e. 0.4787 0.4670
Non-overlapping 5-year average
1960 - 2000
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Table 19: Growth E¤ects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regimes with LYS Classication
in Rich Countries
Dependent variable: log(Real GDP per capita)
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Output per Capita 0.8537 0.8678 0.8647 0.8697
(log(initial real GDP per capita)) (0.1069)*** (0.1249)*** (0.1458)*** (0.1301)***
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.1215 -0.0319 -0.1606 -0.0275
(Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger classification) (0.0711)* (0.0187)* (0.0902)* (0.0156)*
Financial Development 0.2069 0.1218 0.2246 0.1317
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.0967)** (0.0579)** (0.1159)* (0.0739)*
International Financial Integration 0.0237 0.0293 0.0209 0.0259
(Chinn-Ito, capital account variable) (0.0129)* (0.0167)* (0.0128)# (0.0147)*
Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0292 0.0264
(0.0143)** (0.0172)*
Education -0.0197 -0.0307 0.0170 -0.0337
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (0.0704) (0.0685) (0.0840) (0.0694)
Trade Openness -0.1336 -0.0234 -0.0504 -0.0820
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.1651) (0.1338) (0.1516) (0.1269)
Government Burden -0.4374 -0.1419 -0.5271 -0.2327
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (0.1994)** (0.0655)** (0.2024)** (0.0879)**
Price instability -0.2362 -0.1400 -0.2722 -0.2979
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.2192) (0.1753) (0.1910) (0.0969)***
Crisis 0.1675 0.0493
(banking or currency crisis dummy) (0.2736) (0.1209)
Implied lambda 0.0331 0.0322 0.0282 0.0262?? = exp(- ?t))
(0.0101)* (0.0102)* (0.0109)* (0.0112)
No. Countries 37 37 37 37
No. Observations 187 187 187 187
Specification Tests (p-values)
   (a) Hansen Test: 0.386 0.997 0.369 0.977
   (b) Serial Correlation:
        First-Order 0.034 0.007 0.023 0.008
        Second-Order 0.463 0.407 0.658 0.449
Wald Tests (p-values)
Ho: Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect = 0 0.1535 0.1347
Ho: International Financial Intergration Total Effect = 0 0.0529 0.0426
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Threshold Analysis
Growth enhancing effect of exchange rate flexibility:
IFI variable greater than: 1.1497 1.3903
s.e. 0.7398 0.8460
Non-overlapping 5-year average
1960 - 2000
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Figure 12: International Financial Integration Threshold in Poor Countries [Table 18, Column (2)]
Figure 13: International Financial Integration Threshold in Poor Countries [Table 18, Column (4)]
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Figure 14: International Financial Integration Threshold in Rich Countries [Table 19, Column (2)]
Figure 15: International Financial Integration Threshold in Rich Countries [Table 19, Column (4)]
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Table 20: Growth E¤ects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regimes with LYS Classication
excluding by Region
Dependent variable: log(Real GDP per capita)
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Output per Capita 0.6057 0.8972 0.5616 0.8996
(log(initial real GDP per capita)) (0.1590)*** (0.0496)*** (0.1391)*** (0.0572)***
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.1200 -0.0357 -0.1840 -0.0280
(Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger classification) (0.0724)* (0.0174)** (0.0839)** (0.0171)*
D*Degree of the Exchange Flexibility 0.0869 0.0118 0.1592 0.0126
(0.0605) (0.0068)* (0.0732)** (0.0062)**
Financial Development 0.3481 0.1838 0.3556 0.1927
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.0883)*** (0.0434)*** (0.0637)*** (0.0451)***
International Financial Integration 0.0229 0.0266 0.0239 0.0268
(Chinn-Ito, capital account variable) (0.0123)* (0.0160)* (0.0117)** (0.0159)*
D*International Financial Integration 0.0329 0.0199 0.0107 0.0155
(0.0159)** (0.0121)* (0.0145) (0.0119)
Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0256 0.0241
(0.0122)** (0.0146)*
D*Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0064 0.0058
(0.0036)* (0.0035)*
Education 0.1072 0.0141 0.0990 0.0176
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (0.0493)** (0.0367) (0.0510)* (0.0409)
Trade Openness -0.1019 -0.0161 -0.1361 -0.0010
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.1394) (0.0537) (0.1017) (0.0680)
Government Burden -0.3040 -0.2748 -0.2749 -0.2599
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (0.2404) (0.1069)** (0.2202) (0.1270)**
Price instability 0.0707 -0.0314 0.1191 -0.0455
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.0940) (0.0706) (0.1074) (0.0715)
Crisis -0.0321 -0.2481
(banking or currency crisis dummy) (0.0899) (0.1262)*
Implied lambda 0.0627 0.0136 0.0721 0.0132?? = exp(- ?t))
(0.0328)* (0.0069)* (0.0310)** (0.0079)*
No. Countries 80 80 80 80
No. Observations 393 393 393 393
Specification Tests (p-values)
   (a) Hansen Test: 0.422 0.850 0.399 0.836
   (b) Serial Correlation:
        First-Order 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.000
        Second-Order 0.359 0.288 0.228 0.281
Exclusion Tests (p-values)
Ho: Exchange Rate Flexibility Coeff. = 0 0.1155 0.1185 0.0627 0.0908
Ho: International Financial Intergration Coeff. = 0 0.0419 0.0705 0.0974 0.0941
Ho: Flexibility*International Financial Integration Coeff.= 0 0.0922 0.0518
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
D = 1 if country is categorized as 1 or 2 (poor) by the World Bank and 0 otherwise (rich)
Non-overlapping 5-year average
1960 - 2000
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Table 21: Growth E¤ects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regimes with de jure Classi-
cation in Poor Countries
Dependent variable: log(Real GDP per capita)
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Output per Capita 0.7093 0.8699 0.7845 0.9125
(log(initial real GDP per capita)) (0.1703)*** (0.0614)*** (0.2876)*** (0.0908)***
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.0852 -0.0172 -0.0794 -0.0181
(Reinhart and Rogoff classification) (0.0293)*** (0.0106)# (0.0320)** (0.0111)#
Financial Development 0.4068 0.1072 0.4401 0.1730
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.1453)*** (0.0398)** (0.1931)** (0.0638)**
International Financial Integration 0.9985 0.2432 0.9893 0.3930
(de jure official equity market liberalization) (0.6009)* (0.1426)* (0.6031)* (0.2167)*
Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0324 0.0305
(0.0167)* (0.0185)*
Education 0.0977 0.0719 0.0826 0.0859
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (0.0936) (0.0333)** (0.1018) (0.0427)*
Trade Openness -0.0807 -0.0536 -0.1034 -0.0768
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.1900) (0.0470) (0.2102) (0.0838)
Government Burden -0.5206 -0.2408 -0.4761 -0.3228
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (0.2453)** (0.1300)* (0.2904) (0.1823)*
Price instability 0.1112 -0.1131 0.1035 -0.0746
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.1593) (0.0794) (0.1785) (0.0657)
Crisis -0.5794 -0.0734
(banking or currency crisis dummy) (1.8047) (0.3304)
Implied lambda 0.0429 0.0174 0.0303 0.0114?? = exp(- ?t))
(0.0259)* (0.0063)** (0.0268) (0.0067)*
No. Countries 39 39 39 39
No. Observations 214 214 214 214
Specification Tests (p-values)
   (a) Hansen Test: 0.989 0.998 0.977 0.972
   (b) Serial Correlation:
        First-Order 0.006 0.001 0.030 0.000
        Second-Order 0.637 0.230 0.679 0.838
Wald Tests (p-values)
Ho: Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect = 0 0.0698 0.0904
Ho: International Financial Intergration Total Effect = 0 0.0841 0.0501
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Non-overlapping 5-year average
1960 - 2000
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Table 22: Growth E¤ects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regimes with de jure Classi-
cation in Rich Countries
Dependent variable: log(Real GDP per capita)
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Output per Capita 0.7993 0.8161 0.8051 0.8287
(log(initial real GDP per capita)) (0.1409)*** (0.1341)*** (0.1126)*** (0.1665)***
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.0142 -0.0161 -0.0174 -0.0213
(Reinhart and Rogoff classification) (0.0085)* (0.0063)** (0.0096)* (0.0080)***
Financial Development 0.1546 0.1825 0.1933 0.1941
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.0849)* (0.1070)* (0.0841)** (0.1136)*
International Financial Integration 0.1864 0.2111 0.2292 0.2611
(de jure official equity market liberalization) (0.1047)* (0.1172)* (0.1261)* (0.1230)**
Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0227 0.0239
(0.0113)** (0.0121)**
Education -0.0462 0.1347 -0.0577 0.1549
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (0.0681) (0.0829) (0.0671) (0.0911)*
Trade Openness -0.1505 -0.0867 -0.0387 -0.0992
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.0848)* (0.1212) (0.1218) (0.1447)
Government Burden -0.4275 -0.4202 -0.4432 -0.4622
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (0.2284)* (0.2511)* (0.2363)* (0.2695)*
Price instability -0.1489 0.0568 -0.1782 0.0824
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.1481) (0.3067) (0.2089) (0.3057)
Crisis 0.1111 0.0560
(banking or currency crisis dummy) (0.1967) (0.1652)
Implied lambda 0.0280 0.0254 0.0271 0.0235?? = exp(- ?t))
(0.0155)* (0.0128)** (0.0164)* (0.0141)*
No. Countries 36 36 36 36
No. Observations 224 224 224 224
Specification Tests (p-values)
   (a) Hansen Test: 0.902 0.955 0.833 0.917
   (b) Serial Correlation:
        First-Order 0.029 0.023 0.020 0.030
        Second-Order 0.437 0.252 0.247 0.263
Wald Tests (p-values)
Ho: Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect = 0 0.1292 0.1036
Ho: International Financial Intergration Total Effect = 0 0.0384 0.0274
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Non-overlapping 5-year average
1960 - 2000
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Table 23: Growth E¤ects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regimes with de jure Classi-
cation excluding by Region
Dependent variable: log(Real GDP per capita)
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Output per Capita 0.5389 0.7043 0.5124 0.6241
(log(initial real GDP per capita)) (0.1114)*** (0.0970)*** (0.1125)*** (0.1090)***
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.0160 -0.0102 -0.0182 -0.0228
(Reinhart and Rogoff classification) (0.0075)** (0.0061)* (0.0096)* (0.0102)**
D*Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.0767 -0.0094 -0.0677 0.0079
(0.0407)* (0.0057)* (0.0414)* (0.0056)
Financial Development 0.5473 0.2191 0.5396 0.2429
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.1276)*** (0.0881)** (0.1198)*** (0.0738)***
International Financial Integration 0.2008 0.1976 0.2044 0.2511
(de jure official equity market liberalization) (0.1052)* (0.1071)* (0.1104)* (0.1166)**
D*International Financial Integration 0.7596 0.0576 0.7437 0.0973
(0.3555)** (0.0309)* (0.4328)* (0.0453)**
Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0212 0.0233
(0.0105)** (0.0113)**
D*Flexibility*International Financial Integration 0.0106 0.0104
(0.0055)* (0.0063)*
Education 0.0874 0.0587 0.0837 0.0682
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (0.0995) (0.0355)* (0.0988) (0.0408)*
Trade Openness -0.2118 -0.1849 -0.2389 -0.1136
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.1633) (0.1264) (0.1730) (0.1299)
Government Burden -0.5823 -0.6029 -0.6814 -0.6535
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (0.3355)* (0.2135)*** (0.3581)* (0.2281)***
Price instability 0.2485 0.0500 0.2735 0.1173
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.1774) (0.1129) (0.1849) (0.1492)
Crisis 0.2104 0.2413
(banking or currency crisis dummy) (0.1186)* (0.1238)*
Implied lambda 0.0773 0.0438 0.0836 0.0589?? = exp(- ?t))
(0.0411)* (0.0172)** (0.0450)* (0.0218)**
No. Countries 75 75 75 75
No. Observations 438 438 438 438
Specification Tests (p-values)
   (a) Hansen Test: 0.934 0.879 0.943 0.422
   (b) Serial Correlation:
        First-Order 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.009
        Second-Order 0.382 0.844 0.153 0.678
Exclusion Tests (p-values)
Ho: Exchange Rate Flexibility Coeff. = 0 0.0255 0.0979 0.0542 0.1432
Ho: International Financial Intergration Coeff. = 0 0.0922 0.0388 0.0186 0.0254
Ho: Flexibility*International Financial Integration Coeff.= 0 0.0778 0.0486
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
D = 1 if country is categorized as 1 or 2 (poor) by the World Bank and 0 otherwise (rich)
Non-overlapping 5-year average
1960 - 2000
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negative across specications. Finally, results from Table 23 -using the indicator variable D-
are consistent with the evidence presented before that countries with lower levels of IFI may
derive growth benets from maintaining a rigid exchange rate regime. In fact, the exclusion
tests are also giving evidence -although usually at the 10% level- of a di¤erential e¤ect that
is sensitive to the choice of country groups.
3.4.5 Exchange Rate E¤ects Decomposition
Another approach to the endogeneity issue is to rely on the existing literature that tries
to explain exchange rate regimes. As also discussed by Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and
Rogo¤ (2006), the literature on the endogeneity of exchange rate regimes is extensive and
largely inconclusive. To focus on a recent paper, using the classication of Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2003), Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Reggio (2004) nd that some political
variables can explain the likelihood of adopting a given exchange rate regime. Based on
this idea of a "good" instrument, this section will try to isolate the extent to which IFI is
a¤ecting the choice of exchange rate regime and the extent to which it is a¤ecting per capita
growth.
The e¤ect of IFI on growth will be decomposed into two channels: a direct growth
channel and an indirect exchange rate regime channel e¤ect. The latter e¤ect captures
the choice of exchange rate regime determinants and will follow the discussion by Levy-
Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Reggio (2004). The main advantage of this approach is that it
quantitatively allows to compare the expected growth benets coming from the degree of
IFI with a more xed exchange rate regime with the growth e¤ects arising from a more
exible regime.
The methodology used here consists of a treatment e¤ects model as described by Heck-
man (1978). This technique, largely used in labor economics, has recently been applied to
growth regressions by Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2006). The empirical strategy
will consist in adding to a growth regression that includes the degree of IFI a propensity to
peg dummy that will be described below. Moreover, the propensity to peg variable will be
considered endogenous and depending on several variables including the degree of IFI. This
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way, the impact of the degree of IFI on growth is composed of two e¤ects: (i) a direct e¤ect
on growth conditional on an augmented set of control variables that includes IFI, and (ii)
an indirect e¤ect reecting the growth e¤ects associated with a higher propensity to peg the
exchange rate. Letting the subscripts i and t represent country and time period respectively,
the equation considered is given by
yit = Xit + IFIit + 'I
peg
it + "it (3.29)
Ipegit =
8<: 1 if aZit + bIFIit + it > 00 otherwise (3.30)
where yit is the growth rate of the logarithm of real per capita GDP in country i at time
t, Xit represents the set of explanatory variables used in the previous sections, IFIit is the
measure of international nancial integration21. Ipegit is the propensity to peg dummy variable
that takes on a value of 1 if country i is classied as xed exchange rate regime in period
t according to the Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) exchange rate classication and a value of 0
otherwise22. Zit is a set of control variables used by Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Reggio
(2004) that reects the three main approaches to account for the way exchange rate regimes
are chosen23: (i) the optimal currency area theory, (ii) the nancial view and (iii) the political
view. To account for the optimal currency area theory the variables included are the GDP
per capita, trade openness, and terms of trade shocks to capture the incidence of real shocks.
The nancial view, which highlights the consequences of international nancial integration,
is captured by the measure of IFI and a measure of total capital ows (inward and outward
ows of portfolio investments and nancial derivatives as a share of GDP). Finally, the
political view, which stresses the use of exchange rate anchors as credibility enhancers in
politically challenged economies is captured by including a variable of the number of years
that the incumbent administration has been in o¢ ce (years in o¢ ce) and a variable of the
number of veto points in the political system (veto points) as reported in Henisz (2002), which
measures directly the constraints on the executive. This last variable represents a measure
21Time dummies to account for time-specic e¤ects are also included.
22In particular, when the exchange rate regime classication is below or equal to 7, the regime is classied
as xed and the variable Ipegit takes the value of 1.When is greater or equal to 8, the regime is classied as
exible and the variable Ipegit takes the value of 0.
23The reader is referred to Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Reggio (2004) for a detailed discussion.
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of government weakness. Lagged values (indicated by placing a 1 after the variable) were
used where endogeneity may be a concern. Moreover, all regressions include year dummies.
The detailed description of each variable is presented in Table 10.
3.4.5.1 (Two-Step) Estimation Procedure To complete the treatment e¤ects model
description and show how this model can be estimated in a two-step procedure an additional
assumption needs to be made: it will be distributed N(0; 1) so
Ipegit =
8<: 1 with Pr (aZit + bIFIit + it > 0) =  [aZit + bIFIit]0 with Pr (aZit + bIFIit + it  0) = 1   [aZit + bIFIit] (3.31)
where  is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal, hence this can be
estimated using a probit model. Moreover, as shown by Maddala (1983) if it is also assumed
that the error terms follow a bivariate normal but not independent distribution this model
can be estimated in a two-step procedure24. The rst step implies the estimation of the
probit model (3.31) and the construction of the hazard rate hit25. In the second step, the
growth regression (3.29) is estimated including, as an additional regressor, the hazard rate
hit: Therefore, the total e¤ect of IFI is the sum of a direct e¤ect, ; and an indirect e¤ect
due to a change in the probability (propensity) to peg.
Finally, although for estimation purposes the annual frequency of the data is convenient,
the growth regression does not allow to lter out uctuations at the business cycle frequency.
Hence, a possible solution is to combine a growth regression estimated using ve-year averages
with a probit propensity to peg model estimated at an annual frequency. In other words,
the rst step remains the same but, the second step is modied to allow for the possibility
of pegging the currency in any given year during the ve-year period.
24Actually, Heckman (1978) and Maddala (1983) show that the model can also be jointly estimated by a
maximum likelihood procedure.
25The hazard rate can be written as:
hi;j =
8><>:
(baZit+bbIFIit)
[baZit+bbIFIit] if Iit = 1
 (baZit+bbIFIit)
f1 [baZit+bbIFIit]g if Iit = 0
where  is the density function of the standard normal and ba and bb are the probit estimates.
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3.4.5.2 Decomposition Results The main results are presented in Table 24 and can
be summarized as follows. First, for the full sample using annual and ve-year average data,
IFI has a signicant direct positive e¤ect on per capita GDP growth with a b > 0. Second,
the propensity to peg, estimated through the probit equation, has a positive and signicant
impact on growth with a b' > 0: This implies that moving from a exible exchange rate
regime to a xed one has a positive impact on per capita GDP growth. Third, due to the
fact that bb > 0; the degree of IFI increases the propensity to peg the currency. Openness
to trade and total capital ows are associated with a higher propensity to peg the currency
while the number of years in o¢ ce of the incumbent executive and the veto points have a
negative inuence.
For the poor and the rich countries samples, in terms of the growth equation, both the
IFI and the propensity to peg have a signicant direct impact what gives evidence that
pegging the currency may be growth enhancing. These last results -both for the whole and
the poor and rich samples- were already conrmed by the dynamic panel analysis in the
previous section. Regarding the treatment equation, the degree of IFI clearly increases the
propensity to peg the currency in both samples.
In order to get some geographic perspective of the di¤erent countries involved in the poor
and rich subsamples, this section also exploits the division of the sample into regions following
the World Bank categories. The results for the ve-year average for the di¤erent regions are
the following. First, for the industrialized countries, Latin America and the Middle East, the
degree of IFI has a signicant direct positive e¤ect on per capita GDP growth. For Africa and
Asia, although the coe¢ cients are positive the showed not signicant at a 10%26. Second,
the propensity to peg has a signicant positive impact on growth for all the regions with the
exception of the industrialized countries. The latter group, although the impact is positive
it is not signicant. As before, when b' > 0, implies that the move from a exible regime
to a xed one is growth enhancing. Third, the degree of IFI increases the propensity to peg
the currency in general. For Africa, Latin America and the Middle East countries, the e¤ect
is clearly positive. That is, it generates a higher propensity to peg. For the industrialized
countries, although the IFI increases the propensity to peg the e¤ect is not signicant at a
26At least for Asia, some intuition for this result was coming from the Figure 7.
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Table 24: International Financial Integration, Flexibility of Exchange Rate and Growth
Estimation: Treatment Effect Model, Two Step Estimation
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period 1960 - 2000 1960 - 2000 1960 - 2000 1960 - 2000 1960 - 2000 1960 - 2000 1960 - 2000 1960 - 2000 1960 - 2000
Sample: Whole Whole Poor Countries Rich Countries Industrial Africa Asia Latin America Middle East
Unit of observation: Annual Non-overlapping Non-overlapping Non-overlapping Non-overlapping Non-overlapping Non-overlapping Non-overlapping Non-overlapping
5-year average 5-year average 5-year average 5-year average 5-year average 5-year average 5-year average 5-year average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Growth Equation
Dependent variable: Real per capita GDP growth
Initial Output per Capita -0.7184 -0.5288 -0.9111 -0.4270 0.2261 0.1939 -2.8425 -0.8019 -1.5450
(log(initial real GDP per capita)) (0.2193)*** (0.2903)* (0.5363)* (0.2468)* (0.4054) (0.3421) (2.2251) (0.8483) (1.5199)
International Financial Integration 0.2619 0.3090 0.5186 0.2836 0.4353 0.1504 0.2484 0.7085 0.8012
(Chinn-Ito, capital account variable) (0.1254)** (0.1508)** (0.1556)*** (0.1622)* (0.1995)** (0.4816) (0.5238) (0.4217)* (0.5661)*
Trade Openness 0.3160 0.5877 0.6303 0.3854 -0.7835 1.6266 2.1251 -0.3422 1.9434
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.2334) (0.3691) (0.5821) (0.4410) (0.6051) (0.7029)** (1.5229) (0.5289) (1.1200)*
Government Burden -0.4800 -0.4880 -0.3394 -0.2135 2.3717 -0.7280 0.3646 -0.9464 -0.4403
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (0.3000)* (0.3705) (0.3826) (0.2098) (1.3131)* (1.1887) (2.6901) (0.8957) (1.3193)
Price instability -3.4422 -1.6086 -1.7427 -1.4190 -18.0956 -5.8650 -15.9753 -1.6356 8.8841
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.9551)*** (0.5085)*** (0.5974)*** (0.6663)** (6.3651)*** (1.9557)*** (11.3888) (0.5193)*** (2.8136)***
Crisis -1.0322 -2.3531 -3.2503 -2.0585 -2.9228 -7.6947 -1.6329 -0.6197 -14.7934
(banking or currency crisis dummy) (0.5708)* (0.8340)*** (1.1567)*** (1.0723)* (0.9471)*** (4.1498)* (1.8900) (1.8509) (3.7103)***
Propensity to Peg 2.1734 2.7911 3.0191 1.9822 0.5417 1.6457 4.7466 2.8325 4.3978
(dummy based on RR classification) (1.1028)** (1.3284)** (1.3729)** (1.2006)* (1.3154) (1.0048)# (2.3233)** (1.7542)* (2.6817)*
First-Step Hazard 1.3213 1.3213 2.6716 -1.1977 -1.3231 -0.8359 -0.2758 1.3070 1.1990
(0.7004)* (0.7004)* (1.4921)* (0.5781)** (0.9873) (0.9806) (1.1012) (1.1543) (1.6874)
Panel B: Treatment (Probit) Equation
Dependent variable: Propensity to Peg
Initial Output per Capita1 -0.2797 -0.2001 -0.3305 -0.6001 0.1865 0.1241 0.1280 -1.7933
(log(initial real GDP per capita)) (0.0422)*** (0.0613)*** (0.0859)*** (0.1253)*** (0.0863)** (0.2315) (0.1514) (0.7008)***
Trade Openness1 0.1709 0.2446 -0.1088 1.2949 1.2726 -0.5329 -0.1803 1.4781
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.0605)*** (0.0945)*** (0.0882) (0.1919)*** (0.2580)*** (0.2259)** (0.1346) (0.5527)***
Terms of Trade Shocks -0.1916 -0.9472 0.2218 -3.4063 -1.1917 2.6996 0.7076 -1.3234
(standard deviation of ToT growth) (0.4541) (0.5299)* (0.1321)* (2.1397)# (1.0852) (2.4592) (1.0586) (2.6281)
International Financial Integration1 0.2050 0.5521 0.0898 0.0967 0.6630 -0.1257 0.5335 0.7938
(Chinn-Ito, capital account variable) (0.0300)*** (0.0588)*** (0.0427)** (0.0802) (0.1273)*** (0.1073) (0.0740)*** (0.2347)***
Total Capital Flows1 0.9026 -0.4240 2.3809 1.4756 -1.4167 -1.3281 -0.5300 -1.1969
(Inflows+outflows/GDP, in logs) (0.3193)** (0.7145) (0.4320)*** (0.6317)** (1.5587) (1.3333) (0.7121) (1.5465)
Years in Office -0.0250 -0.0292 -0.0533 0.1318 -0.1255 -0.1423 0.1404 0.1782
(number of years) (0.0139)* (0.0181) (0.0278)* (0.0764)* (0.0403)*** (0.0608)** (0.1149) (0.0796)**
Years in Office squared 0.0006 0.0004 0.0025 -0.0114 0.0030 0.0066 -0.0160 -0.0039
(number of years) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0012)** (0.0059)* (0.0013)** (0.0027)** (0.0105) (0.0017)**
Veto Points1 -0.1533 -0.0925 -0.2225 -0.0195 -0.5271 -0.2224 -0.0573 -0.5314
(constraints on the executive) (0.0227)*** (0.0301)*** (0.0409)*** (0.1575) (0.0697)*** (0.0626)*** (0.0585) (0.2544)**
Rho 0.275 0.470 -0.305 -0.385 -0.139 -0.146 0.297 0.241
Sigma 4.794 5.690 3.925 3.687 5.996 3.475 4.408 4.969
Lambda 1.321 2.672 -1.198 -1.323 -0.836 -0.276 1.307 1.199
No. Observations 1438 297 162 171 77 66 56 100 35
No. of Countries 82 81 45 36 20 19 13 21 8
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%
includes time dummies and constant
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10%. Finally, the point estimate for Asia showed negative, something that would reverse
the main argument, but not signicant. Moreover, openness to trade is usually associated
with a higher propensity to peg while the veto points have a negative inuence. Interestingly
the impact of the variable capturing the institutional setup of the number of years the chief
executive has been in o¢ ce varies and sometimes exerts a negative inuence and some other
times that inuence is positive.
Since the probit model is non-linear, the partial e¤ect of a change in one variable on
the propensity to peg depends on the value of the other variables. As a rst step, what is
interesting is to compute the average partial e¤ect of the degree of IFI on the propensity
to peg. Once this step is completed, the indirect growth e¤ect of the degree of IFI on per
capita GDP growth can be computed by multiplying the point estimate of the growth e¤ect
of the propensity to peg, b'; by the average partial e¤ect of IFI on the propensity to peg.
Table 25 summarizes the decomposition of the e¤ects of IFI on per capita GDP growth.
In the rst column the annual frequency results are presented while the other columns are
for the ve-year average. For the entire sample, both at the annual and at the ve-year
average period, the total growth e¤ect of IFI is below one percentage point of annual GDP
growth27. In order to have a reference value, Table 26 presents the per capita GDP growth
rate. Thus, compared with the 2.21% average growth rate, the total growth e¤ect of IFI
computed from the decomposition exercise is on average 36%. In terms of the poor and rich
countries samples, the former exhibits a greater direct and indirect growth e¤ect with a total
e¤ect of 0.74 percentage points (compared to a 1.74% average per capita GDP growth rate);
more than twice than that of the rich countries. This result is giving evidence of the potential
e¤ect of IFI on growth and the space that poor countries have to benet from that impact.
In terms of the regions, Latin America and the Middle East countries are exceptions, with
the highest total growth e¤ect, around 0.9 percentage point. The latter result gives evidence
of the potential growth e¤ect of IFI for regions with an average per capita GDP growth rate
of 1.90%, as shown in Table 26. For the remaining results, two groups can be distinguished.
For the industrialized, Asia, and Middle East countries, the direct growth e¤ect is much
27Previous studies by Ranciere, Tornell, Westermann (2006) and Bekaert, Havery and Lundbland (2005)
nd a similar one percentage point increase in annual growth due to a higher degree of international nancial
integration.
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Table 25: Decomposition of the E¤ects of International Financial Integration on Growth
96
Table 26: Per capita GDP Growth by Region
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greater than the indirect e¤ect, it approximately accounts for 90% of the total e¤ect and
compares to the 2.75% average per capita GDP growth of those regions. On the other hand,
in Africa and Latin America, the indirect e¤ect plays a more important role in the total
growth e¤ect. For the African countries, this indirect e¤ect reects more than 70% of the
total growth e¤ect while in Latin America this number is slightly above the 80%. Finally, it
is worth noting that the estimates in this analysis for Asia showed not signicant at a 10%,
something that might be giving evidence of the presence of other factors to consider when
analyzing the Asian region.
3.5 CONCLUSION
This paper examines the relationship between exchange rate regimes, the degree of IFI and
economic growth from 1960 to 2000, paying particular attention to potential endogeneity
issues. In particular, it is argued that it is important not only to look at the e¤ect of
the exchange rate regime but also at the interaction between the exchange rate regime and
the degree of IFI. The paper generalizes Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogo¤ (2006) by
focusing not only on the domestic market structure but also on the degree of completeness of
international nancial market. Hence, in the theoretical model, a more exible exchange rate
can reduce average growth, especially in countries with low nancially developed domestic
credit markets and low degrees of international nancial integration. When confronting the
predictions of the theoretical model with the cross-country panel data, the main hypothesis
is conrmed suggesting the importance of the degree of IFI for how the choice of exchange
rate regime a¤ects growth. Results proved robust to di¤erent samples and measurement of
the variables IFI and exchange rate classication. A nal exercise shows that when explicitly
considering the endogeneity of exchange rate regime determination, the degree of IFI still
leads to faster average long run growth.
The results obtained run contrary to the standard exchange rate models. This is im-
portant from a policy perspective, since it indicates that the exchange rate regime needs to
be considered in the light of the development of domestic credit markets and the degree of
international nancial integration of a country.
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4.0 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EXCHANGE RATES IN LATIN
AMERICA
4.1 INTRODUCTION
All prices in any economy are in one way or another a¤ected by the exchange rate, but what
really inuences the choice of exchange rate? The traditional explanations tend to focus on
purely economic factors like the theory of optimal currency areas and the nancial integration
approach, but in the last decade there has been a growing scholarly interest from economics,
nance and political science in the political economy view of exchange rate determination1.
In other words, without denying the importance of economic factors, their importance depend
on the preferences and positions of political actors. Government intervention in managing
the exchange rate is controversial since it is inevitably conditioned by the preferences of
its constituents. Hence, the ultimate decision over the form of the exchange rate regime
adopted has roots in not just purely economic, but also political motivations2. The political
economy of exchange rate policy involves a process where governments face pressure from
di¤erent social groups that reect their preference, the conict among them, and eventually
how strong they are. This conict has certainly been a dening factor in Latin Americas
economic history, and it has on occasion erupted in the form of a massive runs on the
1For the theory of optimal currency areas the choice of regime is related to the geographical and trade
aspects. This approach weights the trade and welfare gains from a stable exchange rate vis à vis the countrys
main trade partners, against the benets of exchange rate exibility as a shock adjuster in the presence of
nominal rigidities. The nancial view is based on the incidence of the impossible trinity (the fact that
policymakers can choose at most two out the three vortexes of the trinity -capital mobility, monetary policy
and a xed exchange rate-) and balance sheet e¤ects.
2For example, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) show that conicting policymaker objectives induce a time
inconsistency problem with regard to the response of the central bank to exchange risk premia shocks; the
fear of oatingphenomenon. Another example is Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) who study a setup
where the credibility to conduct monetary policy is undermined by liquidity shortages in the event of a crisis.
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currencies, imposing real costs and economic stress on the country involved. The literature
on the appropriate currency policy is vast but unlike the case of trade or scal policy, there
is no simple welfare benchmark; so the debates typically involve di¤erent weightings of the
trade-o¤s associated with the exchange rate policy choices.
Two relevant currency decisions confront policymakers, and each has distributional con-
sequences: the regime by which the currency is managed, and the level of the currency. The
regime decision involves choosing whether to oat or x the exchange rate, or to adopt a
system in between a hard x and a pure oat. The level decisions, assuming the currency is
not xed, involve choosing the desired level of the real exchange rate. In short, the govern-
ment must decide whether it prefers a relatively high or relatively low international value
for its currency. Regime decisions involve trade-o¤s among desired national goals, whose
benets and costs fall unevenly on actors within countries. In an open economy, xed rate
regimes have two main national benets: rst, they promote trade and investment by reduc-
ing exchange rate risk. Second, xed rates promote domestic monetary stability. The cost of
xing the exchange rate is that the government sacrices its capacity to run an independent
monetary policy.
The distributional e¤ects of regime choice depend largely on the extent to which the
economic actors are engaged in international economic activity. For example, those agents
involved in foreign trade and investment tend to favor exchange rate stability, since currency
volatility makes their business riskier and more costly. By contrast, groups whose eco-
nomic activity is conned to the domestic economy benet from oating regimes3. Scholars
like Hefeker (1996), Eichengreen (1995), Frieden (1997), Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein (2001),
Leblang (2003) and Frieden, Leblang and Valev (2008) have examined empirically the role
of interest groups in exchange rate regime determination in a variety of contexts4.
As with the regime decision, the choice of the level of the exchange rate has distributional
and electoral implications. The choice of having a relatively appreciated or a relatively
depreciated currency involves a basic political economy trade-o¤ between competitiveness
3In fact, Frieden (2002) nds that special interests have a signicant inuence on both exchange rate
depreciation as well as exchange rate volatility.
4Furthermore, the regime choice has electoral implications which vary with the structure of political
institutions (Bernhard and Leblang, 1999).
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and purchasing power. Group currency preferences are a¤ected by economic factors, and
the degree to which groups can turn these preferences into policy is a¤ected by political
institutions. In fact, some of the regularities about preferences over the currency level
are related to points made above about the regime preferences. It is clear that political
institutions a¤ect the impact of special interests on economic policy, including exchange rate
policy. By the same reasoning, exchange rate policies are a¤ected by electoral institutions
and the timing of elections5.
This paper involves two stages. In the rst stage, a theoretical stylized model will be
laid out in order to address how the political economy of exchange rate policy is driven.
The political game follows a simplied version of Barons (1994) and Perssons (1998) and
models the interaction between special interest groups and policymakers and eventually how
this translates to pressures on the size of the change of the exchange rate. In the analysis of
how actors participate in the policymaking process and a¤ect outcomes it should be kept in
mind that the analysis will be based only on Olsons (1965) "organized" groups which can
eventually become political players, that is, special interest groups6. As suggested before,
the economic structure is crucial for dening potential actors, that is, the share and type
of tradable goods produced in an economy should be important for dening preferences
and strategies for special interest groups. These groups will be assumed to use traditional
mechanisms of policy inuence, such as lobbying legislators and ministers, making explicit
political alliances (or making short-term contributions in money or manpower to political
parties), or helping the government in policy implementation and coordination7.
The special feature of the theoretical model is that it adapts a model of electoral com-
petition to a political game where the exchange rate is subject to political competition by
special interest groups that pressure -based on their preferences- to inuence policymakers.
In the second stage of this project, an empirical analysis will be conducted taking the
model to the data. In particular, the determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime
5Another issue to consider is that interest group activity on the level of the exchange rate may vary over
time and across countries, and its impact on policy is a function of national political institutions.
6It is know since Olson (1965) that the organizational advantages of special interest groups give them
special inuence on government policy and that this inuence might have damaging e¤ects on the economy
as a whole.
7See Grossman and Helpman (2001) for an abstract account of the mechanisms used by special interest
groups to inuence the policymaking process and hence, policy outcomes.
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and level in Latin America will be analyzed, placing special emphasis on the political, in-
stitutional and interest-group explanations. The appropriate technique when working with
multinomial discrete dependent variables, when one has reasons to expect a certain order-
ing of the groups, is ordered logit or probit. Furthermore, to account for the panel data
structure, two additional estimators are used: (i) a random-e¤ects ordered probit and (ii) a
probit panel data model with an AR(1) error component.
4.2 THE MODEL
4.2.1 Policymakers
Government policymakers are benevolent and possess objective functions that seek to max-
imize the welfare of all groups in the economy
EsU
i
s = Es
Z
i2I
V is (gs) di = Es
Z
i2I
V is ("s) di (4.1)
where EsU is is a vector that corresponds to the welfare of all groups in the country, V
i is
the net welfare of a group i -net of contributions received at time s, and g is the redistrib-
utive policy vector. In this case the policy will be "; the exchange rate. Note, that since
the government policymakers are benevolent and do not impose personal preferences the
redistributive policy vector is entered into the government objective function.
4.2.2 Special Interest Groups
There are J organized lobbying groups, which constitute a subset of the population I, such
that for a particular lobbying group i 2 J  I8 that overcome collective action problems
and organize themselves as organized special interests. That is, it will be assumed that
groups may or may not be organized in a lobby. In fact, only members from group J will
be able organize. Special interest groups may undertake a variety of activities to further
8Here the characterization of special interests follows Grossman and Helpmans (2001) and is broad enough
to include tradable-nontradable distinctions.
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their political ends9. That includes but is not limited to the collection and dissemination of
information. In general, contributions can be interpreted both as in cash and in kind. It will
be assumed that special interest groups have access to information that in principle could
allow the policymakers to make better policy decisions. But, the policymakers cannot easily
verify the claims the special interest groups may have. These groups can o¤er contributions
according to a schedule, Li(g), with the aim of inuencing policy outcomes, i.e. government
transfers. Hence, as stated above, the net welfare of a group is then welfare, minus any
contributions
EsV
i
s (g) = EsU
i
s (g) 
1
2
Lis (g)
2 (4.2)
The contribution schedule will be assumed to be globally truthful, continuous, di¤erentiable,
and non-negative, and is the outcome of the program that maximizes (4.2). That is,
Lis
 
g; #i

= min
n
L
i
s (g) ;max

0; EsU
i
s (g)  #i
o
(4.3)
where L
i
s (g) = sup fLis (g) jEsV is (g)  0g is the upper limit of feasible contributions that
group i is willing to undertake, and #i is a constant that may be regarded as the reservation
utility of the ith lobbying group.
4.2.3 Political Equilibrium
To fully understand the nature and importance of the economic equilibrium, the political
dynamics need to be addressed. What matters here is to understand how is the process
that ends in the decision regarding an exchange rate change. In fact, after the policymakers
announce a change in the exchange rate, either a more depreciated or more appreciated
currency, agents in this economy will respond since these types of policies have di¤erential
impacts on the sectors of the economy, i.e. tradable and nontradable sectors. The special
interest groups have information about the policy environment and will try to persuade the
policymakers to take decisions that they consider best. But, in this framework of "opposite
bias", in the Grossman-Helpman notation, each groups ideal points for a given state of the
9The members of an interest group accumulate knowledge about certain policy issues in the course of
performing their everyday activities. Also, they may have the incentive to conduct research on issues of
concern to their members.
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world lie on opposite sides of the policymakersideal. One group prefers a "higher" exchange
rate than the politicians, while the other prefers a "lower" one. This pits the special interest
groups against one another.
The timing of events within a period can be summarized as follows.
1. Policymakers announce the policy they prefer for the exchange rate. This implies a
more devaluated or a more appreciated currency. This announcement is done with no or
little knowledge about the true state of the economy.
2. The special interest groups o¤er their lobbying contributions to inuence the regime
choice.
3. The monetary authority chooses the exchange rate policy according to a preset ex-
change rate rule. Furthermore, this selection of exchange rate policy is made with some
probability : Hence, there will be a probability D of a devaluation and a probability R
of a revaluation.
4. Finally, the exchange rate policy is realized.
The focus will be on the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept of this setup and
hence it is possible to solve it by backward induction. In the nal stage of the game, the
monetary authority chooses whether to revalue or devalue the currency. Following Persson
and Tabellinis (2000) suggestion to facilitate a simple closed-form solution, the monetary
authoritys preferences will be considered to be mainly a random variable b  U  1
2
; 1
2

:
with a uniform distribution. Hence,
s = bs + h  LRs   LDs  (4.4)
where Ll =
R
i2J L
ildi is the aggregate contributions received from all lobbying groups in
favor or regime k and h is the degree of inuence in the monetary authority from the
lobbying groups. In other words, it is a measure of the e¤ectiveness of the lobbying. It is
straightforward to see that whenever the special interest groups have the same contributions
the second term will be close to zero and hence the monetary authority will decide based on
the realization of the random variable b:
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In this type of environment the general rule that the monetary authority follows to set
the regime is one that equate the marginal utility from a revaluation with the marginal
utility from a devaluation, adjusted by its own preferences
U i
 
"Ds

= U i
 
"Rs

+ s (4.5)
where i 2 J: Therefore, the probability that the monetary authority decides for a devaluation
is given by:
D = Prob
b   U i  "Ds   U i  "Rs + h  LDs   LRs 
=
1
2
+

U i
 
"Ds
  U i  "Rs + h  LDs   LRs  (4.6)
what implies that the monetary authority has limited independence over exchange rate
outcomes. Moreover, the last term reects the contributions inuence on the expected
policy outcome.
Next, in the penultimate stage, special interest groups choose their contributions with
respect to each regime. As stated in expression (4.2), the objective of the lobbying groups
is to maximize the expected utility of its members net of contributions:
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i
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2
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= DU i
 
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
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 
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  1
2
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LiDs
2
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2i
(4.7)
where R =
 
1  D and hence the rst two terms refer to the expected utility for the
special interest groups from either a devaluation or a revaluation of the currency. The last
term ensures the convexity of contributions. For example, if contributions are made in cash
then the fact that di¤erent member of the group may di¤er in their willingness to give makes
this cost convex. In general, these contributions reect some sort of disutility and that is
reected in the form of the equation. With no ideology playing a role in the lobbying groups
objective function, the rst order conditions with respect to LiD and LiR are
@EV is
@LiD
=
@D
@LiD

U i
 
"D
  U i  "R  LiD  0 (4.8)
and
@EV is
@LiR
=
@D
@LiR

U i
 
"D
  U i  "R  LiR  0 (4.9)
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respectively, where @
D
@LiD
= h; follows from (4.6). To solve for the optimal contribution it
will be assumed, following Bernheim and Whinston (1986), that these schedules are locally
truthful10. The latter implies that a contribution in the neighborhood of the equilibrium
has the property that @L
iP
@"P
= @U
i
@"P
for any P . That is, the slope of the contribution for a
devaluation or a revaluation is equal to the true impact of this change on a lobbying groups
welfare. Thus the optimal truthful contribution schedules of the lobbying groups are given
by:
LiD = max

0; h
 
U i
 
"Ds
  U i  "Rs  ;
LiR =  min 0; h  U i  "Ds   U i  "Rs  (4.10)
where it was assume that equation (4.10) implies that the special interest groups contribute
only toward the specic policy -devaluation or revaluation- that gives the group the highest
utility; but never will they contribute to more than one. Summing (4.10) across all lobbies
gives
LiD   LiR = h
Z
i2J

U i
 
"D
  U i  "R di (4.11)
which implies that contributions go, on average, to the policy that is more successful in
pleasing the special interest groups.
Turning to the rst stage, the policymakers optimize the welfare of all groups in the
economy as established by (4.1)
EU is = E
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Z
i2I
U i
 
"Ds

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Taking the rst order conditions of (4.12) and using the fact that both the utility function
and its derivative are continuous, the equilibrium allocation can be dened by the following
10Actually, when applying the common agency model of Grossman and Helpman (1994,1995) and Bernheim
and Whinston (1986), the set up extended by Persson (1998) will be followed since it is more appropriate to
study group-specic government policies.
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expressions:
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It is conspicuous the symmetry between the two conditions and thus a Nash equilibrium
involves identical policies, that is, a revaluation or devaluation of the same degree, "D = "R:
To simplify notation, let J =
R
i2J
@U i("R)
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di, I =
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hence, the optimal exchange rate in the political equilibrium can be expressed as
" = "D
 
q;J ;I ; h

(4.17)
=  "R  q;J ;I ; h
that is, the optimal exchange rate is eventually determined by q -to be explained below-
, the distribution of agents and special interest groups
 
I ;J

, and the extent to which
policymakers are inuenced by special interest groups, h. Parameter q includes economic
variables associated with welfare or an indirect utility function of each agent. As a result
of contributions, special interest groups pressure policymakers and eventually a¤ect the
determination of an exchange rate regime and general welfare.
107
4.2.4 Main prediction and discussion
The main prediction of (4.17) is that the optimal exchange rate will be determined by the
economic parameters -such as interest rate, productivity, money demand-, the distribution
of agents and special interest groups in the economy
 
I ;J

, and the capacity of special
interest groups to inuence policymakers as measured by h 11. This has at least two more
implications. The rst one is that agents are di¤erentially a¤ected after a change in the
exchange rate: this is in fact relevant for non-traded goods producers that are consuming
traded goods and whose price will be distorted by any change in the exchange rate. The
second one is that since the impact on the tradable and non-tradable goods sector is clear and
di¤erential, then the exchange rate became a policy variable that is the subject of political
competition through special interest groups potentially associated with those sectors.
To understand how policymakers need to account for the exchange rate regime preferences
of their constituents, in particular, for those agents with substantial political inuence, it is
key to explore the policy preferences of major economic actors. Many economic agents can
be expected to have clear preferences over the exchange rate regime: the trade-o¤ between
exible and xed regimes, already discussed, brings two broad groups against one another,
based on how highly they value the two conicting goals. To stylize the choice, it can
be expected that the tradable goods sector -agriculture and industry- are more prone to a
exible regime that can help them by having a depreciated currency. On the other hand,
it is expected that those with cross-border economic interests to be more favorable toward
a xed regime. Although this may mask a more complex situation, it gives rise to clear
empirically relevant predictions.
4.3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Rather than formally "testing" the model, several implications that seem to shed light on
some aspects of institutional and economic choices that a¤ect the exchange rate arrangement
are highlighted. The empirical analysis relies on the assumption that governments do have
11Moreover, it can be shown from (4.17) that the change in the exchange rate will be larger, the greater
the inuence of special interest groups in policymakers.
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Table 27: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility - RR Classification 703 3.199 1.444 1.000 5.000
M2/Reserves 703 6.410 12.183 0.000 140.134
Real GDP per capita 703 7.718 0.636 6.449 9.070
Real Interest Rate 589 1.886 14.203 -1.158 157.808
Price Instability 699 0.307 0.580 -0.012 4.775
High250 703 0.047 0.212 0.000 1.000
Agricultural Sector/GDP 703 14.186 7.090 3.833 37.702
Industrial Sector/GDP 703 32.298 7.270 16.409 60.561
Private Credit/GDP 633 0.286 0.148 0.029 0.973
Foreign Liabilities/M2 691 0.244 0.328 0.000 3.224
Openness to  Trade 684 3.856 0.517 2.336 5.001
Political Risk 456 3.576 0.864 1.233 5.650
Democracy 703 3.936 6.154 -9.000 10.000
Years in Office 607 4.030 4.609 1.000 35.000
Years Left in Current Term 557 1.962 1.463 0.000 7.000
Government Seats in the Legislature 553 68.545 60.432 8.000 300.000
Executive Special Interest 608 0.058 0.233 0.000 1.000
Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility - LYS Classification 627 3.633 1.264 1.000 5.000
Agricultural Employment/Total Employement 513 22.299 13.593 1.700 58.700
Industrial Employment/Total Employement 513 22.549 4.138 12.900 34.000
International Financial Integration 698 -0.076 1.503 -1.798 2.540
Portfolio Flows/GDP 525 1.400 3.564 0.001 42.273
Vetoplayers 582 2.806 1.470 1.000 7.000
Terms of Trade Shocks 453 0.101 0.069 0.003 0.355
Central Bank Governor Stability 671 0.782 0.341 0.000 1.000
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation 703 0.000 0.866 -5.011 7.298
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Table 28: Sources
Variable Definition and Construction Source
Total number of seats held by all
government parties
Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh's (2006)
Database of Political Institutions from the
World Bank
Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh's (2006)
Database of Political Institutions from the
World Bank
Years left in current term, where a 0 is an
election year and n-1 is the year after the
election (n=length of term)
Polity IV index of democracy Marshall and Jaggers (2002) Polity IV Project
Number of years the chief executive has
been in office
Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh's (2006)
Database of Political Institutions from the
World Bank
Ratio of exports and imports to GDP
Author's construction based on the World
Development Indicators of the World Bank
Composite index of government stability,
corruption, democractic accountability,
bureaucracy quality and law and order
Author's construction based on the
International Country Guide Risk (ICRG) of
the Political Risk Service Group.
Private credit as a share of total GDP Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000)
Ratio of foreign liabilities to broad money
Author's construction based on International
Financial Statistics (IFS) from the IMF
Share of Agriculture in the total GDP
Author's construction based on the World
Development Indicators of the WorldBank
Share of Industry in the total GDP
Author's construction based on the World
Development Indicators of the WorldBank
Log of 100 plus inflation rate
Author's construction based on the World
Development Indicators of the WorldBank
Dummy variable that equals 1 if inflation
in t-1 is greater than 250
Author's construction based on the World
Development Indicators of the WorldBank
Log of the ratio of total real GDP to total
population
Author's construction based on International
Financial Statistics (IFS) from the IMF
Lending nominal interest rate minus
inflation
Author's construction based on International
Financial Statistics (IFS) from the IMF
Exchange rate classification where 1=fully
fixed and 5=fully flexible
Author's construction based on Reinhart and
Rogoff (2004)
Ratio of Broad Money to International
Reserves
Author's construction based on International
Financial Statistics (IFS) from the IMF
Degree of Exchange Rate
Flexibility - RR Classification
M2/Reserves
Real GDP per capita
Real Interest Rate
Price Instability
High250
Agricultural Sector/GDP
Industrial Sector/GDP
Private Credit/GDP
Foreign Liabilities/M2
Openness to  Trade
Political Risk
Democracy
Years in Office
Years Left in Current Term
Government Seats in the
Legislature
110
Table 29: Sources (cont.)
Variable Definition and Construction Source
Government Burden
Log of the ratio of government
consumption to GDP
Author's construction based on the World
Development Indicators of the World Bank
Foreign Direct Investment Log of net foreign direct investment
Author's construction based on the World
Development Indicators of the World Bank
Number of veto players (actors) whose
approval is necessary for a shift in policy
from the status quo.
Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh's (2006)
Database of Political Institutions from the
World Bank
Log of the standard deviation of the terms
of trade changes over the previous five
years
Author's construction based on the World
Development Indicators of the World Bank
Index that measures a country’s degree of
capital account openness
Chinn and Ito (2006)
Ratio of inward and outward flows of
portfolio investments and financial
derivatives to GDP
Author's construction based on the World
Development Indicators of the World Bank
Share of Agricultural employment in the
total employment
Author's construction based on the World
Development Indicators of the World Bank
Share of Industry employment in the total
employment
Author's construction based on the World
Development Indicators of the World Bank
Exchange rate flexibility classification
where 1 = inconclusive and 5 = fix
Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger (2003)
Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh's (2006)
Database of Political Institutions from the
World Bank
Dummy variable equals 1 if executive is
identified as nationalist, rural, regional or
religious.
Executive Special Interest
Degree of Exchange Rate
Flexibility - LYS Classification
Agricultural Employment/Total
Employement
Industrial Employment/Total
Employement
International Financial
Integration
Portfolio Flows/GDP
Vetoplayers
Terms of Trade Shocks
Central Bank Governor
Stability
Real Exchange Rate
Overvaluation
Normalization between 0 and 1 of the
turnover rate of central bank governors
for each country
Author's construction based on Dreher, Sturm,
deHaan (2008)
Log difference between the real effective
exchange rate and estimated equilibrium
(PPP) value for each country
Author's construction based on the World
Development Indicators of the World Bank
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the ability to a¤ect the regime and level of the real exchange rate, at least in the short and
medium term, through the use of exchange rate policy12. As stated before, regime decisions
involve trade-o¤s among desired national goals, whose benets and cost fall unevenly on
actors within countries and the distributional e¤ects of regime choice depend largely on the
extent to which the economic actors are engaged in international economic activity. In other
words, the benets and costs of exchange rates regimes depend on the characteristics of the
country in question. Given the history of high ination in Latin America, the trade-o¤ is
between credibility and competitiveness: that is, between a xed or a exible exchange rate
arrangement. Actually, the regime classications used are exible enough to allow the regime
variable to vary along the xed-exible dimension.
The empirical analysis is based on a panel of 19 Latin American countries for the period
1975-200613. The period was selected based on data availability. It is indeed, to some
extent, possible, to divide the data used in three groups. First, the exchange rate regime
classication group that constitutes the dependent variable in the analysis. Second, the
economic variables that attempt to capture some of the basic economic determinants of the
exchange rate regimes. In that sense, the analysis starts considering variables suggested
in the model to then move farther as to include a more broad set of variables. Finally,
interest-group, political and institutional variables are discussed. These variables will be of
central interest for the analysis to try capturing the political economy process of exchange
rate regimes determination. Tables 27, 28 and 29 contain respectively descriptive statistics
and the sources of the variables used.
4.3.1 Exchange Rate Regime Classication
Classifying a countrys exchange rate regime is not a trivial issue. Although the textbook
answer is simple: either xed or exible, the richness of real world regimes belies this elegant
dichotomy because most governments try to reach some compromise between the di¤erent
12This assumption comes from the ndings of the literature on purchasing power parity that shows that
deviations die out very slow.
13The countries considered are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Suri-
name, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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elements of the so-called "impossible trinity", that is, independent monetary policy, rigidly
xed exchange rates, and complete capital mobility14. Moreover, popular regimes run the
array from currency board and traditional pegs to crawling pegs to crawling pegs, target
zones, and oats, with varying degrees of intervention. In their survey, Ghosh, Gulde and
Wolf (2003) provide an extensive and detailed description of the di¤erent classications as
well as a discussion about what should be relevant for this issue. Hence to pursue this
empirical section it is important to decide upon the methodology for classifying regimes.
Two measures to capture the exibility of exchange rate regime were used in this paper.
First, the Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) (RR) classication extended until 2006. This measure
is based on the verication of the de facto regime, reclassifying the regimes where the ex-
change rate behavior does not match what is expected from the stated policy. This annual
broad classication orders regimes from the most rigid to the most exible in 15 categories15.
To make it more operational, an index of exchange rate exibility based on 5 categories is
constructed, such that the classication of the exchange rate regimes is equally distributed
(within each category)16. Second, the classication of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003)
(LYS) also extended until 2006. This measure, available since 1974, is based on a compar-
ison of exchange rate movements and foreign exchange intervention. Actually it has two
di¤erent classications, one is a three-way and the other is ve-way. For the purposes of the
estimations in this paper I will use the ve-way classication.
14A key ingredient of the Mundell-Fleming framework is the assumption of perfect capital mobility. This
implies international arbitrage across countries in the form of uncovered interest parity. From this model it
follows that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve the three goals: exchange rate stabilization, capital
market integration and independent monetary policy. This is usually referred to as impossible trinity. The
currency crises in Mexico, Asia, Brazil and Russia, and increasing capital mobility brought the "impossible
trinity" hypothesis to the forefront and resulted in a more "bipolar view" of exchange rate regimes. According
to this approach, high capital mobility made intermediate regimes less viable in nancially open economies.
Since monetary policy in nancially open economies cannot be aimed simultaneously at maintaining a stable
exchange rate and at smoothing cyclical output uctuations, these countries should move to the corner
solutions, i.e. pure oat or hard peg.
15From Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004): 1-No separate legal tender, 2-Pre announced peg or currency board
arrangement, 3-Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, 4-De facto peg, 5-
Pre announced crawling peg, 6-Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, 7-De
factor crawling peg, 8-De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, 9-Pre announced
crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%, 10-De facto crawling band that is narrower than or
equal to +/-5%, 11-Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation
and depreciation over time), 12-Managed oating, 13-Freely oating, 14-Freely falling and 15-Dual market
in which parallel market data is missing.
16Figure 16, shows the distribution within categories of the new RR classication.
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Figure 16: Exchange Rate Regime Classications
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Finally, it is worth noting that the Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) classication o¤ers the
advantage that it corrects for multiple exchange rates, a practice that, while common among
developing countries until the early 1970s, diminished steadily to less than 10 percent of cases
during the post Bretton Woods period. The two classications have in common the fact that
they look at what countries actually do rather than what they say they do. Both classica-
tions have their own merits, but for our purposes the RR classication is more appropriate.
The main reason is that the key di¤erence between RR and LYS is that RR look at actual
exchange rates, while LYS base their algorithm on the o¢ cial exchange rates. Furthermore,
the algorithm used by LYS includes (besides the exchange rate) reserves and base money
and, as Calvo and Reinhart (2002) note, using reserves has considerable limitations. In any
case, the ndings reported in the robustness section, will indicate that the basic results of
this paper- the role of institutions and special interests factors in the exchange rate regime
choice- remains essentially unchanged when using the LYS classication as the measure of
exchange rate regime.
4.3.2 Economic Variables
One of the variables considered in the empirical analysis is money, but to include such a
measure it is preferred to have it expressed in terms of foreign reserves: that is, the ratio
of money supply (M2) over central bank international reserves (M2/Reserves). Since the
availability of international reserves can sustain a xed exchange rate regime, a high value of
this ratio is expected to be associated with more exible arrangements. To avoid potential
endogeneity issues, this variable is lagged in the regressions (indicated by placing a 1 after the
variable). Another variable that derives from the model is the real interest rate. This measure
is constructed using information from the countrieslending rates, the U.S. discount rate, and
the expected ination rate. For a given growth rate of money supply, higher money demand
will imply lower ination, hence, if the government enjoys credibility, domestic interest rates
even in countries with a history of high ination- fall immediately to the world level. For a
variety of reasonsincluding interest rates that are set by the authorities rather than being
determined by the marketthe greater condence that pegged exchanges can bring may not
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be fully reected in the observed domestic interest rate. In other words, it is expected that
a lower real interest rate will be reecting a pegged exchange rate regime.
Ination is another important variable that a¤ects the exchange rate regime choice. As
Vegh (1992), Calvo and Vegh (1999) and Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein (2001) argue, countries
with moderate to high ination have incentives to use the exchange rate as an anchor. This
may be due to institutional incapacity of governments -inability to convince the public of their
commitment to price stabilization- or a simple way of gaining credibility. However, ination
increases the probability of incurring in political costs of abandoning a peg and decreases
the likelihood of choosing a xed regime17. Hence to account for possible di¤erential e¤ect
between moderate and high ination a "high ination dummy" was constructed. High250 is
a variable equal to one whenever the ination rate in the previous year exceeds 250% and is
expected to be negative implying the need of a quick credibility enhancement (possibly the
need to adopt a peg) whenever this threshold is passed.
According to the optimal currency areas theory, two key country characteristics that favor
a more stable (or xed) exchange rate are openness (which enhances, to some extent, the
trade gains from stable exchange rates) and the size of the economies (since small economies
are likely to trade internationally and with limited impact of its own currency abroad).
Furthermore, Frieden, Leblang and Valev (2008) argue that more open economies tend to
adopt more stable exchange rates, for several reasons. Nevertheless, it is important to
note that xed exchange rates benet groups with signicant cross-border interests. So,
ultimately, this measure of trade openness, indicates how important cross-border trade is for
the countrys economic agents and thus how signicant will be these interests in xing the
exchange rate. Therefore, openness, measured as the GDP share of exports plus imports is
expected to have a negative sign, while, output per capita, measured as the logarithm of the
countrys GDP per capita in US dollars is expected to have a positive sign. Lagged values
are used where an endongeneity problem may be a concern.
Two other economic variables are included in the regressions. Obstfeld and Taylor (2002),
based on the "impossible trinity", argue that as nancial globalization deepened in the last
17Again, this variable is lagged one period to avoid potential endogeneity problems.
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decades, monetary policy became increasingly at odds with xed exchange rates18. In other
words, a higher level of nancial development is expected to reduce the likelihood of xing
the exchange rate since monetary policy will be less e¤ective. Hence, nancial development,
measured as the GDP share of private credit, is expected to have a positive e¤ect19. Finally,
the recent literature has stressed that currency mismatches in nancially dollarized economies
may also be critical to the choice of exchange rate regimes20. In particular, individuals, rms
and countries with dollar liabilities may be more prone of xed exchange rate regimes, due to
the fact that sharp nominal depreciations of the currency can have a considerable impact on
the solvency of balance sheets with currency mismatches21. Hence, foreign liabilities, dened
as the ratio of foreign liabilities to money stocks is considered and is expected to have a
negative sign. In the regressions, this variable is lagged to account for endogeneity.
4.3.3 Interest Groups, Political and Institutional Variables
One of the implications from the model is the importance of interest groups on the exchange
rate regime choice. In other words, that groups have di¤erent preferences regarding exchange
rate policy and that these preferences play a role in the choice of regime. Special interest
groups tend to concentrate their demands on specic measures that involve compensation if
a¤ected by the exchange rate policy. It is always di¢ cult to nd good variables that capture
the inuence that these groups may have on policymakers. In other words, it will be assumed
that the lobbying power of the tradable goods sector on policymakers is proportional to its
share in the countrys GDP. The fact that this tradable goods sector in Latin America is
basically structured by producers of commodities and manufactures entails that it is very
sensitive to the level of exchange rate and hence a exible exchange rate regime reects its
preferences. In this line of reasoning, the non-traded goods sector favors a peg schedule.
Hence, for the empirical analysis two measures are used that capture the size of the agricul-
tural sector and the size of the industrial sector to proxy for the importance of the tradable
18In fact, many countries lack the infrastructure necessary for monetary authorities to conduct domestic
open market operations.
19To account for possible endogeneity this variable is lagged one period in the regressions.
20See for example, Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003) and Kamil (2006).
21In fact, this argument is behind the "fear of oating" phenomenon of Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
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sectors22. The rst measure is the value added for each sector as a percentage of GDP, while
the second one is the employment in each sector as a percent of the overall employment in
the economy. Although the employment measure captures more precisely how broad-based
the importance of a sector is, due to data availability the baseline regressions use the value
added measure23. To some extent, these group-strength variables are capturing L from the
previous model. Following the line of the discussion above, the agricultural sector and the
industrial sector are expected to decrease the likelihood of a peg schedule. Due to concerns
about endogeneity, these variables are lagged one period.
To capture the institutional and political quality of Latin American systems a political
risk measure is used. This measure comes from the PRS Groups International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) and comprises of four subindices such as government stability, corruption,
democratic accountability and bureaucracy quality24. Each of these subcomponents are
scored and aggregated into a cumulative political risk rating. It is expected that when
institutions are not reliable, more political risk (more unstable political systems) increase
the likelihood of a pegged regime -i.e. a negative sign- since governments facing unstable
situations might not care much about the long-term sustainability of the policies they follow.
Another institutional variable included is democracy. This measure comes from the Polity IV
dataset and ranges from -10 for autocratic regimes to 10 for fully developed democracies. For
the period considered, the average score for Latin America is 5, which reects the fact that
after 1985 almost all countries considered in the sample were democracies. Although it is not
clear what is the impact of democracy in the exchange rate regime choice, Hall (2006) argue
that democracies are more likely to commit to a oating exchange rate regime25. Hence, a
positive sign is expected in the regressions.
Based on the World Banks Database of Political Institutions, another set of control vari-
ables to reect political and institutional characteristics, and indicators of political strength
is used. The rst variable is related to the composition of the legislature and measures the
22On average for Latin America, the tradable sector (agriculture and industry) accounts for 40% of total
GDP.
23In the robustness checks the employment measure is used.
24The assessments of the ICRG are made on the basis of subjective analysis of the available information.
25In fact, the number of veto players or the regular use of open, competitive elections encourage commit-
ments to oat.
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strength of the executive: government seats in the legislature. This variable is expected to
have a negative sign mainly because a higher share of seats means that the government faces
less political competition, so a readjustment may be less costly. Although indirectly this
variable captures the degree of fragmentation of the party system26. The other three vari-
ables are related to the executive: the number of years left in the current term, the number
of years that the incumbent administration has been in o¢ ce and a dummy variable that
accounts for the support that the executive might have from special interests. In the rst
case, this variable is capturing the institutional setup, represented by h in the model. This
variable will score a 0 in an election year and n-1 in the year after an election, where n is
the length of the term. Therefore it is expected to have a positive sign since the shorter the
horizon until the next election, the less prone the executive would be to pursue a change in
policy, such as moving to a more exible exchange rate, with its potential political costs.
The latter variable - support that the executive might have from special interests- refers to
characteristics such as nationalist, rural, regional or religious. In those cases where the ex-
ecutive is linked, by the party system, to some special interest the dummy variable will take
the value of 1. The expected sign of this variable is not clear. On the one hand, there are
cases where the nationalist characteristic determines a more exible regime, while there are
other cases where regional issues make special interests to pressure to sustain a x regime.
Finally, another institutional variable that could potentially have an e¤ect on the ex-
change rate regime is the degree of central bank independence. Nevertheless, there are at
least three reasons why it is not clear in which direction central bank independence should
a¤ect the regime choice. First, on the one hand, a central bank that pursues price stability
may be more prone to tie its hands by adopting a xed exchange rate regime. Second, on
the other hand, central bank independence may be seen as an alternative to a peg as means
to provide credibility. Third, the measure itself is a matter of great debate. The most widely
employed legal index of central bank independence is from Cukierman (1992) and Cukier-
man et al. (1992) although there are some other alternative measures. However, as pointed
out by Forder (1996) and Mangano (1998), legal measures of central bank independence
26As it is standard in the literature, the e¤ective number of parties measures the fragmentation of the
party system. So more (number of) parties would imply a small share for the government what determines
a negative correlation.
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may not reect the true relationship between the central bank and the government. In fact,
Walsh (2005) argues that in countries where the rule of law is less strongly embedded in
the political culture, there can be wide gaps between the formal, legal institutional arrange-
ments and their practical impact; something particularly likely in Latin America. Therefore,
Cukierman (1992) suggests for those cases, that the turnover rate of central bank gover-
nors is a better proxy for central bank independence than measures based on central bank
laws. The turnover rate is based on the presumption that, at least above some threshold, a
higher turnover of central bank governors indicates a lower level of independence27. For the
empirical analysis, central bank governor stability is a normalized version of the turnover
rate28.
4.3.4 Empirical Methodology
As previously stated in the introduction, the benchmark for the empirical analysis is an
ordered probit regression model where the dependent variable captures the exchange rate
regime according to the adjusted RR de facto classication29. That is, the dependent variable
takes the values from 1 (xed) to 5 (free falling). Later in the paper the results of additional
estimations where the classication of regimes vary are discussed. One of the concerns
with this methodology is that underscores the importance of the underlying correlation
structures of a panel. The ordered probit regression pools the data into a single continuous
set, and this may lead to an e¢ ciency problem, in terms of the standard errors. To allow
for a panel data structure and thus for individual specic e¤ects when analyzing limited
dependent variables a random-e¤ects ordered probit is also considered and described below.
Furthermore, although popular in panel data ordered probits, the random-e¤ects models
allow modeling a type of unobserved heterogeneity meeting relatively strong assumptions.
Hence, as it will be described below, to relax some of the assumptions, a limited dependent
panel data model with an AR(1) error components is nally estimated.
27Even this measure is disputed. Haan and Kooi (2000) and Sturm and Haan (2001) argue that the
turnover rate of central bank governors is only relevant when properly accounting for ination suggesting
that causality may be an issue, at least for developed countries.
28This variable is a normalization, between 0 and 1, of the number of turnovers of central bank governors
for each country. More details are given in Table B.
29All the regressions include year dummies.
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4.3.4.1 Random-E¤ects Ordered Probit In general it is possible to write the random-
e¤ects ordered probit model in terms of a latent-response formulation. That is,
yit = Xit + it i = 1; : : : ; N t = 1; : : : ; T (4.18)
it = vit + ui
with
V ar(it) = 
2
v + 
2
u = 1 + 
2
u
Corr(it; is) =  =
u
1 + u
where Xit denotes a vector of exogenous explanatory variables, yit is unobserved and is
related to yit via the threshold model
yit =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
0 if yit  0
1 if 0 < y

it  1
2 if 1 < y

it  2
...
J if J 1 < y

it
(4.19)
Conditional on the two random e¤ects, vit and ui, and Xit, the probability function for a
single observation of the dependent variable can be written as
f (yitjXit; vit; ui) = 
 
y+1  Xit   vit   ui
    y  Xit   vit   ui
where  is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution,  1 =  1
and J =1: The remaining J threshold parameters are freely estimated together with :
Dene ait = J 1 Xit and bit = J  Xit if yit = J , then following Butler and Mo¢ tt
(1982) the likelihood function is
P (yi1; yi2; : : : ; yiT ) =
Z bi1
ai1
: : :
Z biT
aiT
f (i1; i2; : : : ; iT ) diT ; : : : ; di2; di1
=
Z bi1
ai1
: : :
Z biT
aiT
Z 1
 1
TQ
t=1
f (vitjui) f (ui) duidviT ; : : : ; dvi1
=
Z 1
 1
TQ
t=1
[F (bitjui)  F (aitjui)] dui
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in which f(:) and F (:) represent the pdf and cdf of the normal distribution function, respec-
tively. Based on the latter expression the maximization problem takes place30.
4.3.4.2 Probit Panel Data Model with AR(1) Error Component As said in the
rst part of this section, random-e¤ects models allow modeling a type of unobserved het-
erogeneity meeting relatively strong assumptions. Basically two: (i) the unobserved hetero-
geneity has to be independent of explanatory variables and (ii) it has to be constant over
time. The specication used relaxes the second assumption but not the rst one. Just as
observed covariates can change over time, so can unobserved inuences and determinants of
the outcomes. In particular, following Heiss (2007), unobserved heterogeneity is modeled as
a stationary AR(1) process. Consider again a latent random model like (4.18):
yit = Xit + uit + eit i = 1; : : : ; N t = 1; : : : ; T
uit = uit 1 + vit
where Xit denotes a vector of strictly exogenous explanatory variables, yit is unobserved and
is related to yit via a threshold model like (4.19). The random variables uit are independent
of the exogenous explanatory variables and the i.i.d. error term eit. They are normally
distributed with zero mean and variance 2 and follow a stationary AR(1) process where
vit are i.i.d. shocks with variance (1  2)2: Note that from this general model a standard
ordered probit model follows in the special case  = 0 and a standard random-e¤ects ordered
probit model follows in the case  = 1.
In order to derive a parametric expression of conditional outcome probabilities, it is
needed to assume that the i.i.d. error terms eit are i.i.d. with a normal distribution. This
parametric assumption leads to a standard ordered probit specication except that the latent
process uit is present. It is now possible to write the probability of the observed realization
yit conditional on Xit, uit, as
f (yitjXit; uit) = 
 
y+1  Xit   uit
    y  Xit   uit
30The estimation of parameters by maximum likelihood is done once the integral has been evaluated, and
the resulting estimator is consistent, e¢ cient, and approximately normally distributed. Estimations were
performed in Stata 9.
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To complete the model, the joint distribution of the uit has to be specied. Following Heisss
(2007) notation,  (:;; 2) is the normal pdf. with mean  and variance 2, then the
marginal distribution is
f (uitjXit) = 
 
uit; 0; 
2

with a conditional distribution of
f (uitjXit; uit 1) = 
 
uit; uit 1;
 
1  22
This completes the model to be estimated. Heiss (2007) describes the estimation procedure
implemented such that sequential Gaussian quadrature is used.
4.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section the estimation results are presented. First the results of testing the hypothesis
that political economy factors play a signicant role in shaping exchange rate policy in Latin
America are presented followed by a robustness analysis. Then, a discussion regarding the
level and the regime of the exchange rate policy will be presented.
4.4.1 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes
Tables 30, 31 and 32 present the results for the ordered probit model, the random-e¤ects
ordered probit model and the probit panel data model with the AR(1) error component,
respectively. In each table columns (1) -(4) represent di¤erent specications beginning from
the most basic to the most complex one where the rationale is the following: column (1) is
the specication that tries to capture the implications from the theoretical model as good
as possible. Column (2) is an extended version that includes two key political variables:
political risk and democracy. Column (3) is an even more extended version that includes
potential determinants of exchange rate regimes according to traditional theories, already
discussed, as the optimal currency area and the nancial view of exchange rates. Finally
column (4) aggregates all variables and includes a more political economy perspective by
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Table 30: Determinants of Exchange Rate Regimes in Latin America (OP)
Dependent variable: Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility (Reinhart and Rogoff classification)
Estimation: Ordered Probit Regression
(Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Money Supply to International Reserves1 0.0128*** 0.0139** 0.0102* 0.0150**
(M2/Reserves) (0.0048) (0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0067)
Output per Capita 0.1751* 0.5280*** 0.6165*** 0.8019***
(real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.1077) (0.1308) (0.1485) (0.1628)
Real Interest Rate 0.0239 0.0697*** 0.1638*** 0.1556***
(based on lending rates) (0.0350) (0.0143) (0.0268) (0.0269)
Price instability1 2.0913*** 2.2373*** 3.4981*** 3.2745***
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.2230) (0.2879) (0.4291) (0.4263)
High Inflation -1.6525*** -2.1026*** -2.9395*** -2.4952***
(dummy =1 if inflation in t-1>250) (0.3825) (0.4371) (0.6004) (0.5999)
Agricultural Sector1 0.0139# 0.0353** 0.0375** 0.0601***
(share of agriculture in GDP) (0.0085) (0.0150) (0.0156) (0.0158)
Industrial Sector1 0.0239*** 0.0364*** 0.0330*** 0.0418***
(share of industry in GDP) (0.0084) (0.0095) (0.0104) (0.0102)
Financial Development1 1.2636*** 0.9558**
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.3836) (0.4015)
Foreign Liabilities1 0.2965 0.6250
(foreign liabilities/M2) (0.3245) (0.4041)
Trade Openness1 -0.1658# -0.2981*
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.1014) (0.1663)
Political Risk -0.3700*** -0.4717*** -0.4648***
(ICRG composite index) (0.0835) (0.0988) (0.1001)
Democracy 0.0352*** 0.0815*** 0.0390*
(Polity2 index) (0.0162) (0.0186) (0.0212)
Years in Office 0.0058
(number of years) (0.0138)
Years Left in Current Term 0.1262***
(number of years left ) (0.0401)
Government Seats in the Legislature -0.0024*
(number of seats) (0.0005)
Executive Special Interest 1.0258***
(dummy =1 if the executive is linked to interests) (0.3269)
Central Bank Governor Stability 0.3563**
(normalized numbers of governor turnovers) (0.1766)
No. Countries 19 19 19 19
No. Observations 589 456 435 428
All regressions include time dummies and constant
Lagged values of variable x are denoted x1.
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Annual
1975 - 2006
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Table 31: Determinants of Exchange Rate Regimes in Latin America (RE)
Dependent variable: Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility (Reinhart and Rogoff classification)
Estimation: Random-Effects Ordered Probit Regression
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Money Supply to International Reserves1 0.0183*** 0.0215*** 0.0116* 0.0171**
(M2/Reserves) (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0073)
Output per Capita 0.1920* 0.8181*** 1.5848*** 1.0353***
(real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.1155) (0.1456) (0.1863) (0.1711)
Real Interest Rate 0.0689* 0.0532*** 0.0109*** 0.0113***
(based on lending rates) (0.0359) (0.0150) (0.0027) (0.0023)
Price instability1 2.0792*** 1.7973*** 2.8483*** 2.6803***
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.2274) (0.2768) (0.4307) (0.4199)
High Inflation -1.4025*** -1.2959*** -2.2764*** -2.4335***
(dummy =1 if inflation in t-1>250) (0.3978) (0.4423) (0.6350) (0.6409)
Agricultural Sector1 0.0404*** 0.1956*** 0.2132*** 0.1791***
(share of agriculture in GDP) (0.0126) (0.0228) (0.0234) (0.0202)
Industrial Sector1 0.0443*** 0.0479*** 0.0287*** 0.0510***
(share of industry in GDP) (0.0093) (0.0102) (0.0110) (0.0111)
Financial Development1 1.7364*** 1.6683***
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.4461) (0.4242)
Foreign Liabilities1 -0.5848* -0.80817*
(foreign liabilities/M2) (0.3362) (0.416)
Trade Openness1 -0.7019*** -0.8635***
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.1642) (0.1849)
Political Risk -0.4857*** -0.5910*** -0.6247***
(ICRG composite index) (0.0899) (0.1040) (0.1059)
Democracy 0.0639*** 0.0444** 0.0416*
(Polity2 index) (0.0184) (0.0192) (0.0226)
Years in Office -0.0004
(number of years) (0.0144)
Years Left in Current Term 0.0764*
(number of years left ) (0.0424)
Government Seats in the Legislature -0.0043***
(number of seats) (0.0007)
Executive Special Interest 1.0357**
(dummy =1 if the executive is linked to interests) (0.4203)
Central Bank Governor Stability 0.4415**
(normalized numbers of governor turnovers) (0.1808)
No. Countries 19 19 19 19
No. Observations 589 456 435 428
All regressions include time dummies and constant
Lagged values of variable x are denoted x1.
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Annual
1975 - 2006
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Table 32: Determinants of Exchange Rate Regimes in Latin America (OP with AR(1))
Dependent variable: Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility (Reinhart and Rogoff classification)
Estimation: Ordered Probit Regression with an AR(1) error component
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Money Supply to International Reserves1 0.0176*** 0.0184*** 0.0131* 0.0120*
(M2/Reserves) (0.0058) (0.0069) (0.0079) (0.0072)
Output per Capita 0.1824* 1.1393** 0.9900* 1.0868**
(real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.1118) (0.5390) (0.5975) (0.4752)
Real Interest Rate 0.0489* 0.0581*** 0.1036* 0.1006*
(based on lending rates) (0.0298) (0.0225) (0.0626) (0.0604)
Price instability1 2.0224*** 1.8960*** 2.4031*** 2.5261***
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.7452) (0.5574) (0.8854) (0.8831)
High Inflation -1.4318** -1.3554** -2.0614** -2.1778**
(dummy =1 if inflation in t-1>250) (0.5738) (0.6151) (0.9055) (0.9504)
Agricultural Sector1 0.0378** 0.1668*** 0.1913*** 0.1997***
(share of agriculture in GDP) (0.0191) (0.0426) (0.0575) (0.053)
Industrial Sector1 0.0433*** 0.0386** 0.0325* 0.0326*
(share of industry in GDP) (0.0165) (0.0184) (0.0198) (0.0193)
Financial Development1 2.2066*** 1.9911***
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.8171) (0.7374)
Foreign Liabilities1 -0.5689# -0.9059*
(foreign liabilities/M2) (0.3475) (0.4837)
Trade Openness1 -0.6770 -0.6575**
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.4349) (0.3191)
Political Risk -0.5205*** -0.5849*** -0.6102***
(ICRG composite index) (0.0944) (0.1196) (0.1137)
Democracy 0.0428* 0.0469* 0.0382
(Polity2 index) (0.0232) (0.0251) (0.0309)
Years in Office -0.0058
(number of years) (0.021)
Years Left in Current Term 0.1239*
(number of years left ) (0.064)
Government Seats in the Legislature -0.0037**
(number of seats) (0.0014)
Executive Special Interest 0.6696*
(dummy =1 if the executive is linked to interests) (0.4063)
Central Bank Governor Stability 0.4442
(normalized numbers of governor turnovers) (0.2813)
No. Countries 19 19 19 19
No. Observations 589 456 435 428
All regressions include time dummies and constant
Lagged values of variable x are denoted x1.
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Annual
1975 - 2006
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including institutional and political variables. Therefore, as already discussed in the previous
section, the estimations are more accurate as one goes from Table 30 to Table 32.
The coe¢ cient for the ratio M2/Reserves is signicant and positive, thus conrming
the prior that a high value of this ratio is associated with more exible arrangements. In
fact, this empirical nding conrms results by Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2002) obtained
using the another exchange rate regime classication that countries that tend to have a more
exible exchange rate regime do so keeping a large stock of reserves. Output per capita, a
measure of the size of the economies, turns out also strongly signicant and with a positive
sign what conrms the optimal currency areas theory that small countries choose a more
xed exchange rate regime. The real interest rate is signicant in all specications except in
Column (1) from Table 30. In any case, as expected, a lower real interest rate is reecting
a xed exchange rate regime. Nevertheless, this result needs to be interpreted with caution
since for some periods countries had interest rates that were not market-determined but
government-determined. This may be hiding a more complex policymaking process where
lending and deposits rates are also subject to political competition. Regarding the variables
that capture price instability, results are strong and show a very signicant e¤ect. In fact, the
rst variable, Price instability, is reecting the fact that ination decreases the likelihood of
choosing a xed regime. The high ination dummy, which is negative in all the specications
indicates that whenever faced with a high ination period, the probability of adopting a more
xed regime increases.
The variables representing interest groups, agricultural sector and industrial sector, in
all three estimation techniques and even after controlling for many aspects, are positive
and exhibit a strong signicance -around the one percent level-. Although, these might be
imperfect measures of lobbying power of the tradable sector, results show a nonnegotiable
and consistent signicance31.Therefore, economies with more lobbying power of tradable
sectors tend to choose more exible regimes.
The coe¢ cient associated with the degree of nancial development is always positive and
signicant as a determinant of the exchange rate regime. This is consistent with the view
31It might be the case that in some countries, the tradable sector is heterogeneous and with limited capacity
to be organized as a pressure group. Still, results came out strong enough.
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that a higher level of nancial development is expected to reduce the likelihood of observing
a xed exchange rate regime. The variable foreign liabilities enters negative and signicant
in all the specications accounting for the fact that in countries with dollar liabilities a
more xed exchange rate regime is likely to be chosen. The coe¢ cient for trade openness is
also negative and signicant in all the regressions, indicating that more open economies, as
expected, are more likely to adopt xed exchange rate regimes.
When including a measure of political risk in the regressions, it turns out to be negative
and signicant, at a one percent level, across all specications and techniques. This implies
that situations where institutions are not reliable with a high political risk (more unstable
systems) are associated with more pegged regimes, something that conrms Alesina and
Wagners (2006) results. The democracy variable is also signicant in all specications
except in Column (3) of Table 32; that is when estimated the specication with the probit
panel data model with an AR(1) error component. The positive coe¢ cient conrms the prior
that democracies are more likely to commit to a oating exchange rate regime. Because of
the specications in Columns (2) and (3), this result seems not to be bias by the coinciding
trends toward more democracy that is observed in Latin American countries in the nineties.
The number of years in o¢ ce, one of the measure of political strength, turns out not
signicant in all the specications. Nevertheless, the other two measures of political strength
have a signicant impact in all regressions. As expected, the years left in current term and
the government seats in the legislature have a signicant positive and negative coe¢ cient
respectively. This implies, in the rst case, that the closer to the next election the more
prone would be the government to x the exchange rate. In the other case, a stronger
government, with less fragmentation, tends to pursue a more x regime. The variable that
accounts for the support that the executive might have from special interest appears always
positive and signicant. This result is giving evidence of the fact that the executive may
be inuenced by special interest groups representing the tradable goods sector, since the
positive sign implies a lobbying e¤ect for a more exible exchange rate regime.
Finally, the central bank governor stability variable has a positive and signicant sign in
all regressions from Tables 30, 31 and 32 except in Column (3) from Table 32. This result
suggests that the stability of central bank governors works as a substitute for xed exchange
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rates as a way to provide credibility.
4.4.2 Dynamic Panel Model
A concern from the previous results is the potential endogeneity of the regressor to the
exchange rate. Hence, to avoid the potential bias associated with the maximum likelihood
estimator of the probit models it is possible to use an estimator based on the generalized
method of moments (GMM) developed for dynamic panel data introduced by Holtz-Eakin,
Newey, and Rosen (1990), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995). The
GMM dynamic panel estimator that will be used, controls for the potential endogeneity
of all explanatory variables by using "internal instruments", that is, instruments based on
lagged values of the explanatory variables32. This method does not allow to control for full
endogeneity but for a weak type of it. To be precise, it is assumed that the explanatory
variables are only "weakly exogenous", which means that they can be a¤ected by current
and past realizations of the exchange rate regime but must be uncorrelated with the future
realizations of the error term. In the notation of Arellano and Bond (1991), the weak
exogeneity assumption implies that future innovations of the exchange rate regime do not
a¤ect current values of the regressors33. Eventually, the validity of the weak exogeneity
assumption will be tested. To stay in the Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover
(1995) assumption of T > n the data is averaged over non-overlapping, three-year periods,
for the period 1985-2006.
Table 33 presents the results using the system dynamic panel estimator. In general,
the estimates suggest that the conclusions from Tables 30, 31 and 32 hold. That is, the
exogenous component of the regressors exerts a signicant impact on the change of the
exchange rate regime. For instance, the economic variables such as the ratio M2/Reserves,
output per capita, the real interest rate, the measure of price instability, the degree of
nancial integration, and trade openness have a positive impact on the change of the exchange
rate regime. This implies that has a more exible regime. In terms of the institutional and
32In this type of specication, the dependent variable is now the change in the degree of exchange rate
exibility.
33More details about this estimator can be found in Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover
(1995).
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Table 33: Determinants of Exchange Rate Regimes in Latin America (Arellano-Bond)
Dependent variable: Change in the Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility (Reinhart and Rogoff classification)
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Money Supply to International Reserves1 0.0842** 0.0788*** 0.0711* 0.0716*
(M2/Reserves) (0.0385) (0.0225) (0.0404) (0.0425)
Output per Capita 0.2441 0.3898** 0.4894** 0.7720***
(real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.1806) (0.1943) (0.2308) (0.2941)
Real Interest Rate 0.0167 0.0329* 0.0733** 0.0794*
(based on lending rates) (0.0123) (0.0197) (0.0332) (0.0448)
Price instability 1.1665* 1.5995* 1.6839** 2.6191***
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.6283) (0.7650) (0.7471) (0.8809)
High Inflation -1.3233*** -1.3844*** -2.0281** -2.3611**
(dummy =1 if inflation in t-1>250) (0.4588) (0.5152) (0.9148) (0.9935)
Agricultural Sector 0.3221* 0.4737* 0.6984** 0.6848*
(share of agriculture in GDP) (0.1699) (0.2303) (0.2855) (0.3318)
Industrial Sector 0.2552* 0.3563* 0.3365* 0.3995*
(share of industry in GDP) (0.1349) (0.1805) (0.2020) (0.2344)
Financial Development 0.6798* 0.8325*
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.3825) (0.4122)
Foreign Liabilities -1.0782* -1.2130**
(foreign liabilities/M2) (0.6316) (0.5599)
Trade Openness 0.3601 0.2136
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.2468) (0.2561)
Political Risk -0.7597*** -0.9297* -0.9809*
(ICRG composite index) (0.3224) (0.5304) (0.5465)
Democracy 0.2795** 0.3369** 0.3949***
(Polity2 index) (0.1086) (0.1282) (0.1332)
Years in Office -0.2717
(number of years) (0.1924)
Years Left in Current Term 0.2720*
(number of years left ) (0.1542)
Government Seats in the Legislature 0.0514
(number of seats) (0.0741)
Executive Special Interest 0.4926*
(dummy =1 if the executive is linked to interests) (0.2853)
Central Bank Governor Stability 0.1187
(normalized numbers of governor turnovers) (0.1199)
No. Countries 19 19 19 19
No. Observations 114 114 114 114
Specification Tests (p-values)
   (a) Hansen Test: 0.989 0.832 0.816 0.876
   (b) Serial Correlation:
        First-Order 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.009
        Second-Order 0.540 0.459 0.442 0.495
All regressions include time dummies and constant
Lagged values of variable x are denoted x1.
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Non-overlapping 3-year average
1985 - 2006
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political variables, although results are equivalent as in Tables 30, 31 and 32, some variables
lose signicance. Specically, the number of years in o¢ ce, the government seats in the
legislature, and the stability of central bank governors although they have the expected sign,
consistent with the previous ordered probit estimations, they are no longer signicant.
To assess the validity of the instruments two specication tests were used. The rst
Hansens (1982) J test of over-identication restrictions, tests the exogeneity assumption of
the instruments. The null hypothesis of the Hansens J test should not be rejected and indeed
in all cases it is not. The second test examines the hypothesis that the error term is not
serially correlated. In all regressions, the null hypothesis of no rst order serial correlation
test is rejected and there is no evidence of second order serial correlation.
4.4.3 Robustness Analysis
Tables 34 -36 present the robustness analysis where the benchmark equation specication
is Column (2) from Tables 30-33. In each table, Column (1) reports the results of the
ordered probit model, Column (2) reports the results of the random-e¤ects ordered probit
and Column (3) the results of the ordered probit panel data model with an AR(1) error
component. The rst robustness check implies analyzing whether the main results are robust
to a di¤erent exchange rate classication. Specically, in Table 34 the LYS exchange rate
classication was used. All variables with the exception of the real interest rate and ination
are signicant. In fact, it can be concluded that results hold in general, with the exception
of the real interest rate and ination, which lose signicance. In particular, the lobbying
power of the tradable sectors enters strongly signicant increasing the likelihood of a exible
exchange rate regime.
Going back to the RR classication, Table 35 presents the results when using sectorial
employment instead of value added. That is, the measure used to approximate to the share of
each tradable sector and hence, its lobbying power is labor-based: the amount of employment
as a share of total employment. To be more specic the variables used are agricultural
employment and industrial employment, both as a share of total employment. This measure
captures more precisely how broad-based the importance of the sector is. The drawback
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Table 34: Robustness: Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger classication
Dependent variable: Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger classification)
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3)
Money Supply to International Reserves1 0.0128*** 0.0113** 0.0100**
(M2/Reserves) (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0047)
Output per Capita 0.3455*** 0.7205*** 0.5627*
(real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.1315) (0.1621) (0.3055)
Real Interest Rate 0.0126 0.0112 0.0117
(based on lending rates) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0039)
Price instability1 0.0731 0.0711 0.0304
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.0955) (0.1004) (0.0999)
Agricultural Sector1 0.0391*** 0.0524*** 0.0459*
(share of agriculture in GDP) (0.0146) (0.0172) (0.0264)
Industrial Sector1 0.0294*** 0.0268*** 0.0303**
(share of industry in GDP) (0.0088) (0.0102) (0.0149)
Foreign Liabilities1 -0.4413** -0.3815** -0.3967**
(foreign liabilities/M2) (0.1813) (0.1904) (0.1873)
Political Risk -0.1994*** 0.1143*** -0.1448***
(ICRG composite index) (0.0800) (0.0873) (0.0913)
Democracy 0.0388** 0.0891*** 0.0927***
(Polity2 index) (0.0161) (0.0185) (0.0191)
No. Countries 19 19 19
No. Observations 456 456 456
(1) Ordered Probit Regression
(2) Random-Effects Ordered Probit Regression
(3) Ordered Probit Regression with an AR(1) error component
All regressions include time dummies and constant
Lagged values of variable x are denoted x1.
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Annual
1975 - 2006
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Table 35: Robustness: Employment by Sector
Dependent variable: Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility (Reinhart and Rogoff classification)
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3)
Money Supply to International Reserves1 0.0140** 0.0177** 0.0180***
(M2/Reserves) (0.0058) (0.0071) (0.0062)
Output per Capita 0.1838* 0.2993# 0.4473#
(real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.1109) (0.1829) (0.2736)
Real Interest Rate 0.0568*** 0.0582*** 0.0564**
(based on lending rates) (0.0148) (0.0163) (0.0272)
Price instability1 1.4284*** 1.5332*** 1.5181***
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.2270) (0.2411) (0.5727)
Agricultural Employment1 0.0144*** 0.0156* 0.0195*
(share of agricultural employment) (0.0051) (0.0092) (0.0117)
Industrial Employment1 0.0426*** 0.0518*** 0.0505**
(share of industrial employment) (0.0149) (0.0190) (0.0211)
Foreign Liabilities1 -0.4609* -0.5459* 0.4909
(foreign liabilities/M2) (0.2425) (0.2918) (0.3102)
Political Risk -0.3828*** -0.5492*** -0.5347***
(ICRG composite index) (0.0836) (0.0977) (0.0860)
Democracy 0.0306* 0.0366* 0.0319*
(Polity2 index) (0.0165) (0.0208) (0.0190)
No. Countries 19 19 19
No. Observations 456 456 456
(1) Ordered Probit Regression
(2) Random-Effects Ordered Probit Regression
(3) Ordered Probit Regression with an AR(1) error component
All regressions include time dummies and constant
Lagged values of variable x are denoted x1.
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Annual
1975 - 2006
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Table 36: Robustness: No Free-Falling Category
Dependent variable: Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility (Reinhart and Rogoff classification)
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3)
Money Supply to International Reserves1 0.0089 0.0228** 0.0197*
(M2/Reserves) (0.0094) (0.0101) (0.0115)
Output per Capita 0.7903*** 1.6102*** 1.5477**
(real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.1640) (0.1909) (0.6340)
Real Interest Rate 0.0121*** 0.0044 0.0030
(based on lending rates) (0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0081)
Price instability1 1.8335*** 2.5165*** 2.6176***
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.5048) (0.8479) (0.9578)
Agricultural Sector1 0.1030*** 0.2670*** 0.2678***
(share of agriculture in GDP) (0.0195) (0.0261) (0.0621)
Industrial Sector1 0.0907*** 0.0790*** 0.0789***
(share of industry in GDP) (0.0145) (0.0153) (0.0294)
Foreign Liabilities1 -0.7151* -0.2819 -0.4233
(foreign liabilities/M2) (0.4016) (0.4090) (0.6593)
Political Risk -0.3900*** -0.5167*** -0.5553***
(ICRG composite index) (0.0990) (0.1052) (0.1176)
Democracy -0.0073 0.0456* 0.0540*
(Polity2 index) (0.0228) (0.0239) (0.0286)
No. Countries 19 19 19
No. Observations 345 345 345
(1) Ordered Probit Regression
(2) Random-Effects Ordered Probit Regression
(3) Ordered Probit Regression with an AR(1) error component
All regressions include time dummies and constant
Lagged values of variable x are denoted x1.
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Annual
1975 - 2006
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is that sample is reduced due to data availability. All regressors are signicant with the
expected sign, thus, results hold in general, with the only exception of the high ination
periods in Column (3), which loses signicance.
Table 36 reports the results of the benchmark equation, using the RR classication, but
excluding the "free-falling" exchange rate regimes. These are the years when the exchange
rate is in a downward spiral during a nancial crisis or during price liberalization. Therefore,
the sample is reduced even more to 345 observations. With the exception of the real interest
rate and the high ination dummy that lose signicance when using more accurate estimators
-Columns (2) and (3)-, the results imply that the conclusions remain the same as before.
In summary, Tables 34-36 suggest that the results are robust to changes in the speci-
cation of the model.
4.4.4 Additional E¤ects
To account for a more broad analysis of the exchange rate regime determinants the specica-
tion will need to include variables related to the international nancial integration situation
of each country. In other words a more systematic analysis to capture the nancial linkages
on the choice of regime. In particular, since a rapid process of nancial deepening and inno-
vation has gradually reduced the e¤ectiveness of capital controls, with the same consequences
in terms of the monetary policy-exchange rate stability dilemma. The nancial variables to
be included in the specication are international nancial integration and portfolio ows.
The variable international nancial integration is Chinn and Itos (2006) measure of de jure
capital account openness, usually referred as KAOpen. This measure is available for 185
countries since 1970 and it is based on four binary dummy variables reported in the IMFs
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions with a higher number
indicating a lower overall level of restrictions. Portfolio ows is the sum of the absolute value
of inward and outward ows of portfolio investments and nancial derivatives as a share of
GDP: in other words, a measure of de facto capital account openness. Moreover, these two
variables are expected to enter the regressions with a negative sign, implying that a greater
degree of international nancial integration decreases the likelihood of choosing a more ex-
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Table 37: Additional E¤ects: Accounting for Other Exchange Rate Determinants Theories
Dependent variable: Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility (Reinhart and Rogoff classification)
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2) (3)
Money Supply to International Reserves1 0.0418** 0.0217 0.0532**
(M2/Reserves) (0.0169) (0.0177) (0.0211)
Output per Capita 1.0858*** 1.2920*** 1.7417***
(real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.2006) (0.2216) (0.6558)
Real Interest Rate 0.0091* -0.0073 -0.0009
(based on lending rates) (0.0049) (0.0058) (0.0078)
Price instability1 0.5891 2.0922** 1.8933**
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.8081) (0.9068) (0.9444)
Agricultural Sector1 0.1131*** 0.2046*** 0.3014***
(share of agriculture in GDP) (0.0230) (0.0291) (0.0739)
Industrial Sector1 0.0800*** 0.1090*** 0.0964***
(share of industry in GDP) (0.0167) (0.0206) (0.0288)
Financial Development1 2.8366*** 3.6097*** 3.7852***
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.5314) (0.6072) (0.8903)
Foreign Liabilities1 -0.9247* -1.3190** -1.2263*
(foreign liabilities/M2) (0.4991) (0.5406) (0.6652)
Trade Openness1 -0.6617*** -0.6830*** -0.7589*
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.1928) (0.2232) (0.4625)
International Financial Integration -0.3251*** -0.2461*** -0.2019**
(Chinn-Ito, capital account variable) (0.0561) (0.0643) (0.0889)
Portfolio Flows1 -0.0148 -0.0398** -0.0247
(Inflows+outflows/GDP, in logs) (0.0183) (0.0199) (0.0236)
Terms of Trade Shocks -1.3518* -1.4039 -1.5059
(standard deviation of the 5-year window of ToT) (0.7610) (0.8990) (0.9425)
Political Risk -0.6881*** -0.6918*** -0.7092***
(ICRG composite index) (0.1328) (0.1403) (0.1709)
Democracy 0.1060*** 0.1841*** 0.1706***
(Polity2 index) (0.0356) (0.0381) (0.0583)
Years in Office 0.0026* 0.0025* 0.0021
(number of years) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0025)
Veto Players1 0.0135 0.0147 -0.0307
(number of veto players) (0.0603) (0.0664) (0.0772)
No. Countries 19 19 19
No. Observations 294 294 294
(1) Ordered Probit Regression
(2) Random-Effects Ordered Probit Regression
(3) Ordered Probit Regression with an AR(1) error component
All regressions include time dummies and constant
Lagged values of variable x are denoted x1.
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Annual
1975 - 2006
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ible exchange rate system. These results are expected since Latin American countries are
highly dollarized economies that are more prone to x their currency due to the potentially
negative e¤ect of sharp depreciations.
For this last specication two more variables are included to balance the inclusion of
more nancial variables: terms of trade shocks and veto players. Terms of trade shocks is
computed as the standard deviation of terms of trade changes over the previous ve years
and captures the incidence of real shocks. Veto players is a variable of the number of veto
players, actors whose approval is necessary for a shift in policy from the status quo. The
higher the score, the greater is the policy constraints. This variable is included as a measure
of political constraints of the executive and hence as another institutional variable of the
model.
The results are shown in Table 37 and are in line with the previous ndings. That is,
for the variables already analyzed in previous specications. Regarding the new variables
included international nancial integration and portfolio ows they appear with the expected
negative sign implying that the propensity to peg is higher in countries with high levels of
nancial linkages. Again, this might be a result that characterizes a highly dollarized region.
Terms of trade exhibits the expected sign but only signicant in the rst specication -
Column (1)-, hence this variable turns out relatively uninformative. Finally, veto players is
not signicant in any regression implying that this variable is not incorporating any relevant
information to this specication.
4.4.5 Persistence and the Dynamic Ordered Probit Framework
It can be argued that many of the variables used in the analysis are only meaningful in
relation to the status-quo. In other words, that whatever regime you have on time t  
1, you will be likely to have at t. This type of behavior may occur for several reasons
inherent in the institutional framework. Besides the reasons why, the specication should
take into account the persistent nature of exchange rate regimes. This allows for correlation
between the individual e¤ects and the means of the regressors. For this purpose, a dynamic
ordered probit will be estimated. This particular specication will include previous exchange
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rate states in order to capture the state dependence and the model can be interpreted
as a rst-order Markov process. Hence, the dynamic ordered probit model will allow for
state dependence and account for the initial conditions problem as discussed by Heckman
(1981) and Wooldridge (2005). In fact, the procedure suggested by Wooldridge (2005) to
deal with the problem of initial conditions will be adopted. This problem is due to the
generic feature of the panel that individuals (countries) inherit di¤erent unobserved and
time-invariant characteristics which a¤ect outcomes in every period. The general dynamic
specication estimated can be written as:
yit = Xit + yit 1 + yi0 + i + it
where yit 1 is a vector of lagged values of the dependent variable and yi0 is the ini-
tial period value. i is an individual-specic and time invariant component and it is the
disturbance term34.
Table 38 presents the results from the estimations. Using category 2 -which refers to
regimes that vary from a pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to
+/-2% to a de factor crawling peg- as the reference category, lagged dummies are introduced
to account for the fact that exchange rate regimes may exert autocorrelation. The results
show that the estimates are similar to those reported in the previous section in the following
respects: all variables retain their signs and signicance as in the previous specications. The
lagged categories of the dependent variable -included to formally test for state dependence-
are highly statistically signicant. As stated before, if a country has a certain exchange rate
regime in t 1 most likely it will remain in that category in period t. In fact, the coe¢ cients
on lagged exchange rate regime show a clear gradient in the magnitude of the coe¢ cients as
one moves from an exchange rate category of 5 to 1. The estimated coe¢ cients for the initial
period observations are signicant and imply a positive gradient (slope) in the estimated
e¤ects as one moves from the xed to the more exible initial category. This implies that
there is a positive correlation between the initial period observations and unobserved latent
exchange rate classication.
34Time dummies are also included in the specication.
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Table 38: Robustness: Dynamic Ordered Probit with Wooldridge Solution for the Initial
Condition
Dependent variable: Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility (Reinhart and Rogoff classification)
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
(1) (2)
Money Supply to International Reserves1 0.0109* 0.0164***
(M2/Reserves) (0.0056) (0.0063)
Output per Capita 0.3463** 0.3244**
(real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.1423) (0.1461)
Real Interest Rate 0.0279** 0.0258*
(based on lending rates) (0.0135) (0.0155)
Price instability1 0.0321* 0.0598***
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.0164) (0.0178)
Agricultural Sector1 0.0244** 0.0441***
(share of agriculture in GDP) (0.0104) (0.0115)
Industrial Sector1 0.0294*** 0.0268***
(share of industry in GDP) (0.0088) (0.0102)
Foreign Liabilities1 -0.4248* -0.4724*
(foreign liabilities/M2) (0.2560) (0.2663)
Political Risk -0.2811*** -0.3814***
(ICRG composite index) (0.0907) (0.0943)
Democracy 0.0333* 0.0314*
(Polity2 index) (0.0178) (0.0186)
Exchange Rate Flexibility1 -1.1134*** -1.0559***
(category=1) (0.2391) (0.2439)
Exchange Rate Flexibility1 0.9666*** 0.6179***
(category=3) (0.1899) (0.2021)
Exchange Rate Flexibility1 1.8214*** 1.5085***
(category=4) (0.1801) (0.1914)
Exchange Rate Flexibility1 2.1231*** 1.6975***
(category=5) (0.2191) (0.2348)
Exchange Rate Flexibility0 -0.1850* -0.2016*
(category=1) (0.1091) (0.1184)
Exchange Rate Flexibility0 0.2319* 0.2696*
(category=3) (0.1404) (0.1595)
Exchange Rate Flexibility0 0.4331* 0.5310*
(category=4) (0.2596) (0.2800)
Exchange Rate Flexibility0 0.4314* 0.7986***
(category=5) (0.2357) (0.2602)
No. Countries 19 19
No. Observations 456 456
(1) Ordered Probit Regression
(2) Random-Effects Ordered Probit Regression
All regressions include time dummies and constant
Lagged values (t-1) of variable x are denoted x1.
Initial period observations of variable x are reported as x0.
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Annual
1983 - 2006
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To sum up, results conrm the evidence presented in the previous section that agricultural
and industrial lobbying increase the likelihood of choosing a more exible exchange rate
regime. Furthermore, allowing for the persistence of exchange rate regimes by estimating
the model in a dynamic ordered probit setting, resulted in highly signicant lagged variables
reinforcing the beliefs that previous exchange rate regimes help "predicting" current regimes.
4.4.6 Relevance of the Results
Although the previous estimations give information regarding the sign of the impact on the
exchange rate regime, it is important to extend the analysis to account for the nonlinear
e¤ects of the di¤erent regressors. In fact, these e¤ects can vary depending on the value of
the explanatory variables at which they are measured. Figures 17 and 18 address this point
by computing the cumulative probabilities for the di¤erent regimes spanning the support of
each explanatory variable. This exercise is conducted based on the estimates reported in
Column (4) of Table 32 computing the cumulative probability for each independent variable
that vary over a specied range while the others are held constant at their means.
From Figure 17, the size of the countries plays a signicant role where small countries
are more likely to choose a xed exchange rate regime. The probability of adopting a xed
exchange rate decreases with the real interest rate, the M2/Reserves ratio, ination and
nancial development where nonlinearities seem to play a signicant role. In other words,
moving to a higher real interest rate, a higher M2/Reserves ratio, a higher ination and a
higher degree of nancial development, decrease the probability of choosing a xed exchange
rate regime. Moving to the key variables regarding the lobbying pressure of the agricultural
sector and industrial sector, it can be concluded that the greater the sector is, the greater
the reduction in the probability of choosing a xed regime. It is remarkable how similar both
graphs are.
From Figure 18, the probability of xing the exchange rate increases with the amount
of foreign liabilities, the degree of openness, political risk, and the number of government
seats in the legislature. On the other hand, the level of democracy, the number of years left
for the executive in the current term and the measure of stability of central bank governors
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Figure 17: E¤ects on the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
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Figure 18: E¤ects on the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime (cont.)
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decrease the probability of choosing for a xed exchange rate regime. In all these cases, there
are no clear nonlinearities a¤ecting the regime. Finally, as expected from the regressions,
the variable years in o¢ ce seems to be negligible since it does not have a clear e¤ect on the
choice of exchange rate regime.
4.5 REGIME VS LEVEL DECOMPOSITION DISCUSSION
Until this section the discussion has been centered in the exchange rate regime. As with the
regime decision, the choice on the level of the exchange rate has distributional and electoral
implications. In fact, governments cannot directly set the real exchange rate, but they can
a¤ect trends in the real exchange rate over a period long enough to be of political and
economic signicance.
In principle, there is no clear economic guideline as to the appropriate level of the real
exchange rate: having a more depreciated or appreciated currency have domestic distributive
consequences where some of the implications are nested with the discussion about the regime
choice. The currency preferences of agents in an economy are a¤ected by economic factors,
and their ability to turn these preferences into policy is a¤ected by political institutions.
Moreover, it is the combination of interests around the level of the exchange rate that make
political institutions within which they are expressed, particularly important to explaining
policy outcomes. This is because the real exchange rate a¤ects broad aggregates like national
income, prices, growth rates, etc.
Since the literature on theoretical models of real exchange rate determination is abun-
dant, in this section the focus will be on the empirical application of these models and its
connection with special interest groups. In other words, this empirical exercise consists of
estimating an equation on the relationship between the real exchange rate and a limited
number of fundamentals which have a theoretical inuence on the level of real exchange
rate. The recent empirical literature on real exchange rates in Latin America suggests that
only a restricted number of variables seem to inuence the level of real exchange rate35.
35See for example, Edwards (1989), Gay and Pellegrini (2003), Alberola (2003), Garegnagni and Escude
(2005) and Carrera and Restout (2008).
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These variables include a Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect, government spending, terms of trade,
the degree of openness and capital inows. Based on the previous discussion, the empirical
approach of this section will include as another determinant of the level of real exchange rate
the special interest groups variables, the size of the tradable sectors.
The most common denition of the real exchange rate is the nominal exchange rate
adjusted by price levels:
es =
"sP

s
Ps
where " is the nominal exchange rate, P  is the foreign price level and P is the domestic
price level. Under the assumption that the law of one price holds for tradable goods -i.e.
prices of the tradables will be equal all around the world-, the real exchange rate dened on
the basis of tradable and non-tradable goods distinction can be mathematically represented
as:
es =
PT;s
PN;s
=
"sP

T;s
PN;s
where PT and P T are the domestic and foreign prices of tradable goods and PN is the price
of the non tradable goods36. This denition is called the internal real exchange rate and
is appropriate for developing countries whose exports are predominantly primary products
subject to the law of one price. As noted by Edwards (1989), this denition provides a
consistent index of the countrys tradable sector competitiveness and also guides the resource
allocation since an increase in es causes a shifting of resources away from the non tradable
sector to the tradable one. Hence, in this denition, the decline of es indicates the real
appreciation of the domestic currency. In the Balassa-Samuelson model the real exchange
rate depends entirely on productivity di¤erentials between the tradable and non tradable
goods sectors37. The e¤ect claims that an increase in traded sector productivity relative to
non traded sector implies a real appreciation of the domestic currency. Thus a negative sign
is expected. The impact of public demand on the real exchange rate is traditionally linked
to the hypothesis that government spending is mainly focus on non tradable goods. Hence,
36This measure of real exchange rate may have some aws: mainly the fact that purchasing power parity
might not hold and di¤erences in incomes might not be thoroughly taken into account. On the other hand
it has the great advantage of data availability without relying on weighting wholesale prices in a country by
country basis.
37That is why the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect refers to the productivity e¤ect.
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an increase in public consumption will raise total demand for non traded goods and thus
raising its relative price. Therefore, a decline in the real exchange rate level is expected. The
terms of trade e¤ect on the level of real exchange rate is ambiguous since an improvement
of the terms of trade generates two contrary e¤ects: income versus substitution38. Since a
greater degree of openness to trade is expected to generate a real appreciation of the domestic
currency since in a more open economy there is a convergence of international prices which
limits pressure on the real exchange rate, a positive sign is expected. Finally, it is expected
that capital inows will have an appreciation e¤ect on the domestic currency. The intuition is
the following: a foreign capital surge a¤ects the economy by raising the domestic absorption
which leads to an increase in consumption demand for both tradable and non tradable goods.
Thus, on non tradable goods, this excess demand has to match to a proportional increase of
non tradable supply in order to ensure market equilibrium leading to a rise of its price.
Some regularities about preferences over the currency level are related to preferences
about the regime. The fact that the tradable goods sector in Latin America is basically
structured by producers of commodities and manufactures entails that it is very sensitive to
the level of exchange rate and hence a exible exchange rate regime and a tendency for a
depreciated currency reects its preferences. Thus, a positive coe¢ cient should be expected.
Furthermore, the e¤ect of the exchange rate regime on the real exchange rate level
depends highly on the region of interest. In particular, in Latin America, after a history of
hyperination and exchange rate-based stabilization programs, the stylized facts documented
by Calvo and Vegh (1993) -after a non credible (xed) exchange rate regime stabilization, a
boom of consumption of non tradable goods follows-.implies that xed exchange rate regimes
will lead to an increase of the real exchange rate and hence a positive sign.
4.5.1 Decomposition Exercise
This section will decompose the e¤ect of the special interest groups on the level of real ex-
change rate into two channels: a direct channel and an indirect exchange rate regime channel
e¤ect. The latter e¤ect captures the choice of exchange rate regime determinants discussed
38Therefore, the overall impact of terms of trade depends on which of these e¤ects dominates.
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in the previous sections. The main advantage of this approach is that it quantitatively allows
comparing the expected total e¤ect coming from a direct e¤ect over the level of real exchange
rate and an indirect e¤ect through the exchange rate regime. The assumption behind this ex-
ercise is that the lobbying groups can pressure enough not only on the policymaking process
of the exchange rate regime but on the discussion about the level.
The methodology used here consists of a treatment e¤ects model as described by Heck-
man (1978). This technique, largely used in labor economics, has recently been applied to
growth regressions by Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2006) and Rodriguez (2008). The
empirical strategy will consist in adding to a real exchange rate determinants regression -that
includes the special interest groups variables- a propensity to oat dummy39. Moreover, the
propensity to oat variable will be considered endogenous and depending on the specication
of Columns (4) from Tables 1-3. This way, the impact of the lobbying power of the tradable
sectors on the level of real exchange rate is composed of two e¤ects: (i) a direct e¤ect con-
ditional on an augmented set of control variables that includes the agricultural sector and
the industrial sector, and (ii) an indirect e¤ect reecting the e¤ects associated with a higher
propensity to oat the exchange rate. A more detailed description of how this methodology
ts in this type of exercise can be found in Rodriguez (2008).
4.5.1.1 (Two-Step) Estimation Procedure As described in Maddala (1983), this
setup can be estimated in a two-step procedure40. The rst step implies the estimation
of a probit model and the construction of the hazard rate hit41. The hazard rate, or inverse
mills ration in the notation of Greene (2002), is a measure of the impact of the self-selection.
In the second step, the real exchange rate regression is estimated including, as a additional
regressor, the estimated hazard rate hit: Therefore, the total e¤ect of special interest groups
measured by the size of the tradable sectors is the sum of a direct e¤ect -the coe¢ cients
associated with these variables in the second step-, and an indirect e¤ect due to a change in
39The propensity to oat dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if country i is classied as greater or equal
to 8 in period t according to the Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) exchange rate classication. Furthermore, when
the exchange rate regime classication is below or equal to 7, the regime is classied as xed and the variable
takes the value of 0.
40Actually, Heckman (1978) and Maddala (1983) show that the model can also be jointly estimated by a
maximum likelihood procedure.
41For more details, see Rodriguez (2008).
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the probability (propensity) to oat.
4.5.2 Decomposition Results
The main results are presented in Columns (1)-(4) from Tables 39 and 40 and can be summa-
rized as follow. First, from the real exchange rate level equation, all variables are signicant
and have the expected sign. The only exception is government spending that has the correct
sign but appears not signicant in all four specications. In particular, the positive sign of
the agricultural and industrial sector variables can be interpreted in the following way: an
increase in the lobbying power of the tradable sectors tends to depreciate the domestic cur-
rency by increasing the real exchange rate level. Second, the propensity to oat, estimated
through the rst stage probit equation, has a positive and signicant impact on the real
exchange rate level. In other words, moving from a xed exchange rate regime to a exible
one has a depreciation e¤ect on the domestic currency by increasing the real exchange rate
level. Third, as it was concluded in the previous sections, the agricultural and the industrial
sectors increase the propensity to have a exible regime. There are some variables, like the
ratio of M2/Reserves, foreign liabilities, the number of years left in the current term, and
the government seats in the legislature that lose signicance in this framework. Finally,
the hazard rate, which measures the impact of self-selection, is signicant, implying that
self-selection plays a role and the method is the appropriate.
From the advantages and disadvantages of both having a more xed or exible exchange
rate, as a practical matter, in many countries this e¤ect has resulted in overvaluation of the
real exchange rate. To account for this aspect -and for robustness- a measure of overvaluation
of the real exchange rate is constructed. Choosing a base year for each country such that
purchasing power parity (PPP) holds, log deviations from the e¤ective exchange rate are
computed42. The results are presented in Columns (5)-(8) from Tables 39 and 40. With a few
exceptions, all variables considered in the second stage are signicant and with the expected
sign across all di¤erent specications43. Note than a positive sign implies an overvaluation
42That is for each country: [es   e] : More details are provided in Tables 28 and 29.
43Output per capita is the exception that while still being signicant its sign changed reversing our
argument.
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Table 39: Determinants of the Real Exchange Rate Level in Latin America
Estimation: Treatment Effect Model, Two Step Estimation
(Robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients)
Period:
Unit of observation:
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Real Exchange Rate Equation
Government Burden -0.3845 -0.1947 -0.1862 -0.2555 -0.0094 -0.0126 -0.0164* -0.0164*
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (0.4713) (0.4857) (0.4686) (0.4739) (0.0074) (0.0083) (0.0085) (0.0086)
Output per Capita -2.2714*** -2.4633*** -2.3835*** -2.8114*** 2.1572*** 1.7845** 2.3217*** 2.7482***
(real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.4505) (0.4738) (0.4248) (0.4225) (0.6711) (0.7912) (0.7933) (0.7677)
Terms of Trade1 -3.0859*** -2.3786*** -2.5628*** -2.8405*** -0.9656*** -0.7261*** -0.7414*** -0.6222***
(terms of trade index, in logs) (0.5713) (0.6912) (0.7054) (0.7734) (0.1892) (0.1171) (0.1294) (0.1408)
Trade Openness1 1.4721*** 1.1966*** 1.6562*** 1.5777*** 1.7251*** 1.7352*** 1.5645** 1.6745***
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.3464) (0.3492) (0.3460) (0.3442) (0.5431) (0.5947) (0.6455) (0.6259)
Foreign Direct Investment1 -1.5246** -0.9771 -1.3518* -1.6069** -0.2343* -0.1639 -0.2768** -0.2515*
(net foreign direct investment, in logs) (0.7715) (0.7833) (0.7440) (0.7554) (0.1221) (0.1347) (0.1363) (0.1383)
Portfolio Flows1 -0.7203* 0.4903 -0.7081* -0.7953** -0.5122* -0.5097 -0.5123 -0.6125*
(Inflows+outflows/GDP, in logs) (0.3985) (0.3832) (0.3676) (0.3728) (0.3062) (0.3165) (0.3267) (0.3368)
Agricultural Sector1 0.5954 1.2773** 1.4862*** 1.8953*** 0.4110 1.1043** 1.2267*** 1.4221***
(share of agriculture in GDP) (0.5393) (0.5572) (0.4849) (0.4824) (0.3781) (0.4693) (0.4790) (0.5288)
Industrial Sector1 0.4383 0.7309* 0.9822*** 1.3103*** 0.3019 0.4027* 0.4123* 0.4570*
(share of industry in GDP) (0.4140) (0.3739) (0.2951) (0.2842) (0.2262) (0.2312) (0.2515) (0.2652)
Propensity to Float 3.0762*** 3.3925*** 2.6821*** 2.1225*** 1.2893*** 1.6906*** 1.0924*** 1.1476***
(dummy based on RR classification) (0.9743) (0.9591) (0.9610) (0.7681) (0.2623) (0.2282) (0.1791) (0.1603)
First-Step Hazard -1.4540** -1.9524** -0.8076* -0.6791* -0.1968* -0.2877** 0.2276** 0.1696*
(0.7152) (0.6608) (0.4893) (0.4018) (0.1201) (0.1392) (0.1123) (0.1025)
1975 - 2006
Annual
Real Effective Exchange Rate
1975 - 2006
Annual
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation
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Table 40: Determinants of the Real Exchange Rate Level in Latin America (cont.)
Period:
Unit of observation:
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B: Treatment (Probit) Equation
Dependent variable: Propensity to Float
Money Supply to International Reserves1 0.0148 0.0132 -0.0037 -0.0003
(M2/Reserves) (0.0118) (0.0130) (0.0153) (0.0161)
Output per Capita 0.3828** 0.6924*** 0.8820*** 1.0200***
(real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.1553) (0.1786) (0.2091) (0.2255)
Real Interest Rate 0.0226 0.0200 0.0256** 0.0230*
(based on lending rates) (0.0254) (0.0300) (0.0131) (0.0141)
Price instability1 1.0694*** 0.9472** 2.4789*** 2.1847***
(inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.3799) (0.4083) (0.8058) (0.8340)
High Inflation -0.8689 -1.2009** -2.0412** -1.4993*
(dummy =1 if inflation in t-1>250) (0.5627) (0.6030) (0.8800) (0.8961)
Agricultural Sector1 0.0400** 0.0408* 0.0485** 0.0644**
(share of agriculture in GDP) (0.0181) (0.0214) (0.0232) (0.0252)
Industrial Sector1 0.0462*** 0.0600*** 0.0542*** 0.0541***
(share of industry in GDP) (0.0129) (0.0147) (0.0168) (0.0180)
Financial Development1 1.7074*** 1.2342**
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.5611) (0.5957)
Foreign Liabilities1 0.3949 0.0514
(foreign liabilities/M2) (0.5422) (0.6266)
Trade Openness1 0.2196 -0.4120*
(exports+imports / GDP, in logs) (0.1948) (0.2372)
Political Risk -0.3561*** -0.4398*** -0.3998***
(ICRG composite index) (0.1237) (0.1414) (0.1435)
Democracy 0.0138 0.0133 0.0550**
(Polity2 index) (0.0240) (0.0293) (0.0273)
Years in Office 0.0208
(number of years) (0.0220)
Years Left in Current Term 0.0022
(number of years left ) (0.0569)
Government Seats in the Legislature 0.0015
(number of seats) (0.0020)
Executive Special Interest 1.3601***
(dummy =1 if the executive is linked to SIG) (0.4609)
Central Bank Governor Stability 0.3286**
(normalized numbers of governor turnovers) (0.1627)
Rho -0.467 -0.633 -0.298 0.178 -0.428 -0.561 0.449 0.347
Sigma 3.113 3.084 2.707 2.692 0.460 0.513 0.507 0.489
Lambda -1.454 -1.952 -0.807 -0.679 -0.197 -0.288 0.227 0.170
No. Observations 421 380 359 352 421 380 359 352
All regressions include time dummies and constant
Lagged values of variable x are denoted x1.
*** means significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (# at 11%)
Real Effective Exchange Rate
1975 - 2006
Annual
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation
1975 - 2006
Annual
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Table 41: Decomposition E¤ects of the Tradable Sectors on the Exchange Rate Level
(Based on the Results from Table 39)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Agriculture
   Direct Effect 0.60% 1.28% 1.49% 1.90% 0.41% 1.10% 1.23% 1.42%
   Indirect Effect 0.05% 0.09% 0.11% 0.13% 0.05% 0.09% 0.11% 0.13%
   Total Effect 0.65% 1.37% 1.60% 2.03% 0.46% 1.20% 1.34% 1.55%
È2 test - Total Effect = 0
  (p-value) 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.08
Industry
   Direct Effect 0.44% 0.73% 0.98% 1.31% 0.30% 0.40% 0.41% 0.46%
   Indirect Effect 0.08% 0.17% 0.18% 0.18% 0.08% 0.17% 0.18% 0.18%
   Total Effect 0.52% 0.90% 1.17% 1.49% 0.39% 0.58% 0.60% 0.64%
È2 test - Total Effect = 0
  (p-value) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.07
where the e¤ective exchange rate is greater than its PPP value implying a more depreciated
domestic currency. Even in terms of magnitude, results are similar to using real e¤ective
exchange rate level. Thus, results regarding the level and regime hold even when using the
real exchange rate overvaluation measure. Table 41 reports the decomposition e¤ects of
the tradable sectors on the real exchange rate level and overvaluation where each column
corresponds to the di¤erent specications from Tables 39 and 40. Since the probit model is
non-linear, the partial e¤ect of a change in one variable on the propensity to oat depends on
the value of the other variables. The focus of this exercise it to analyze the agricultural and
industrial sectors variables while the rest of the variables are hold at their means. For the
di¤erent specications, the total lobbying e¤ect of the agricultural sector is on average 1.41%
of the annual real exchange rate level (1.14% for the overvalution measure), while the same
e¤ect from the industrial sector is on average 1.0% (0.6% for the overvaluation measure).
It is worth noting that there is considerable variation between specications: for the real
exchange rate level, in Column (1) the total e¤ect is, on average 0.7% while in Column (4)
it is, on average, 2.0%.
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4.6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper the political economy of exchange rate policy in Latin America is analyzed.
From the political model, the main implication is that the optimal exchange rate will be
determined by the economic parameters -such as interest rate, productivity, money demand-
, the distribution of agents and special interest groups in the economy, and the capacity of
special interest groups to inuence policymakers. This has at least two more implications.
The rst one is that agents are di¤erentially a¤ected after a change in the exchange rate:
this is in fact relevant for non-traded goods producers that are consuming traded goods and
whose price will be distorted by any change in the exchange rate. The second one is that
since the impact on the tradable and non-tradable goods sector is clear and di¤erential,
then the exchange rate became a policy variable that is the subject of political competition
through special interest groups potentially associated with those sectors.
In the second part of the paper, the main implications from the model are tested empiri-
cally for Latin America. The data suggest that political economy factors have played a role in
shaping exchange rate policy. In fact, special interests also appear to a¤ect currency policy,
especially as the tradable goods sectors, represented by the agricultural and manufacturing
sectors, promote more exible exchange rate regimes to maintain the competitiveness of lo-
cally produced tradables. Furthermore, there is also evidence that less stable central bank
governors and less fragmented governments with political power tend to x the exchange
rate. The results are robust for di¤erent specications, methodologies and variables.
Finally, a decomposition exercise was performed to analyze the interaction between the
regime and the level of the exchange rate. Results conrmed the importance of the tradable
sector in the determination of not only the regime but the level of the exchange rate.
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